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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

ESSAYS IN REAL ESTATE SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

by

Zifeng Feng

Florida International University, 2019

Miami, Florida

Professor Zhonghua Wu, Major Professor

This dissertation consists of three essays that examine aspects of real estate securities and
financial institutions.
The first essay examines the relations between Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT)
efficiency and operational performance, risk, and stock return. REIT-level operational
efficiency is measured as the ratio of operational expenses to revenue, where a higher
operational efficiency ratio (OER) indicates a less efficient REIT. For a sample of U.S.
equity REITs, operational performance, measured by return on assets as well as return on
equity, is negatively associated with previous-year operational efficiency ratios. Results
further show that more efficient REITs have lower levels of credit risk and total risk.
Perhaps most important, empirical evidence shows that the cross-sectional stock return of
REITs is partially explained by operational efficiency and that a portfolio consisting of
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highly efficient REITs earns, on average, a higher cumulative stock return than a portfolio
consisting of low efficiency REITs.
The second essay analyzes the impact of technology investment on firm performance and
market value using a unique dataset on technology spending by U.S. banks. It first
documents that banks increasingly invested in technology from 2000-2017 and did not cut
technology spending even when experiencing negative performance shocks. Meanwhile,
operating performance and market value are positively correlated with lagged technology
spending, and the positive correlation is primarily driven by large banks. Interestingly,
while technology spending increases asset turnover, it only improves the profit margin for
large banks.
The third essay investigates the impact of technology investment on bank production and
employment. It documents that technology input on average contributes about 12.85% to
the increase in value-added output of banks from 2000-2017, according to the estimation
from a firm-level production function correcting for endogenous input choices. Moreover,
bank employment and tasks are positively correlated with their lagged technology spending
in the cross-section, supporting the task-based framework of Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018). These results indicate that technology capital is highly productive to US banks and
use of technology generally lead to more bank employment at the firm-level, which is likely
due to an increased amount of tasks created by new technology.
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1. Chapter I: REIT Operational Efficiency: Performance, Risk, and Return

1.1.Introduction
The literature focused on REITs is extensive. Most studies, however, focus on one
of several broad areas including diversification benefits, acquisition strategies, differences
in equity and mortgage investments, corporate governance and capital structure. 1 Few
studies investigate relations between revenues from real estate assets and the expenses
needed to generate those revenues. Specifically, little work has been applied to (1) the
appropriate classification of REIT revenues and expenses, such as gross rent, net rent,
depreciation, amortization and tenant pass-throughs; and (2) exploring the performance
and value implications associated with these relations. In the present research, measures of
REIT operational efficiency similar to those found in the banking literature are introduced.
These measures of efficiency, linking various types of operational expenses to revenues,
are defined within a REIT context. The impact of these measures on REIT operational
performance, risk and stock return is concurrently explored.
Efficiency in banking and financial institutions has been investigated in detail. The
most common efficiency ratio found in the literature, and used by analysts and bank
executives, is defined as a bank’s non-interest expenses divided by revenue or net income
(Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005; Jacewitz and Kupiec, 2012).
In the Quarterly Banking Profile from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), efficiency is defined as “noninterest expense less amortization of intangible assets

1

See Brounen and de Koning (2013) and Baker and Chinloy (2014) for more details.
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as a percent of net interest income plus noninterest income”. The FDIC further explains
that “this ratio measures the proportion of net operational revenue that are absorbed by
overhead expense, so that a lower value indicates greater efficiency.”2 REITs are, in fact,
as financial institutions in many ways. The National Association of Real Estate Investment
Trusts (NAREIT) defines a REIT as “A company that owns or finances income-producing
real estate. Modeled after mutual funds, REITs provide investors of all types of
regular income streams, diversification and long-term capital appreciation. REITs typically
pay out all of their taxable income as dividends to shareholders.” 3 A REIT is an
intermediary that holds a portfolio of real estate assets and passes income and cash flows
to its shareholders, and its value should be related to how efficient it is in providing this
service.
While some REIT studies focus on technical efficiency, X-efficiency and
economies of scale (Kuhle, Walther and Wurtzebach, 1986; Anderson, Lewis,
and Springer, 2000; Anderson, Fok, Springer, and Webb, 2002; Devaney and Weber, 2005),
this study employs an efficiency ratio that is based on the banking efficiency concept
described above. The efficiency ratios are used to measure the amount of revenue REITs
generate relative to operational expenses. Specifically, two REIT operational efficiency
ratios are defined as: a) total expenses less real estate depreciation and amortization
expense to total revenue and b) total expenses less real estate depreciation and amortization
expense adjusted for property specific expenses to total revenue less expense

2

https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/qbp/glossary.html

3

https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics/what-reit
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reimbursements.4 In the accounting and financial economics literature, similar ratios of
operating expense divided by annual sales are used as an agency cost proxy because they
serve as a measure of the effectiveness of management in controlling operations and direct
agency costs (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000).
Using a broad sample of U.S. equity REITs from the modern REIT era, the results
show that REIT return on assets and REIT return on equity are strongly related to firm
operating efficiency. The results suggest that more efficient REITs are associated with
better operational performance.5 Further results show that REIT total risk and credit risk
benefit from greater operational efficiency. It is also illustrated that REIT cross-sectional
stock returns may be partially explained by operational efficiency. Besides, a portfolio
consisting of more efficient REITs earns, on average, higher cumulative stock returns
compared with a portfolio consisting of less efficient REITs. Overall, these findings
illustrate the importance of REIT operational efficiency on performance, risk and return.6

4

The measure is adjusted to reflect those costs that are directly associated with asset operations and
management. The adjustment is made for expenses that are passed through to tenants. Not all property
expenses are reimbursed so one also control for property type, which is the primary determinant of
reimbursements.
5

It is recognized that there still exists a potential endogeneity issue between operational efficiency and firm
performance and there may be possible unobserved heterogeneity that determines the observed relation
between operational efficiency and firm performance. As this is one of the first papers on the topic, it is likely
that more research needs to be done to refine all potential conclusions.
6

Theoretically, a reverse causality issue for REIT risk, especially stock return volatility, stock return and
REIT operational efficiency should not exist. The empirical results that REIT operational efficiency has a
negative (positive) relation with one period ahead firm risk (stock return) can provide reliable casual
inference. It is not likely that the lower risk and/or higher return causes higher operational efficiency.

3

1.2.An Overview of Related Literature
There is a rich banking literature on the efficiency of financial institutions. Most of
the literature focuses on four types or categories of efficiency. The first type is scale
efficiency. The idea is that financial institutions benefit from economies of scale. Hence,
larger firms are more likely to have better performance (Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey,
1993; Berger, Hunter, and Timme, 1993). The second category is scope efficiency,
whereby financial institutions benefit from lowering average costs by producing and
selling a wide array of products (Zardkoohi and Kolari, 1994). The third efficiency measure
is X-efficiency, which illustrates whether financial institutions are operating with an
efficient mix of inputs, (Berger, Hunter, and Timme, 1993; Allen and Rai, 1996). Finally,
the fourth and most common efficiency category is related to overall operational efficiency
and is often measured with an efficiency ratio defined as non-interest expenses divided by
revenues or net income (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005;
Jacewitz and Kupiec, 2012). This efficiency measure is a straightforward indicator of
overhead expenses relative to operational revenues. Financial institutions associated with
lower ratios are more efficient.
Anderson, Lewis, and Springer (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the
efficiency literature for real estate brokerage services and REITs at the advent of the
modern REIT era. Allen and Sirmans (1987), Linneman (1997), Bers and Springer (1997)
and Vogel (1997) show that REIT mergers and acquisitions are due in part to the existence
of economies of scale. Similarly, Anderson, Fok, Zumpano, and Elder (1998) and
Anderson, et al. (2002) analyze REIT scale economies and X-efficiencies using data
envelopment analysis (DEA). They show that REITs are generally scale inefficient. In

4

their narrow 1992-1996 sample period, REITs’ overall efficiency scores measured between
44.1% and 60.5% (out of 100%). They also show that large REITs are more efficient than
small REITs and suggest that expansion may improve performance. Using a stochastic
frontier methodology and Bayesian statistics to define REITs’ efficient cost frontiers,
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) find that REITs are almost 90% efficient and show
that REIT performance and efficiency are positively related.
There is, however, conflicting evidence concerning studies focused on economies
of scale in REITs. For example, McIntosh, Liang, and Thompkins (1991) and McIntosh,
Ott, and Liang (1995) provide evidence against the existence of scale economies. Similarly,
Mueller (1998) and Ambrose, Ehrlich, Hughes, and Wachter (2000) show that smaller
REITs are more profitable, indicating there may be an optimal REIT size based on their
cash flows. More recently, Chung, Fung, and Hung (2010) show that institutional
ownership can help reduce REITs’ inefficiency. Other studies of the impact of institutional
ownership on performance find few relations (Hartzell, Sun, and Titman, 2006; Bianco,
Ghosh, and Sirmans, 2007; Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok, 2010), with Hardin, Nagel,
Roskelley, and Seagraves (2017) arguing that only a small set of investors will expend
sufficient energy to monitor to improve operating performance. The ambiguity may also
be related to the sample frame and the maturation of the REIT industry.
Bers and Springer (1998a, 1998b) use the ratio of different REIT costs, such as
general and administrative (G&A) expense, management fees, operating expenses, and
interest expense, to total liabilities to examine scale economies. This measure, which is
conceptually similar to the efficiency measures used in this paper, allowed them to show a
negative cost elasticity associated with interest expense related to total liabilities. In a

5

related paper, Bers and Springer (1997) assess differences in scale economies among a
variety of REIT characteristics and find that internal or external management choice,
capital structure, and property types are related to their scale economies.
The present investigation builds on this existing, older literature primarily focused
on the pre-modern REIT era by introducing efficiency ratios adjusted for industry
characteristics as found in the banking literature. The questions of interest are
straightforward. Does REIT efficiency impact operational performance measures? And,
are REITs rewarded for their efficiency?

1.3.Data Sources and Summary of Statistics
The firm characteristics for U.S. equity REITs for the modern REIT era (1995 –
2016) with annual frequency are collected from From SNL Financial.7 Each observation
includes, total assets, total debt, total equity, total revenue 8 , total expenses, expense
reimbursements 9 , real estate depreciation and amortization, rental operational expense,
share price, total dividends paid, common shares outstanding, implied market
capitalization, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, funds from

7

The sample period starts in 1995 because the property level data are used to calculate geographic
diversification and property type diversification are only available from 1995. For robustness, an extended
sample with a longer period shows quantitatively similar empirical results, while not controlling for
diversification. Also, only publicly traded REITs is addressed as Seguin (2016), Soyeh and Wiley (2017) and
others argue that these firms are sufficiently different to warrant segmentation.
8

All revenue including nonrecurring. Revenue is net of interest expenses for banks, thrifts, lenders, FHLBs,
investment companies, asset managers and broker-dealers, as defined by SNL.
9

Expenses reimbursed from tenants for common area maintenance and improvements, including operating
expenses such as real estate taxes, insurance, and utilities, as defined by SNL.

6

operations (FFO), IPO date, the year the REIT was established, the metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) of properties, and real estate property type.10 Stock return data from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and market factors and risk-free rate data from
Kenneth French’s website are also obtained. 11
REIT operational efficiency ratio (OER) in general terms is defined as total
operational expenses divided by revenue. Hence, the higher (lower) the efficiency ratio,
the less (more) efficient the REIT. More specifically, two variations of the general REIT
operational efficiency ratio are defined as: a) the ratio of non-real-estate-depreciation-andamortization expense, defined as total expenses minus real estate depreciation and
amortization, to total revenue, and b) the ratio of non-real-estate-depreciation-andamortization expense adjusted for property expenses to total revenue less expense
reimbursements. These two variations account for real estate depreciation and amortization
and property operational expense reimbursements to better reflect the more controllable
cash flow related expenses associated with each REIT.
The cost of holding and maintaining real properties varies across property type as
does lease structure. Hence, operational expense ratios likely vary due to the type of
properties owned. It is needed to employ measures that adjust for operational efficiency
differences for REITs that are associated with real estate property types. These

10

When REIT accounting information is not available in one period, but is available for the pervious and
subsequent periods, it is replaced by the estimation calculated from the characteristics in previous and
𝑥
𝑥
𝑥
𝑥
subsequent periods using the formula: : 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡
= (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1
+ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
)/2. Where 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡
is the
value of 𝑥 (TA, TE, etc.) of REIT 𝑖 in year 𝑡.
Kenneth R. French’s Data Library:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
11

7

standardized operational efficiency measures (OER1 and OER2) are defined as the
operational efficiency ratio of each REIT divided by the mean of the operational efficiency
ratios of all REITs that specialize in the same real estate property type in that year.
REIT operational performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which is
defined as funds from operations divided by total assets in the previous period, and return
on equity (ROE), which is defined as funds from operations divided by total equity in the
previous period.12 REIT total risk is measured by the standard deviation of the annualized
stock return and can also be referred to as stock return volatility. REIT credit risk is proxied
by the EBITDA-to-Debt ratio. The stock return for a REIT is defined as the sum of the
share price change and dividends divided by share price in the previous period. Other
variables used in this study include firm size, which is defined as the logarithm of implied
market capitalization; leverage ratio, which is defined as the ratio of total book assets to
total book equity, following Adrian and Shin (2010); firm age, which is defined as
logarithm of one plus firms’ years since IPO13; geographic diversification, which is defined
as the negative of the Herfindahl Index of each REIT, calculated using assets invested in
different MSA locations, based on book values, as in Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2014);
property type diversification, which is defined as the negative of the Herfindahl Index of
each REIT, calculated using assets invested in different real estate property types, based
on book values, as in Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2014); and firm classification and whether
the firm is in the S&P Index, which is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 when a REIT

12

These are common performance metrics for REITs.

13

When the IPO date is not available, the year a REIT status is established is used instead.
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is in the S&P index. The variables used in this paper along with their definition are
displayed in the Appendix.
Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with fewer
than two consecutive years of stock price and operational efficiency information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions. The
final sample used in the analysis consists of 317 REITs.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for the REITs included in the sample
including operational performance, risk, stock return, and operational efficiency measures.
Over the full sample period (1995 – 2016), the average REIT market capitalization has a
mean of $2.3 billion and a median of $0.9 billion. Total REIT revenue per year has a mean
of $0.4 billion and a median of $0.2 billion. Return on assets (ROA) has an average of 6.04%
and a median of 6.05%, while return on equity (ROE) has an average of 16.39% and a
median of 14.31%. The mean and median of annual stock return volatility are 0.30 and
0.23, and the mean and median for the EBITDA-to-Debt ratio are 0.19 and 0.16. The
average annual stock return during the examined period is 12.99%, with a median of
12.97%. In terms of the operational efficiency ratios, the mean and median of the
standardized operational efficiency ratio type one (OER1) are 0.99 and 0.96, and mean and
median of the standardized operational efficiency ratio type two (OER2) are 0.99 and 0.91.

1.4.Research Methodologies
The analysis begins with an evaluation of whether a REIT’s operational
performance is associated with its operational efficiency ratios. Specifically, the regression
REIT return on assets on each of the measures of operational efficiency while controlling

9

for REITs characteristics is adopted. An ordinary least squares (OLS) model with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level and with the
property type and year fixed effects (or with firm and year fixed effects) is used, as follows.
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1

(1-1)

+ 𝛽6 𝑆&𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where ROAi,t is the funds from operations divided by lagged total assets of REIT 𝑖 at year
𝑡m and the other variables included in equation (1) are as defined earlier in the text.
Additionally, the multivariate regression from equation (1-1) using a non-parametric
analysis approach by sorting REITs into quintiles based on their standardized operational
efficiency ratios in each year is applied. The spreads of the mean and median of the ROA
from the extreme quintiles, along with their associated two-sample t test and Wilcoxon
rank-sum test values are aslo reported.
The use of lagged property portfolio characteristics as explanatory variables
provides adjustment to reflect the beginning annual portfolios held by a REIT. Performance
should be more reflective of the characteristics of the REIT properties at the start of the
year than at the end of the year. This can be important in the REIT industry where holding
periods are long-term and where the industry has expanded dramatically over the last two
decades. Cash flow generation and expenses follow in large measure the properties held at
the beginning of each period in combination with changes in the portfolio during the
interim period versus the ending period composition of the portfolio. It is needed to adjust

10

other variables for comparability and to mitigate potential issues related to endogeneity.
The general concept is to create the basic firm and managerial characteristics for the firm
before the period of assessment.
For a visual illustration, figures that plot the measures of return on assets versus
each of the standardized operational efficiency ratios for the previous year are provided.
The slope, t-statistics, p-value and adjusted R-squared from the univariate regression
associated with each figure are reported on the top of each figure.
Return on equity is another profitability ratio that measures the ability of a firm to
generate profits. It can be argued from the shareholder’s perspective that return on equity
is the best indicator of firm performance (Elayan, Meyer, and Li, 2009) as an investment.
Hence, whether REIT return on equity (ROE) is associated with the two measures of
operational efficiency is explored.

𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1

(1-2)

+ 𝛽6 𝑆&𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the funds from operations, respectively, divided by lagged total equity of
REIT 𝑖 at year 𝑡, and other variables are as defined previously. The multivariate regression
from equation (1-2) using a non-parametric analysis approach is applied and figures which
plots the measures of return on equity versus each of the standardized operational
efficiency ratios for the previous year are created.
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A similar approach is used to examine the relations between REIT total risk, credit
risk, and operational efficiency. Total risk is measured as annualized stock return volatility,
and credit risk is measured as the EBITDA-to-Debt ratio, which is an indicator of a REIT’s
ability to satisfy its debt payment obligations.
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1

(1-3)

+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6 𝑆&𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is the annualized stock return volatility and EBITDA divided by total debt,
respectively, of REIT 𝑖 at year 𝑡, and the other variables are as previously defined. Once
again, the multivariate regression from equation (1-3) using a non-parametric analysis
approach is applied and figures which plots the measures of return on equity versus each
of the standardized operational efficiency ratios for the previous year are created.
Finally, whether REIT operational efficiency ratios help explain the cross-sectional
stock return of REITs is examined. Specifically, the regression of annual excess REIT stock
return using the Fama French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model and the Fama French (2015) five-factor model while including the REIT operational
efficiency variable are adopted as follows:14

14

Similar models can be found in Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2016),
among others.
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𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 𝛼3 ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 𝛼3 ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡
+ 𝛽1 𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(1-4)

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 𝛼3 ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝑟𝑚𝑤𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑡
+ 𝛽1 𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the annual stock return of REIT 𝑖 minus the risk-free rate at year 𝑡;
𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the value-weighted market return minus the risk-free rate at year 𝑡; 𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 (Small
minus Big), ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 (High minus Low), 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 (Momentum), 𝑟𝑚𝑤𝑡 (Profitability) and 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑡
(Investment) are the year 𝑡 return to zero investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed
to capture size, book-to-market, momentum, profitability and investment effects,
respectively. 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest in this regression, as it captures the relations
between REIT stock return and the operational efficiency ratios after controlling for market
risk.
Alternatively, a similar approach to examine the relations between REIT stock
return and REIT operational efficiency is adopted.

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
(1-5)
+ 𝛽4 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6 𝑆&𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
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Where 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is residual excess stock return, which is obtained from the
Fama-French (2015) five-factor model, of REIT 𝑖 at year 𝑡, and the other variables are as
previously defined.
To further evaluate whether REIT operational efficiency ratios have a long-term
effect on stock returns, portfolios by sorting the standardized operational efficiency ratios
(𝑂𝐸𝑅1 and 𝑂𝐸𝑅2) of each REIT in the previous year are constructed. Specifically, REITs
are divided based on the median (or 30 and 70 percentiles) of their 𝑂𝐸𝑅1 and 𝑂𝐸𝑅2,
respectively, and REITs with above or below median (or 70 or 30 percentiles) 𝑂𝐸𝑅1 and
𝑂𝐸𝑅2 are placed in the low or high efficiency portfolios, respectively. These portfolios are
rebalanced each year. Then, the one- to four- year cumulative return of these operational
efficiency based portfolios are compared.

1.5.Empirical Results
1.5.1. Operational Performance and Operational Efficiency
As described in the methodology section, relations between the REIT operational
efficiency ratios and REIT operational performance measured by return on assets (ROA)
and return on equity (ROE) are explored. The results from equation (1-1) are reported in
Panel A of Table 2. Overall, the results provide evidence that more efficient REITs have,
on average, higher returns on assets, even after controlling for size, financing, management
structure, diversification and growth strategy.
In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of the previous year OER1 and OER2
variables are negative with statistical significance at the 1% level (-5.27 and -3.24,
respectively) in a property type and year fixed effect model. These results suggest that more
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efficient REITs (lower efficiency ratio) generate higher ROAs. The results presented with
a firm and year fixed effect model as in columns (3) and (4) are very similar to the results
presented in columns (1) and (2) and display statistical significance at the 1% level. The
estimated coefficients of -2.97 and -1.76 for the previous year OER1 and OER2 variables,
respectively, suggest a positive relation between REIT efficiency and ROA.15
In addition to the coefficients of interest, REITs with higher market capitalization,
lower leverage, and less geographic diversification are associated with higher ROA are
also shown. This is in line with expectations and is consistent with the literature. Larger
REITs usually perform better (Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993; Berger, Hunter, and
Timme, 1993; Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman, 2005) and the negative relationship
between firm performance and leverage is widely found in the finance literature (e.g.
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002). It is also
well-known that there exists a diversification discount on firm performance or valuation,
as in, for example, Lang and Stulz (1994), Capozza and Seguin (1999), Cronqvist, Högfeldt,
and Nilsson (2001), Campa and Kedia (2002), Danielsen and Harrison (2007), Ro and
Ziobrowski (2011), Hartzell, Sun and Titman (2014), and Ling, Ooi, and Xu (2016).
It is worth noting that achieving a higher relative level of return on assets is difficult
to do in a capital-intensive business such as equity REITs. This further highlights the
importance of REITs operational efficiency on operational performance.

15

It is recognized that REIT operational efficiency may also be an endogenous outcome of managerial
decisions and other factors. For instance, ownership structure, corporate governance, investments in a
growing market just by chance.
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The positive relation between operating efficiency and operating performance also
shows in the univariate regression models. Panel A of Figure 1-1 plots ROA versus each
of the previous year standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2). The
negative slope is visually clear in each of the plots.
Panel B of Table 1-2 presents the results from a quintile analysis approach that
compares REIT mean and median ROA sorted by their previous year standardized
operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2). The results show that the mean and median
ROA of REITs sorted by previous year standardized operational efficiency ratios decrease
monotonically from the first quintile (highest operational efficiency) to the fifth quintile
(lowest operational efficiency) in both cases. The spreads of the mean (median) of ROA
between the two extreme quintiles is 4.74% (4.27%) and 4.29% (3.73%), respectively.
Each of these differences is statistically significant at the 1% level using the t-statistic from
the two-sample t-test or the z-statistics from the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The
results from the non-parametric analysis support the multivariate regression results and
clearly show, not only positive relations between return on assets and operational efficiency,
but that the relation is monotonic and continuous.
The results from equation (1-2) are reported in Panel A of Table 1-3. Overall, the
results presented in this panel are very similar to the results reported in Panel A of Table
1-2, where the relationship between return on assets and operational efficiency is examined.
The coefficients of the operating efficiency measures are negative and statistically
significant in all four specifications. These results support the results from the previous
table and suggest that REIT operating efficiency is positively related to return on equity.
All else equal, if a REIT can decrease its OER1 by 1%, it would realize an average ROE
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increase of 11.87 basis points (column (1)). Also, similar to the results from Panel A of
Table 1-2, there is evidence for positive relations between return on equity and leverage.
Consistent results can also be found in Panel A of Figure 1-2, which plots ROE versus each
of the previous year OER1 and OER2 measures. The negative slope (positive relation
between operational efficiency and return on equity) is visually clear.
Like Panel B of Table 1-2, Panel B of Table 1-3 presents the results from a quintile
analysis. Again, the results of this panel are like the results presented in Table 1-2. The
spreads of the mean and median of ROE between the first quintile (highest operational
efficiency) to the fifth quintile (lowest operational efficiency) of REITs sorted by previous
year standardized operational efficiency ratios are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Collectively, the results provide strong evidence that REIT operational
performance is positively related to the efficient management of the firm measured by the
previous year’s operational efficiency. On average, more efficient REITs (lower
operational efficiency ratios) generate higher returns on assets and returns on equity.

1.5.2. Firm Risk and Operational Efficiency
The results presented in this subsection shed light on the extent to which a REIT’s
risk is associated with its operational efficiency ratios. As mentioned earlier, REIT total
risk is measured as annualized stock return volatility, and REIT credit risk is measured as
the EBITDA-to-Debt ratio. Stock return volatility plays an essential role in the finance
literature, including asset pricing, cost of capital, risk management, and asset allocation.
There is ample evidence that higher volatility is associated with higher expected returns.
The EBITDA-to-Debt ratio measures the ability of a firm to withstand a negative shock to
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its profitability without defaulting on its debt obligations. This measure is especially
important for REITs given that the real estate sector is more levered than most other
industry sectors (Morri and Beretta, 2008). Moreover, unlike other firms, the ability of
REITs to fund investments via internally generated cash flows is limited due to their
mandatory distribution requirement of at least 90% of earnings to shareholders. As a result,
large REIT investments are more likely to be funded by the use of debt, at least in the short
run, or an increase in share count.
The results from Equation (1-3) when stock return volatility is the dependent
variable are reported in Panel A of Table 1-4. The positive coefficients, 0.078 and 0.045,
respectively, of previous year OER1 and OER2 in columns (1) and (2), with statistical
significance at 1%, indicate that REITs with higher efficiency ratios (lower operating
efficiency) have, on average, higher stock return volatility. The results presented with a
firm and year fixed effect model as in columns (3) and (4) are very similar to the results
presented in columns (1) and (2). The results imply that more efficient REITs (lower
efficiency ratio) are exposed to less total return risk.
Regarding the other factors impacting firm-level risk, the results are generally in
line with the existing REIT literature (e.g., Tom and Austin, 1996; Allen, Madura, and
Springer, 2000; Tien and Sze, 2003). REITs with higher market capitalization are
associated with lower total risk. Consistent with the REIT literature and what has been
shown in banking (e.g., Demsetz and Strahan, 1997), size-related diversification leads to
reductions in firm-specific risk (e.g., Norman, Sirmans, and Benjamin, 1995; Gyourko and
Nelling,1996; Tom and Austin, 1996). Younger REITs appear to be less risky, which
warrants additional research and may be related to the newness of the REIT industry and
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conversions of private portfolios to publicly traded vehicles. Variables addressing more
geographic diversification and inclusion in S&P indices, on average, have higher total risk
in the property type and year fixed effect model as in columns (1) and (2). However, those
variables are not statistically significant in the firm and year fixed effect model as in
columns (3) and (4).
Like Figure 1-1, Panel A of Figure 1-2 plots the univariate results of stock return
volatility versus previous year OER1 and OER2. The slope, t-statistics, p-value and
adjusted R-squared are reported on the top of each figure. The results are consistent with
the findings reported using multivariate regression.
Panel B of Table 1-4 presents the quintile analysis results. These results support the
results presented in the previous panel. The means and medians of stock return volatility
are monotonically increasing from the first quintile (highest operational efficiency) to the
fifth quintile (lowest operational efficiency) of REITs sorted by previous year OER1 and
OER2. The mean (median) difference between these extreme quintiles are 0.09 (0.05) and
0.08 (0.04) for OER1 and OER2, respectively, and associated with high statistical
significance.
When the EBITDA-to-Debt ratio is the dependent variable in Equation (1-3), the
results are reported in Panel A of Table 1-5. The estimated coefficients of OER1 and OER2
in columns (1) to (2) for EBITDA-to-Debt ratio are both negative (-0.13, and -0.09,
respectively) and statistically significant at the 1% level. Quantitively similar results with
a firm and year fixed effect model can be found in columns (3) and (4). Together, the results
imply that more efficient REITs (lower efficiency ratio) are associated with lower debt
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levels relative to their cash flow. Aside from the coefficients of interest, the results also
show that REITs with lower debt are associated with less credit risk, as expected.
Panel B of Table 1-5 presents the quintile analysis results. The means and medians
of EBITDA-to-Debt ratio are monotonically decreasing from the first to the fifth quintile.
The spreads of the mean (median) between the two extreme quintiles are 0.11 (0.07) and
0.10 (0.06) for OER1 and OER2, respectively, and are significant at 1% level in both the
two-sample t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test.

1.5.3. Stock Return and Operational Efficiency
As a final step, after examining the relationship between operational efficiency and
operational performance and risk, whether REITs’ operational efficiency is related to their
stock return is investigated.
Table 1-6 presents the OLS regression coefficient estimates of the Fama French
(1993) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and the Fama French
(2015) five-factor model along with a REIT operational efficiency variable, as in Equation
(4). REIT stock return net of the risk-free rate is the dependent variable in these regressions.
In each of the four specifications, the operational efficiency ratio used is found to be
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. More specifically, the estimated
coefficients associated with OER1 in columns (1) to (3) are -9.74, -9.67 and -9.62,
respectively, while those with OER2 in columns (4) to (6) are -6.33, -6.30 and -6.23,
respectively.
The regression analysis indicates that a portion of REIT expected returns that
cannot be explained by the common market factors is associated with REIT operational
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efficiency. As the efficiency ratios proposed in this paper measure the amount of revenue
REITs generate relative to their operational expenses, such information should be unique
for each REIT and not related to market-wide shocks from either real estate or capital
markets.
Also, the residual excess stock return obtained from the Fama-French (2015) fivefactor model is used to explore relations between REIT stock return and REIT operational
efficiency ratios. The results from equation (1-5) are reported in Table 1-7. The results
provide evidence that more efficient REITs have, on average, higher stock returns which
could not be explained by the common market factors, even after controlling for size,
financing, management, diversification and growth strategy.
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More specifically, the

estimated coefficients associated with OER1 in columns (1) and (3) are -10.63 and -7.11,
respectively, while those with OER2 in columns (2) and (4) are -6.45 and -3.57,
respectively. The result suggests that REITs that exhibit higher operational efficiency are
associated with higher risk-adjusted stock returns, as expected. REITs with operational
effectiveness and efficiency generate better results for given portfolios of real estate, which
is reflected in stock performance. REIT operational efficiency captures the relative ability
to generate cash flows, which is concomitantly related to the management of the firm and
assets related to managerial structure, employee retention, and human capital.
Finally, to determine whether cumulative stock returns are different between high
and low efficiency REITs, portfolios are constructed by sorting REITs based on their
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For robustness, residual stock return is also obtained via the Fama French (1993) three-factor model and
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Quantitatively similar results are found. For brevity, these results are
not reported, but are available upon request.
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previous year standardized operational efficiency ratio (OER1 and OER2) and then the
cumulative return differentials for periods of one to four years after portfolio formation are
examined. The results of this analysis are illustrated in Figure 1-3.
A glance at Figure 1-3 reveals that, in the medium term, portfolios that consist of
low efficiency REITs materially underperform portfolios that consist of high efficiency
REITs. Specifically, the four-year cumulative return differential between the portfolio
consisting of the bottom 30% of OER1 and the portfolio consisting of the top 30% of OER1
is about 8%, as shown in Panel A. Similarly, the four-year cumulative return differential
between the portfolio consisting of the bottom 30% of OER2 and the portfolio consisting
of the top 30% of OER2 is also as large as 8%, as showed in Panel B. These results are
consistent with the findings presented in Table 1-5. Portfolios taken from the more efficient
REITs outperform portfolios derived from the less efficient REITs

1.6.Robustness Checks

Since the analysis uses lagged variables in explaining the relationship between
REIT operational performance and operational efficiency in Section 5.1, a correlation table
with current period and previous period variables is provided. The correlation table
indicates whether the variables of interest persistent. Panel A of Table 1-8 shows the results
on the pair-wise correlation of the regression variables. The operational performance of
REITs is strongly correlated with their previous-year operational performance. The
correlation of ROA at year t and year t-1 is 0.68, while the correlation of ROE at year t and
year t-1 is 0.53. There exists high persistence in operational efficiency measures. The
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correlation of current- and previous-year OER1 and OER2 is 0.63 and 0.64, respectively.
More importantly, the correlation of ROA and ROE with current year OER1 (OER2) is 0.66 (-0.61) and -0.25 (-0.25), respectively, and previous year OER1 (OER2) is -0.43 (0.40) and -0.09 (-0.10), respectively. As a higher operational efficiency ratio (OER)
indicates a less efficient REIT, this result further suggests the existence of a positive
relationship between REIT operational efficiency and operational performance.

Besides the possibility that lagged dependent variables may cause the coefficients
for explanatory variables to be biased downward, if residual autocorrelation exists, the
correlation results on current period and previous period variables also motivate us to
examine other relationships further. Specifically, the relationship in cross-section by
regressing REIT performance (ROA and ROE) on their current year standardized
operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2, respectively), while controlling for current
year firm size, financing, management, diversification, and growth strategy, as in equation
(1-1). The results of this analysis are reported in Panel B of Table 1-8. The estimated
parameters for OER1 and OER2 are quantitatively and qualitatively greater than those
reported in Tables 1-2 and 1-3, where the lagged variables are used. In a property type and
year fixed effect model, the estimated coefficients of current year OER1 are -7.75 when
the dependent variable is ROA and -18.61 when the dependent variable is ROE. The
estimated coefficients of current year OER2 are -5.03 when the dependent variable is ROA
and -12.66 when the dependent variable is ROE, with statistical significance at the 1%
level, as in Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). The estimated coefficients of current year
operational efficiency measures are quantitatively and qualitatively similar in a firm and
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year fixed effect models as in Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). These consistent results provide
a further evaluation of the sensitivity of the estimated parameters and further confirming a
positive relation between REIT efficiency and performance.

1.7.Conclusions
The paper defines REIT operational efficiency and examines the extent to which
REIT operational efficiency is related to operational performance, total risk, credit risk,
and stock return. Using a sample of U.S. equity REITs during the modern REIT era (1995
– 2016), results show that more efficient REITs are associated with higher operational
performance measured by return on assets and return on equity. Similarly, the results of
the analysis show that more efficient REITs post lower stock return volatility and are
associated with lower credit risk, measured by their EBITDA-to-Debt ratio. Furthermore,
there is evidence that higher efficiency REITs outperform, on average, lower efficiency
REITs in terms of risk-adjusted cross-sectional stock return as well as in terms of
cumulative stock return in the medium term.
Collectively, the findings illustrate the importance of correctly measuring and
accounting for REIT operational efficiency. This work has potential implications for REIT
management, shareholder relations, REIT valuation, and portfolio allocation decisions.
Moreover, a trading strategy that uses operational efficiency may yield higher returns. The
research opens the door for more research on REIT operational efficiency to include
institutional ownership and governance factors that might impact operational efficiency.
Further research that examines in detail the importance of the components of REIT revenue
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and expenses concurrent with management and ownership structure will likely yield
considerable insights.

References

Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S. (2010). Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 19(3), 418-437.
Allen, P. R., & Sirmans, C. F. (1987). An analysis of gains to acquiring firm's shareholders:
the special case of REITs. Journal of Financial Economics, 18(1), 175-184.
Allen, L., & Rai, A. (1996). Operational efficiency in banking: an international
comparison. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20(4), 655-672.
Allen, M. T., Madura, J., & Springer, T. M. (2000). REIT characteristics and the sensitivity
of REIT returns. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 21(2), 141-152
Ambrose, B. W., Ehrlich, S. R., Hughes, W. T., & Wachter, S. M. (2000). REIT economies
of scale: fact or fiction?. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 20(2),
211-224.
Anderson, R., Fok, R., Zumpano, L., & Elder, H. (1998). Measuring the efficiency of
residential real estate brokerage firms. Journal of Real Estate Research, 16(2), 139-158.
Anderson, R. I., Fok, R., Springer, T., & Webb, J. (2002). Technical efficiency and
economies of scale: a non-parametric analysis of REIT operating efficiency. European
Journal of Operational Research, 139(3), 598-612.
Anderson, R., Lewis, D., & Springer, T. (2000). Operating efficiencies in real estate: A
critical review of the literature. Journal of Real Estate Literature, 8(1), 1-18.
Anderson, R., & Reeb, D. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance:
evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301-1328
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. The
Journal of Finance, 55(1), 81-106.
Baker, H. K., & Chinloy, P. (Eds.). (2014). Public real estate markets and investments.
Oxford University Press, USA.

25

Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2006). Investor sentiment and the cross‐section of stock
return. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1645-1680.
Banz, R. W. (1981). The relationship between return and market value of common
stocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(1), 3-18.
Bauer, R., Eichholtz, P., & Kok, N. (2010). Corporate governance and performance: The
REIT effect. Real Estate Economics, 38(1), 1-29.
Berger, A. N., Hancock, D., & Humphrey, D. B. (1993). Bank efficiency derived from the
profit function. Journal of Banking and Finance, 17(2), 317-347.
Berger, A. N., Hunter, W. C., & Timme, S. G. (1993). The efficiency of financial
institutions: a review and preview of research past, present and future. Journal of
Banking and Finance, 17(2), 221-249.
Bers, M., & Springer, T. (1997). Economies-of-scale for real estate investment
trusts. Journal of Real Estate Research, 14(3), 275-290.
Bers, M., & Springer, T. M. (1998a). Sources of scale economies for REITs. Real Estate
Finance, 14(4), 47-56.
Bers, M., & Springer, T. M. (1998b). Differences in scale economies among real estate
investment trusts: more evidence. Real Estate Finance, 15(1), 37-44.
Bianco, C., Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. F. (2007). Corporate governance and firm
performance - evidence from REITs. Journal of Portfolio Management, 33(5), 175-191.
Bikker, J. A., & Haaf, K. (2002). Competition, concentration and their relationship: An
empirical analysis of the banking industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(11),
2191-2214.
Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I., & Wachtel, P. (2005). Bank performance, efficiency and ownership
in transition countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(1), 31-53.
Brounen, D., & de Koning, S. (2013). 50 years of real estate investment trusts: An
international examination of the rise and performance of REITs. Journal of Real Estate
Literature, 20(2), 197-223.
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002). Explaining the diversification discount. The Journal of
Finance, 57(4), 1731-1762.
Capozza, D. R., & Seguin, P. J. (1999). Focus, transparency and value: the REIT
evidence. Real Estate Economics, 27(4), 587-619.

26

Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of
Finance, 52(1), 57-82.
Chaudhry, M., Maheshwari, S., & Webb, J. (2004). REITs and idiosyncratic risk. Journal
of Real Estate Research, 26(2), 207-222.
Chung, R., Fung, S., & Hung, S. Y. K. (2012). Institutional investors and firm efficiency
of real estate investment trusts. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics, 45(1), 171-211.
Cronqvist, H., Högfeldt, P., & Nilsson, M. (2001). Why agency costs explain
diversification discounts. Real Estate Economics, 29(1), 85-126.
Danielsen, B., & Harrison, D. (2007). The impact of property type diversification on REIT
liquidity. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 13(4), 329-344.
Demsetz, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1997). Diversification, size, and risk at bank holding
companies. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 300-313.
Devaney, M., & Weber, W. L. (2005). Efficiency, scale economies, and the risk/return
performance of real estate investment trusts. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics, 31(3), 301-317.
Elayan, F., Meyer, T., & Li, J. (2006). Evidence from tax-exempt firms on motives for
participating in sale-leaseback agreements. Journal of Real Estate Research, 28(4),
381-410.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2002). Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about
dividends and debt. The Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 1-33.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and
bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2015). A five-factor asset pricing model. Journal of Financial
Economics, 116(1), 1-22.
Feng, Z., Ghosh, C., He, F., & Sirmans, C. F. (2010). Institutional ownership and REIT
CEO compensation. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 40(), 446-479
Giacomini, E., Ling, D. C., & Naranjo, A. (2017). REIT leverage and return performance:
Keep your eye on the target. Real Estate Economics, forthcoming.
Hardin III, W. G., Nagel, G., Roskelley, K. D., & Seagraves, P. A. (2017). Motivated
institutional monitoring and firm performance. Journal of Real Estate Research, 39:3,
401-439.

27

Hartzell, J. C., Sun, L., & Titman, S. (2014). Institutional investors as monitors of corporate
diversification decisions: Evidence from real estate investment trusts. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 25, 61-72.
Jacewitz, S., & Kupiec, P. (2012). Community bank efficiency and economies of
scale. FDIC Special Study, December.
Kuhle, J., Walther, C., & Wurtzebach, C. (1986). The financial performance of real estate
investment trusts. Journal of Real Estate Research, 1(1), 67-75.
Lang, L. H., & Stulz, R. M. (1994). Tobin's q, corporate diversification, and firm
performance. Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), 1248-1280.
Lewis, D., Springer, T. M., & Anderson, R. I. (2003). The cost efficiency of real estate
investment trusts: an analysis with a Bayesian stochastic frontier model. The Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 26(1), 65-80.
Ling, D. C., Ooi, J. T., & Xu, R. (2016). Asset growth and stock performance: evidence
from REITs. Real Estate Economics, DOI 10.1111/1540-6229.12186.
Linneman, P. (1997), Forces changing the real estate industry forever. Wharton Real Estate
Review, Spring, 1-12.
McIntosh, W., & Liang, Y. (1991). An examination of the small-firm effect within the
REIT industry. Journal of Real Estate Research, 6(1), 9-17.
McIntosh, W., Ott, S. H., & Liang, Y. (1995). The wealth effects of real estate transactions:
the case of REITs. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 10(3), 299-307.
Morri, G., & Beretta, C. (2008). The capital structure determinants of REITs. Is it a peculiar
industry?. Journal of European Real Estate Research, 1(1), 6-57.
Mueller, G. (1998). REIT size and earnings growth: is bigger better, or a new
challenge?. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 4(2), 149-157.
Norman, E., Sirmans, S., & Benjamin, J. (1995). The historical environment of real estate
returns. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 1(1), 1-24.
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some
evidence from international data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.
Reinganum, M. R. (1981). Misspecification of capital asset pricing: empirical anomalies
based on earnings' yields and market values. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(1), 1946.

28

Ro, S., & Ziobrowski, A. J. (2011). Does focus really matter? Specialized vs. diversified
REITs. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 42(1), 68-83.
Seguin, P. J. (2016). The relative value of public non-listed REITs, Journal of Real Estate
Research, 38(1), 59-91.
Soyeh, K., & Wiley, J. (2018). Liquidity management at REITs: listed & public non-traded.
Journal of Real Estate Research, forthcoming.
Tien, S., & Sze, L. (2003). The role of Singapore REITs in a downside risk asset allocation
framework. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 9(3), 219-235.
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The Journal
of Finance, 43(1), 1-19.
Tom, G., & Austin, J. (1996). Risk and real estate investment: an international
perspective. Journal of Real Estate Research, 11(2), 117-130.
Vogel, J. H. (1997). Why the new conventional wisdom about REITs is wrong. Real Estate
Finance, 14, 7-12.
Zardkoohi, A., & Kolari, J. (1994). Branch office economies of scale and scope: evidence
from savings banks in Finland. Journal of Banking and Finance, 18(3), 421-432.

29

Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in this paper. The sample
period is from 1995 - 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix A1. Because the
regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with fewer than two consecutive
years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1) information are excluded.
Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the
influence of extreme observations.
Media
Std.
Yearly
Mean
Min
Max
n
Dev.
Obs.
Market Capitalization ($B)
2.270
0.903
3.975
0.005
24.136
3,426
Total Assets ($B)
2.841
1.304
4.264
0.009
24.534
3,575
Total Equity ($B)
1.111
0.492
1.661
-0.056
9.180
3,575
Total Debt ($B)
1.472
0.674
2.207
0.005
12.518
3,493
Funds from Operations ($B)
0.143
0.066
0.225
-0.067
1.301
3,514
Total Revenue ($B)
0.422
0.183
0.664
0.001
4.028
3,575
Expense Reimbursement ($B)
0.042
0.005
0.089
0.000
0.607
2,791
Total Expense ($B)
0.373
0.152
0.601
0.000
3.642
3,575
Real Estate Depreciation and
0.090
0.037
0.139
0.000
0.786
3,575
Amortization ($B)
Rental Operating Expense ($B) 0.104
0.036
0.177
0.000
1.023
3,575
EBITDA ($B)
0.243
0.113
0.398
0.000
5.559
3,479
Leverage
2.868
2.364
2.737
-9.334 17.317
3,575
Firm Age
11.664 9.000 10.758 0.000
56.000
3,422
Geographic Diversification
-0.426 -0.310 0.283
-1.000
-0.119
2,901
Property Type Diversification
-0.812 -0.946 0.229
-1.000
-0.181
2,901
Book-to-Market Ratio
0.465
0.393
0.626
-0.802
2.854
3,426
Return on Assets (%)
6.036
6.051
3.920
-7.229 18.261
3,201
Return on Equity (%)
16.386 14.312 21.009 -72.157 132.832 3,201
Stock Return Volatility
0.297
0.227
0.195
0.124
1.145
3,255
EBITDA-to-Debt Ratio
0.190
0.165
0.130
0.020
0.932
3,366
Stock Return (%)
12.994 12.972 27.980 -67.217 102.131 3,123
OER1
0.995
0.956
0.338
0.276
2.579
3,575
OER2
0.991
0.907
0.494
0.151
3.191
3,575
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Table 1.2: Return on Assets and Operational Efficiency
Panel A reports the results of multivariate regressions of REITs’ return on assets (ROA)
on their lagged standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2, respectively).
The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The coefficients on variables of property type and
years are suppressed from reporting. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are
heteroscedasticity-robust. Panel B reports the time-series average of ROA of portfolios
sorted by standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2). The t-statistics
from two-sample t-test with equal variances are reported in brackets. The z-statistics from
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%,
5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisk, respectively. All variables are defined
in Appendix A1. Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with
fewer than two consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1)
information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the
distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A: Regressions
VARIABLES

(1)
ROA

Log Market Capitalization, t-1

0.398
[4.92]***
Leverage, t-1
-0.067
[-1.76]*
Firm Age, t-1
-0.058
[-0.48]
Geographic Diversification, t-1
-1.074
[-3.21]***
Property Type Diversification, t-1
-0.704
[-1.25]
Firm in S&P Index, t-1
0.247
[1.04]
OER1, t-1
-5.273
[-13.56]***
OER2, t-1
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-sq.
Property Type FE
Firm FE
Year FE
Number of REIT

(2)
ROA

(3)
ROA

(4)
ROA

0.463
[4.99]***
-0.082
[-2.08]**
-0.145
[-1.09]
-0.983
[-2.57]**
-0.335
[-0.55]
0.157
[0.60]

0.723
[3.50]***
-0.068
[-1.90]*
-0.705
[-2.30]**
-1.769
[-2.46]**
-0.139
[-0.16]
-0.279
[-0.91]
-2.977
[-6.63]***

0.793
[3.68]***
-0.070
[-1.93]*
-0.710
[-2.24]**
-1.804
[-2.21]**
0.039
[0.04]
-0.313
[-0.97]

7.679
[4.95]***

-3.238
[-10.99]***
5.893
[3.91]***

7.828
[5.11]***

-1.760
[-6.17]***
6.434
[4.35]***

2,494
0.409
YES
NO
YES
249

2,494
0.374
YES
NO
YES
249

2,494
0.300
NO
YES
YES
249

2,494
0.288
NO
YES
YES
249
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Panel B: Quintiles sorting
ROA, t+1
Ranking, t

Rank by OER1

Rank by OER2

1

8.08/7.81

7.92/7.62

2

6.96/6.67

6.67/6.46

3

6.30/6.14

6.32/6.22

4

5.40/5.26

5.55/5.51

5

3.34/3.55

3.63/3.88

5-1 Spread

-4.74/-4.27

-4.29/-3.73

t test

[19.66] ***

[17.42] ***

rank-sum test

(19.45) ***

(17.44) ***
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Table 1.3: Return on Equity and Operational Efficiency
Panel A reports the results of multivariate regressions of REITs’ return on equity (ROE)
on their lagged standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2, respectively).
The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The coefficients on variables of property type and
years are suppressed from reporting. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are
heteroscedasticity-robust. Panel B reports the time-series average of ROE of portfolios
sorted by standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2). The t-statistics
from two-sample t-test with equal variances are reported in brackets. The z-statistics from
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%,
5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables are defined
in Appendix A1. Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with
fewer than two consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1)
information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the
distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A: Regressions
VARIABLES

(1)
ROE

Log Market Capitalization, t-1

0.638
[1.26]
Leverage, t-1
4.352
[5.49]***
Firm Age, t-1
0.288
[0.49]
Geographic Diversification, t-1
-3.847
[-1.78]*
Property Type Diversification, t-1
-4.200
[-1.30]
Firm in S&P Index, t-1
0.027
[0.03]
OER1, t-1
-11.870
[-3.68]***
OER2, t-1

(2)
ROE

(3)
ROE

(4)
ROE

0.790
[1.46]
4.319
[5.49]***
0.097
[0.16]
-3.641
[-1.66]*
-3.369
[-1.08]
-0.171
[-0.17]

-0.002
[-0.00]
4.148
[4.22]***
-2.350
[-1.20]
-8.099
[-1.80]*
1.737
[0.26]
-0.635
[-0.51]
-6.775
[-2.08]**

0.079
[0.04]
4.141
[4.22]***
-2.410
[-1.24]
-8.324
[-1.87]*
2.004
[0.31]
-0.696
[-0.55]

Constant

8.202
[0.94]

-7.231
[-3.05]***
4.072
[0.47]

Observations
Adj. R-sq.
Property Type FE
Firm FE
Year FE
Number of REIT

2,494
0.397
YES
NO
YES
249

2,494
0.392
YES
NO
YES
249

33

16.093
[1.35]

-4.708
[-1.78]*
13.814
[1.15]

2,494
0.301
NO
YES
YES
249

2,494
0.301
NO
YES
YES
249

Panel B: Quintiles sorting
ROE, t+1
Ranking, t

Rank by OER1

Rank by OER2

1

17.16/14.71

17.86/15.06

2

17.80/15.43

17.18/15.20

3

17.99/15.39

17.62/15.06

4

17.26/14.61

17.02/13.87

5

11.60/9.94

12.15/10.39

5-1 Spread

-5.56/-4.77

-5.72/-4.67

t test

[4.46] ***

[4.57] ***

rank-sum test

(10.20) ***

(9.50) ***
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Table 1.4: Total Risk and Operational Efficiency
Panel A reports the results of multivariate regressions of REITs’ total risk, which is
measured as its annualized stock return volatility, on their lagged standardized operational
efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2, respectively). The t-statistics are reported in brackets.
The coefficients on variables of property type and years are suppressed from reporting.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are heteroscedasticity-robust. Panel B
reports the time-series average of stock return volatility of portfolios sorted by standardized
operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2). The t-statistics from two-sample t-test
with equal variances are reported in brackets. The z-statistics from two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum test are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is
shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A1.
Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with fewer than two
consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1) information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to
avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A: Regressions
VARIABLES

Log Market Capitalization, t-1
Leverage, t-1
Firm Age, t-1
Geographic Diversification, t-1
Property Type Diversification, t-1
Firm in S&P Index, t-1
OER1, t-1
OER2, t-1
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-sq.
Property Type FE

(1)
Stock
Return
Volatility

(2)
Stock
Return
Volatility

(3)
Stock
Return
Volatility

(4)
Stock
Return
Volatility

-0.036
-0.037
-0.066
-0.067
[-6.05]*** [-5.83]*** [-5.39]*** [-5.37]***
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.001
[0.67]
[0.78]
[0.54]
[0.56]
0.008
0.008
0.025
0.024
[1.61]
[1.76]*
[2.47]**
[2.41]**
0.028
0.027
0.045
0.046
[2.19]**
[2.04]**
[1.34]
[1.34]
-0.012
-0.017
0.018
0.015
[-0.60]
[-0.83]
[0.48]
[0.40]
0.020
0.022
0.010
0.011
[2.09]**
[2.22]**
[0.96]
[1.01]
0.078
0.039
[4.66]***
[3.08]***
0.045
0.019
[3.97]***
[2.07]**
1.010
1.049
0.544
0.567
[14.85]*** [14.52]*** [6.48]*** [6.56]***
2,440
0.734
YES
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2,440
0.730
YES

2,440
0.791
NO

2,440
0.790
NO

Firm FE
Year FE
Number of REIT

NO
YES
242

NO
YES
242

YES
YES
242

YES
YES
242

Panel B: Quintiles sorting
Stock Return Volatility, t+1
Ranking, t

Rank by OER1

Rank by OER2

1
2

0.27/0.22
0.27/0.21

0.27/0.22
0.27/0.22

3

0.29/0.22

0.29/0.22

4
5

0.30/0.23
0.36/0.27

0.30/0.23
0.35/0.26

5-1 Spread
t test
rank-sum test

0.09/0.05
[-8.16] ***
(-7.69) ***

0.08/0.04
[-7.02] ***
(-7.20) ***
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Table 1.5: Credit Risk and Operational Efficiency
Panel A reports the results of multivariate regressions of REITs’ Credit Risk, which is
measured as EBITDA-to-Debt Ratio, on their lagged standardized operational efficiency
ratios (OER1 and OER2, respectively). The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The
coefficients on variables of property type and years are suppressed from reporting.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are heteroscedasticity-robust. Panel B
reports the time-series average of EBITDA-to-Debt of portfolios sorted by standardized
operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2). The t-statistics from two-sample t-test
with equal variances are reported in brackets. The z-statistics from two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum test are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is
shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A1.
Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with fewer than two
consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1) information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to
avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A: Regressions
VARIABLES

(1)
EBITDAto-Debt

Log Market Capitalization, t-1

-0.003
[-0.88]
Leverage, t-1
-0.005
[-3.87]***
Firm Age, t-1
0.010
[1.99]**
Geographic Diversification, t-1
-0.005
[-0.31]
Property Type Diversification, t-1
-0.025
[-1.12]
Firm in S&P Index, t-1
0.023
[1.86]*
OER1, t-1
-0.134
[-6.25]***
OER2, t-1
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-sq.
Property Type FE
Firm FE

0.203
[4.10]***
2,463
0.229
YES
NO
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(2)
EBITDAto-Debt

(3)
EBITDAto-Debt

(4)
EBITDAto-Debt

-0.002
0.004
0.005
[-0.63]
[0.41]
[0.53]
-0.005
-0.003
-0.003
[-4.05]*** [-3.35]*** [-3.35]***
0.007
-0.003
-0.004
[1.44]
[-0.32]
[-0.37]
-0.003
0.049
0.047
[-0.20]
[1.22]
[1.16]
-0.018
0.000
0.002
[-0.79]
[0.01]
[0.09]
0.021
-0.017
-0.017
[1.64]
[-1.47]
[-1.52]
-0.056
[-3.30]***
-0.086
-0.035
[-5.76]***
[-3.34]***
0.153
0.306
0.280
[3.42]*** [3.77]*** [3.53]***
2,463
0.221
YES
NO

2,463
0.101
NO
YES

2,463
0.099
NO
YES

Year FE
Number of REIT

YES
247

YES
247

YES
247

YES
247

Panel B: Quintiles sorting
EBITDA-to-Debt, t+1
Ranking, t

Rank by OER1

Rank by OER2

1

0.26/0.20

0.26/0.20

2

0.19/0.18

0.19/0.17

3

0.18/0.16

0.18/0.17

4

0.17/0.15

0.17/0.15

5

0.15/0.13

0.15/0.13

5-1 Spread

-0.11/-0.07

-0.10/-0.06

t test

[12.67] ***

[11.27] ***

rank-sum test

(15.88) ***

(14.19) ***
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Table 1.6: Cross-Sectional Stock Return and Operational Efficiency
This table presents OLS regression coefficient estimates of REITs’ annual excess return on
the Fama French (1993) three factors, Carhart (1997) momentum factor and Fama French
(2015) five factors, and a REIT’ lagged standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1
and OER2, respectively). The t-statistics are reported in brackets. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level and are heteroscedasticity-robust. All variables are defined in
Appendix A1. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks,
respectively. Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with
fewer than two consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1)
information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the
distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
Excess
Excess
Excess
Excess
Excess
Excess
Return
Return
Return
Return
Return
Return
mktrf
smb
hml
mom
rmw
cma
OER1
OER2
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-sq.

0.546
0.469
0.725
0.546
0.468
[17.50]*** [14.48]*** [16.92]*** [17.45]*** [14.50]***
0.544
0.455
0.674
0.544
0.454
[15.32]*** [12.69]*** [14.18]*** [15.32]*** [12.65]***
0.543
0.499
0.288
0.543
0.499
[20.92]*** [17.51]*** [5.48]*** [20.91]*** [17.47]***
-0.144
-0.145
[-5.07]***
[-5.07]***
0.476
[7.11]***
0.075
[1.12]
-9.738
-9.674
-9.619
[-4.89]*** [-4.84]*** [-4.81]***
-6.330
-6.301
[-4.39]*** [-4.36]***
12.425
14.071
9.392
9.021
10.708
[6.76]*** [7.41]*** [4.67]*** [6.78]*** [7.65]***
3,123
0.238

3,123
0.248

3,123
0.251
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3,123
0.237

3,123
0.246

0.725
[16.96]***
0.673
[14.21]***
0.288
[5.49]***

0.475
[7.13]***
0.075
[1.12]

-6.228
[-4.28]***
6.010
[4.04]***
3,123
0.250

Table 1.7: Residual Stock Return and Operational Efficiency
This table reports the results of multivariate regressions of REITs’ residual excess stock
return (Residual Return), which is obtained from the Fama-French (2015) five-factor
model, on their lagged standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2,
respectively). The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The coefficients on variables of
property type and years are suppressed from reporting. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level and are heteroscedasticity-robust. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is
shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A1.
Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with fewer than two
consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1) information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to
avoid the influence of extreme observations.

VARIABLES

(1)
Residual
Return

Log Market Capitalization, t-1

-0.884
[-2.57]**
Leverage, t-1
0.090
[0.37]
Firm Age, t-1
-1.310
[-2.28]**
Geographic Diversification, t-1
-1.250
[-0.84]
Property Type Diversification, t-1
-0.881
[-0.38]
Firm in S&P Index, t-1
-1.393
[-1.23]
OER1, t-1
-10.628
[-4.16]***
OER2, t-1
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-sq.
Property Type FE
Firm FE
Year FE
Number of REIT

15.515
[2.62]***
2,537
0.425
YES
NO
YES
250
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(2)
Residual
Return

(3)
Residual
Return

(4)
Residual
Return

-0.749
[-2.10]**
0.061
[0.25]
-1.469
[-2.46]**
-1.045
[-0.68]
-0.089
[-0.04]
-1.579
[-1.37]

-13.394
-13.149
[-10.09]*** [-9.47]***
-0.180
-0.183
[-0.68]
[-0.69]
0.575
0.611
[0.32]
[0.34]
2.715
2.769
[0.45]
[0.45]
-0.327
0.203
[-0.06]
[0.04]
-1.385
-1.490
[-0.82]
[-0.88]
-7.108
[-2.02]**
-6.448
-3.570
[-3.74]***
[-1.70]*
10.842
81.297
77.145
[1.96]*
[8.24]*** [8.00]***
2,537
0.422
YES
NO
YES
250

2,537
0.477
NO
YES
YES
250

2,537
0.475
NO
YES
YES
250

Table 1.8: Robustness check
This table presents the results of robustness checks. Panel A reports correlations of regression variables on the relationship
between performance and operational efficiency measures at year t and year t-1. Significance at the 5% levels is shown with one
asterisk. Panel B reports the results of regressing the performance (ROA and ROE) of REIT on their standardized operational
efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2, respectively) at the same period. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The coefficients on
variables of property type and years are suppressed from reporting. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are
heteroscedasticity-robust. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables
are defined in Appendix A1. Because the regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with fewer than two
consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1) information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized
at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A: correlations of key regression variables at year t and at year t-1
ROA, t
ROA, t

ROA, t1

ROE, t

ROE, t1

Market
Capitali
zation, t

Market
Capitaliza
tion, t-1

Leverag
e, t

Leverag
e, t-1

1

ROA, t-1
ROE, t

0.678*
0.433*

1
0.226*

1

ROE, t-1
Market Capitalization, t

0.235*
0.097*

0.416*
0.075*

0.534*
0.041*

1
0.030

1

Market Capitalization, t-1
Leverage, t
Leverage, t-1

0.084*
-0.102*
-0.119*

0.082*
-0.081*
-0.108*

0.041*
0.336*
0.522*

0.036
0.307*
0.355*

0.966*
-0.007
-0.004

1
-0.009
0.003

1
0.616*

1

Firm Age, t

-0.093*

-0.103*

-0.049*

-0.056*

0.151*

0.129*

-0.013

-0.014

Firm Age, t-1

-0.088*

-0.108*

-0.043*

-0.059*

0.135*

0.136*

-0.027

-0.010

GeogDiverse, t
GeogDiverse, t-1

0.047*
0.027

0.056*
0.046*

-0.020
-0.029

-0.012
-0.017

0.159*
0.166*

0.152*
0.163*

-0.0291
-0.035

-0.0360
-0.030
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PropTypeDiverse, t
PropTypeDiverse, t-1

-0.038
-0.054*

-0.032
-0.042*

-0.010
-0.021

-0.011
-0.015

0.010
-0.001

0.020
0.012

0.0284
0.038*

0.028
0.026

OER1, t
OER1, t-1
OER2, t

-0.657*
-0.431*
-0.610*

-0.428*
-0.636*
-0.389*

-0.248*
-0.094*
-0.249*

-0.121*
-0.228*
-0.130*

-0.109*
-0.108*
-0.122*

-0.103*
-0.096*
-0.117*

0.103*
0.087*
0.060*

0.109*
0.109*
0.057*

OER2, t-1

-0.395*

-0.589*

-0.100*

-0.229*

-0.116*

-0.109*

0.056*

0.065*

Panel A: correlations of key regression variables at year t and at year t-1 (Continued)
PropT PropT
Firm
Geog Geog
Firm
ypeDi ypeDi
Age, Divers Divers
Age, t
verse, verse,
t-1
e, t
e, t-1
t
t-1
Firm Age, t
1
Firm Age, t-1
-0.014
1
GeogDiverse, t
-0.010 0.999*
1
GeogDiverse, t-1
-0.0360 -0.061* 0.966*
1
PropTypeDiverse, t
-0.030 -0.059* -0.102* -0.117*
1
PropTypeDiverse, t-1
0.028 0.190* -0.126* -0.102* 0.956*
1
OER1, t
0.026 0.188* -0.084* -0.062* -0.095* -0.056*
OER1, t-1
0.109* -0.099* -0.076* -0.087* -0.089* -0.100*
OER2, t
0.109* -0.112* -0.070* -0.042* -0.043* -0.006
OER2, t-1
0.057* -0.127* -0.062* -0.070* -0.033 -0.043*
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OER1, OER1, OER2, OER2,
t
t-1
t
t-1

1
0.633*
1
0.865* 0.523*
1
0.522* 0.860* 0.641*

1

Panel B: Performance and operational efficiency
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
ROA
ROA
Log Market Capitalization, t
Leverage, t
Firm Age, t
Geographic Diversification, t
Property Type Diversification, t
Firm in S&P Index, t
OER1, t
OER2, t
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-sq.
Property Type FE
Firm FE
Year FE
Number of REIT

(3)
ROA

(4)
ROA

(5)
ROE

0.274
0.329
0.905
1.022
0.327
[3.96]*** [4.57]*** [5.76]*** [5.80]*** [0.75]
-0.030
-0.050
-0.044
-0.052
2.701
[-0.84]
[-1.42]
[-1.43]
[-1.60] [4.86]***
0.016
-0.157
-0.264
-0.306
-0.045
[0.13]
[-1.20]
[-0.74]
[-0.80]
[-0.06]
-0.828
-0.694
-1.313
-1.541
-3.711
[-2.73]*** [-2.04]** [-2.53]** [-2.21]** [-1.73]*
-0.387
0.052
-0.013
0.165
-2.752
[-0.73]
[0.10]
[-0.02]
[0.23]
[-0.67]
0.207
0.071
-0.511
-0.598
-0.794
[1.05]
[0.30] [-2.00]** [-2.11]** [-0.95]
-7.745
-7.224
-18.614
[-23.21]***
[-16.29]***
[-5.23]***
-5.027
-4.546
[-22.59]***
[-19.37]***
15.672
13.628
10.179
7.079
27.059
[14.36]*** [13.70]*** [7.31]*** [5.05]*** [3.43]***
2,555
0.603
YES
NO
YES
247

2,555
0.564
YES
NO
YES
247

2,555
0.548
NO
YES
YES
247
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2,555
0.515
NO
YES
YES
247

2,555
0.227
YES
NO
YES
247

(6)
ROE

(7)
ROE

0.396
0.223
[0.86]
[0.14]
2.658
1.671
[4.90]*** [2.58]**
-0.500
-1.750
[-0.64]
[-0.55]
-3.370
-1.076
[-1.50]
[-0.20]
-1.667
4.552
[-0.43]
[0.43]
-1.151
-1.504
[-1.28]
[-1.19]
-20.816
[-5.22]***
-12.658
[-5.01]***
23.246
39.681
[3.08]*** [2.58]**
2,555
0.226
YES
NO
YES
247

2,555
0.107
NO
YES
YES
247

(8)
ROE
0.378
[0.23]
1.649
[2.57]**
-1.851
[-0.59]
-1.893
[-0.35]
4.957
[0.50]
-1.760
[-1.40]

-14.657
[-4.94]***
32.987
[2.18]**
2,555
0.111
NO
YES
YES
247

Panel A: ROA and OER

Panel B: ROE and OER
Figure 1.1: Operational Performance and Operational Efficiency
This figure plots return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) on the vertical axis
against two lagged standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2,
respectively) on the horizontal axis for the sample period (1995 – 2016). The slope, tstatistics, p-value and adjusted R-squared are reported on the top of each figure. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and are heteroscedasticity-robust. Significance at the
1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables are
defined in Appendix A1. Because the regression specification includes lagged variables,
firms with fewer than two consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency
(OER1) information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails
of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
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Panel A: Stock Return Volatility and OER

Panel B: EBITDA-to-Debt and OER
Figure 1.2: Firm Risk and Operational Efficiency
This figure plots REIT’s total risk, which is measured as its annualized stock return
volatility, and Credit Risk, which is measured as EBITDA-to-Debt Ratio, on the vertical
axis against two lagged standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2,
respectively) on the horizontal axis for the sample period (1995 – 2016). The slope, tstatistics, p-value and adjusted R-squared are reported on the top of each figure. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and are heteroscedasticity-robust. Significance at the
1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables are
defined in Appendix A1. Because the regression specification includes lagged variables,
firms with fewer than two consecutive years of stock return and operational efficiency
(OER1) information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails
of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
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Panel A: Sorted by OER1

Panel B: Sorted by OER2
Figure 1.3: Cumulative Return of Stock Portfolios Sorted by Standardized OER
This figure illustrates the one- to four- year cumulative return of stock portfolios sorted by
standardized operational efficiency ratios (OER1 and OER2). Portfolios are constructed by
sorting REITs based on their previous year OER1 and OER2. Each year, REITs are divided
based on the median (or 30 and 70 percentiles) of OER1 and OER2, and place REITs with
above the median (or 70 percentiles) in the low operational efficiency portfolio and those
below the median (or 30 percentiles) in the high operational efficiency portfolio. These
portfolios are rebalanced each year. Then, their one- to four- year cumulative return within
each portfolio are investigated. All variables are defined in Appendix A1. Because the
regression specification includes lagged variables, firms with fewer than two consecutive
years of stock return and operational efficiency (OER1) information are excluded.
Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the
influence of extreme observations.
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Appendix
Table A. Definition of Variables
Variable
Abb.
Return on assets
ROA
Return on equity

ROE

Stock return
volatility
EBITDA-to-Debt
ratio
Stock Return

Return
Volatility
EBITDA-toDebt
Stock Return

Excess stock return
Standardized
operational
efficiency ratio one

Ret
OER1

Standardized
operational
efficiency ratio two

OER2

Natural log of
Market
capitalization
Leverage Ratio

Size

Year listed

Firm Age

Geographic
diversification

GeogDiverse

Property type
diversification

PropTypeDive
rse

Leverage

Definition
Funds from operations divided by lagged
total assets.
Funds from operations divided by lagged
total equity.
The annualized standard deviation of daily
stock return at each firm-year.
The ratio of EBITDA to total debt
The sum of stock price and dividend paid
divided by lagged stock price, then minus
one.
Stock return minus risk-free rate
The ratio of the ratio of total expense minus
real estate depreciation and amortization to
total revenue to the mean of the ratio of total
expense minus real estate depreciation and
amortization to total revenue of REITs that
have the same real estate property type in
the same year.
The ratio of the ratio of total expense minus
real estate depreciation and amortization
minus rental operating expense to total
revenue minus expense reimbursements to
the mean of the ratio of total expense minus
real estate depreciation and amortization
minus rental operating expense to total
revenue minus expense reimbursements of
REITs that have the same real estate
property type in the same year.
Market capitalization of common equity,
assuming the conversion of all convertible
subsidiary equity into common.
The ratio of total book assets to total book
equity.
The natural logarithm of the number of
years since IPO.
The negative of the Herfindahl Index of
REITs, calculated using their assets invested
in different MSA location, based on book
values.
The negative of the Herfindahl Index of
REITs, calculated using their assets invested
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Firm in S&P Index

Firm in S&P
Index

in different real estate property type, based
on book values.
A dummy variable indicating whether a
REIT is in S&P index
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2. Chapter II: Bank Technology, Performance and Market Value

2.1.Introduction

The past two decades have witnessed the rapid growth in the adoption of innovative
technology by U.S. firms.

Many believe that, due to the dramatic changes in the

technological environment and market structure, firms must actively invest in new
technology to provide higher quality products, deliver better customer services, boost
revenue and cut costs to stay competitive in the market. Firms that are unable or unwilling
to adopt advanced technologies are at a significant disadvantage against their competitors.
An important decision faced by managers today is not about whether or not they should
embrace advanced technologies, but rather about when to adopt them (Hall and Khan,
2003).

The banking industry has long been one of the most technology-intensive industries
in the U.S. (Triplett and Bosworth, 2006). In recent years, technology investment by U.S.
banks, including investment in information and financial technologies, has increased at a
faster pace even though many of banks have experienced slow revenue growth and strived
to cut operating expenses after the financial crisis.1 For instance, data on the U.S. listed
commercial banks used in this paper indicate that the median technology spending per bank
more than doubled since 2000 (see Figure 2-1). Moreover, in 2015, four of the ten biggest

See an article from Reuters on September 28, 2016, “Banks Adopting Blockchain 'Dramatically Faster' than
Expected: IBM” as well as an article from Financial Times on January 20, 2016, “Big US bank revenue
growth is flat as a pancake”.
1
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technology spenders worldwide were U.S. banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan
Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo).2

With the rapid growth in technology investment over the past two decades, many
studies have been conducted to assess the impact of the use of technology in the banking
industry. Research suggests that technology progress significantly influences operations,
production, and service quality of U.S. banks (Haynes and Thompson, 2000; Berger, 2003;
Frame and White, 2014).

Moreover, the adoption of new technology by banks affects market competition,
consolidation in the industry, and is likely to create significant regulatory challenges
(Berger, 2003; Philippon, 2015). While there is a growing literature on the impact of
technological progress and the adoption of new technology, little research has been done
regarding the effects of technology investment on U.S. banks at the firm level.3

Given the profound impact of technological changes, this paper examines the
effects of technology investment on firm performance and market value using a sample of
U.S. listed commercial banks. The first research question is to what extent expanded
technology investment influences the operating performance of firms. According to Matt
Zames, COO of JP Morgan Chase & Co., technology is “an essential core competency and

See a Wall Street Journal article on April 21, 2016, “Wal-Mart Spent $10.5 Billion on Information
Technology in 2015”.
2

3

A few studies in the literature examine the effects of use of internet on output and performance of U.S.
banks. These studies either focus on community banks (DeYoung, Lang, and Nolle, 2007) or use survey data
before the “digital network” age (Prasad and Harket, 1997).
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a key differentiator to drive future growth” in all of their businesses. 4 Adoption of new
technology helps banks identify new business areas, improve the quality of client services,
restructure their business models, improve operational efficiency, and increase
competitiveness in the marketplace.5 Thus, one would expect technology investment to
have a positive long-term impact on bank performance by either increasing revenues and/or
improving operational efficiency. However, others contend that technology acts as a
double-edged sword and it is often costly to invest in financial technology such as
cybersecurity, robo-advising and data analytics, especially for small banks (Dahl, Meyer,
and Wiggins, 2017). 6 Moreover, encroaching automation could wipe out a significant
portion of bank profits as fewer fees can be charged for payments such as checks and wires,
and revenue from wealth management could drop as well. Thus, the net effect of expanded
technology investment on firm performance is ultimately an empirical question.

Also, if the adoption of new technology can improve operational efficiency, provide
better service to customers (Melnick, Nayyar, Pinedo, and Seshadri, 2000), and lead to
performance gains, one would expect that expanded technology investment should enhance
the market value of firms. However, due to managerial entrenchment issues, it is possible

4

See page 52 in the 2015 Annual Report of JPMorgan Chase & Co.

5

For example, distributed ledger technology (DLT) was developed to transform payments, clearing, and
settlement (PCS) processes (Mills et al., 2016). Also, cloud computing, big data analytics, cyber security,
API banking, online and mobile banking, and blockchain enable banks to grow future business. See an article
from Business Insider on February 7, 2017, “These are the top trends that will define the banking industry in
2017.”
See an article from Wall Street Journal on January 18, 2017, “Technology Will Help-And Hurt-Bank
Results, Studies Say.”
6
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that managers undertake non-positive net present value (NPV) projects when making
technology investment decisions (Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010) that could hurt firms in
the long run.7 Thus, another interesting question is, does expanded technology investment
increase or destroy the market value of banks? These two questions are of interest to
practitioners, academics, and policymakers as evidenced by the extensive media coverage
and industrial reports regarding the use of technology by banks in recent years.

One reason for the limited research regarding the impact of technology investment
on operating performance and market value at the firm level is the lack of reliable,
comprehensive data about technology investment, as firms are not required to disclose the
relevant information to the public. As technology becomes more important to the banking
industry, many listed banks have disclosed information on technology spending in their
10K reports. S&P Global Market Intelligence takes a “deep dive” into the banking sector
and collects memo items and supplemental financial schedules from U.S. listed commercial
banks. The technology spending data include expenses paid for communications, data
processing, internet banking, equipment, software purchases and subscriptions to cloudbased services. This unique data set allows us to examine the previously posed two
important questions using data on firm-level technology spending as a proxy for
technology investment. Table A2 in the appendix provides some examples to detail
technology spending data.

7

See Myers and Majluf (1984), Stulz (1990), and Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012), among many others.
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Based on a sample of U.S. listed commercial banks from 2000-2017, dramatic
growth in technology spending by banks is found. The median technology and
communication expense per bank (in 2017 dollars) grew from $1.12 million in 2000 to
$2.95 million in 2017 (see Figure 2-1), and it increased almost monotonically over the
period. When gross total assets (GTA) is used to group the banks into two subsets, a similar
growth pattern is found for both small and large banks. The median technology spending
of small banks (large banks) increased from $0.52 million ($2.57 million) to $1.29 million
($6.39 million) during the sample period.

An important empirical issue is a potential endogeneity between technology
investment and firm performance, as one could argue that firms with better performance
are more likely and able to adopt new technology. To investigate this issue, the analysis
starts first by taking a closer look at how technology spending is related to bank
performance during the recent financial crisis. If technology investment is largely
determined by banks’ operating performance, one would expect the technology investment
to drop significantly over the financial crisis. Interestingly, the results indicate that the
median technology spending per bank monotonically grew from $1.63 million in 2007 to
$1.94 million in 2012 (see Figure 2-1). Besides, when two technology spending ratios (i.e.,
Tech Expenses/Total Assets and Tech Expenses/Loans & Deposits) along with the bank
performance measures over the sample period are plotted, there is a “V” shape for bank
performance measures. However, the median technology spending ratios consistently
increased from 2007-2014 (see Figure 2-2). While almost all of the banks experienced a
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negative performance shock and banks strived to cut their expenses during the crisis, the
technology spending for small and large banks continued to grow at a steady pace.

Moreover, technology spending measures for those firms experiencing a negative
performance shock at the firm-level (see Figure 2-3) are examined. The results indicate
that there is no clear pattern for those banks experiencing a negative performance shock in
year t to cut their technology spending in the next few years suggesting that a negative
performance shock does not seem to affect the technology spending of banks significantly.
These findings suggest that expanded technology spending of U.S. banks is less likely to
be determined by firm performance.

Next, the results show that the performance measures of banks are positively and
significantly correlated with the lagged technology spending measures. Interestingly, the
positive correlation is primarily driven by large banks, and there is little evidence
concerning the positive correlation based on small banks. The results on small banks are
consistent with Hunter and Timme (1986) and Prasad and Harket (1997). A possible
interpretation of the results is as follows. Technology investment is often lumpy and costly
(e.g., cybersecurity), but banks must adopt new technology to stay competitive.
To some extent, small banks are “forced” to use some of the new technologies even
though it may not be “optimal” for them to do so from a pure operational efficiency
standpoint. Thus, the financial performance of small banks may not necessarily be
improved. In contrast, large banks can better capture the benefits from the adoption of
advanced technology due to the economies of scale.
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To examine the channel driving the correlation between firm performance and
technology spending, ROA is decomposed into two components: Profit Margin, measuring
profitability from sales, and Asset Turnover, measuring sales volume effect. The
correlation between the two components and the lagged technology spending measures is
investigated. The results indicate that Asset Turnover is positively and significantly
associated with the lagged technology spending measures in the three samples (full, small,
and large) indicating that technology investment does help increase sales and revenues for
both large and small banks. However, in only the large bank sample, Profit Margin is
positively and significantly associated with the lagged technology spending measures.
These results provide further evidence that the use of technology does not necessarily
improve the performance of small banks. Thus, technology investment is likely to affect
firm performance by increasing sales volume and revenue, rather than by improving
operational efficiency. Moreover, large banks benefit from expanded technology
investment through efficiency gains and cost reductions resulting from the economies of
scale.

Furthermore, additional robustness checks indicate that the positive correlation
between firm performance and lagged technology spending measures still hold when toobig-to-fail banks are excluded, when banks with mergers and acquisition activities are
excluded, and when banks with a relatively small amount of technology spending are
excluded. More importantly, when long lags of the technology spending measures are used,
the results indicate that the positive correlation holds for the large bank group up to four
lags.
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Taken together, these findings suggest that the expanded technology spending by
banks is more of a necessity, instead of a strategic choice, and technology investment helps
to improve the financial performance of large banks. It is worth noting that despite the
attempts to investigate the endogeneity issue between bank performance and technology
spending, it remains an empirical issue for future research due to the data limitations
researchers face.

Regarding the effect of technology investment on firm value, bank market value,
measured as the market-to-book equity ratio and Q, is positively and significantly
associated with their lagged technology spending measures for large banks. However, there
is little evidence regarding the correlation between bank market value and the lagged
technology spending measures for small banks. This finding suggests that shareholders of
large banks do recognize the benefits of expanded technology spending.

Overall, the results in the paper suggest that investment in technology particularly
benefits large banks by improving their financial performance and increasing firm value.
However, there is little evidence that financial performance and the market value of small
banks are significantly improved by expanded technology spending. These findings
provide insight for managers to make efficient capital allocation decisions and have
important implications for policymakers to modify regulations regarding the use of
information and financial technologies.

This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, this paper is
one of the first studies examining the extent to which technology investment influences
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firm performance and market value using firm-level technology spending data of U.S.
listed banks. Previous studies have largely focused on the impact of technology innovations
(proxied by the number of patents) or research and development (R&D) expenses on
corporate decisions and valuation. Thus, this paper provides a different perspective to
examine the impact of technology on firms, and the findings suggest that firms are more
likely to benefit from expanded technology investment through increase in sales volume
rather than efficiency gains.
Second, this paper helps to explain the “IT performance paradox” in the literature
(e.g., Haynes and Thompson, 2000; Mithas, Tafti, Bardhan, and Goh, 2012). Many studies
based on data from manufacturing firms indicates that there is no relationship between
technology investment and firm performance, while others find a strong positive
correlation. There is a firm size effect. While there is no significant correlation between
firm performance and technology investment for small banks, a positive correlation exists
for large banks. It implies that use of technology is more of a necessity for small firms in
order to stay competitive in the market. As it is often expensive to adopt advanced
technology, small firms may not benefit from technology investment the same as large
firms.

Finally, this paper examines the relationship between technology spending and firm
value. The findings suggest that the market does value technology investment by large
banks, perhaps because technology can improve the quality of client service, create new
lines of business, and improve operating efficiency. Thus, this paper fills a gap in the
literature as to whether technology investment enhances or destroys the firm value.
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2.2.Background and Literature

In banking literature, following the seminal work by Sealey and Lindley (1977),
many studies examine the impact of technology changes and progress on bank production
and services, as well as the market structure of the banking industry. Hunter and Timme
(1986) investigate the impact of technical changes on bank production and scale economies.
Using bank holding company data collected from the Bank Compustat file from 1972-1982,
they find that technical changes exhibit positive scale bias. In other words, large banks are
more likely to fully exploit operating scale economies and remain competitive in deposit
markets based on their operating efficiencies resulting from the use of new technology.

Petersen and Rajan (2002) examine the distance between small firms and their
lenders based on a sample obtained from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business
Finance (NSSBF). Their findings suggest that information technology provides greater
information availability to small firms and reduces the costs of processing small business
loans that contribute to a longer distance between small firms and their lenders. They
conclude that there is indirect evidence that information technology does increase bank
productivity.

Berger (2003) examines technological progress and its effects on productivity
growth and the market structure of the banking industry. Based on banking data from
various sources from 1984-2001, their study suggests that technology (primarily Internet
banking, electronic payment technology, and information exchanges) significantly
improve the quality of banking services and increase bank productivity. Specifically,
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consumers benefit from improved “front-office” technology (those directly dealing with
customers) and “back-office” technology (those invisible to customers) that help to reduce
costs and improve lending capacity. Moreover, the paper suggests that technological
progress has a significant impact on the market structure of U.S. banks and helps facilitate
banking consolidation. This view is also supported by Pang (2018) who proposes a
theoretical model to identify the winners and losers of the advances in bank information
technology.

Based on various proxies for the use of technology, a few studies investigate the
different effects of technology on bank investment. For example, Saloner and Shepard
(1995) find that the adoption of automated teller machines (ATMs) delays the decline in
the number of branches for banks. Ferrari, Verboven, and Degryse (2010) examine the
investment and demand of ATMs and determine that banks substantially underinvest in
ATMs.

Using either survey data, data from small community banks, or data from European
banks, a few studies examine the effects of technology on the financial performance of
banks. An early study by Prasad and Harket (1997) examines the contributions of
information technology (IT) on profitability in U.S. retail banking. Based on a survey
dataset of U.S. retail banking institutions from 1993-1995, they find that an increase in IT
investment does not benefit banks’ productivity and financial performance. They argue,
since there is no “barrier to entry” in terms of IT in the retail banking industry, small retail
banks must adopt new technology in order to stay in the competition, even though it is not
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in the best interest of them to use the technology based on cost-benefit considerations. Thus,
the use of IT may not necessarily have a positive relationship with bank performance.

A more recent study by DeYoung, Lang, and Noelle (2007) employs U.S.
community bank data from 1999-2001 to study the impact of transactional banking
websites on bank performance. They determine that internet adoption improves
performance for community banks, primarily through increased revenues from deposit
service charges. In contrast, Arnaboldi and Claeys (2010) find little evidence of economies
of scope on the use of technology by European banks. They confirm that there is little gain
from internet banking investment based on a panel of the 60 largest European banking
groups from 1995-2005. Moreover, based on a sample of 737 European banks from 19952000, Beccalli (2007) investigates whether IT investment improves bank performance. The
paper also finds little relationship between IT investment and bank performance or
efficiency. However, their research demonstrates that investments related to IT service
from external providers (e.g., consulting services, training, and education) have a positive
impact on financial performance, while investments in hardware and software are
negatively related to banks’ profits. In short, the results from these papers suggest that
there is mixed evidence about the effect of the use of technology on bank performance.

Also, Martin-Oliver and Salas-Fumas (2008) and Martin-Oliver, Ruano, and SalasFumas (2013) use data from Spanish commercial banks to examine the impact of
technology investment before the financial crisis. They find some evidence that technology
investment influences the productivity and performance of Spanish banks. Sullivan and
Wang (2013) study the endogenous diffusion and impact of Internet banking, which is
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believed to be a cost-saving technological innovation. They suggest that large banks could
take advantage of being early adopters and could increase in size at the time when the
innovation was initially introduced. While the focus is to assess the impact of technology
on the financial industry in terms of ﬁnancial stability and access to services, Philippon
(2015) provides some evidence that the adoption of financial technology does not reduce
the intermediation costs for banks.

There are also studies that examine the economic benefits of technology adoption
using data from manufacturing firms. The results are mixed and inconclusive. Berndt and
Morrison (1995) find limited evidence of a positive relationship between firm performance
and their ratios of high-tech capital to physical capital stock in U.S. manufacturing
industries from 1968-1986. Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996) confirm the little relationship
between firms’ use of information technology and their performance. More recently, a
positive and statistically significant technology and performance relationship is noted in
Mithas et al. (2012) whose sample is more than 400 large global firms. They also find that
IT-enabled revenue growth, but not operating cost reduction, significantly contributes to
this positive relationship. 8

Most of the studies in the banking literature focus on the effects of technology on
bank productivity, quality of services, and the market structure. While there are a few
papers that examine the relationship between technology investment and bank performance,

8

Other studies in the literature include Brynjolfsson (1993). A detailed review of the literature can be found
in Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996) and Draca, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2007).
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the extant research is largely based on limited survey data from U.S. banks or short-term
data prior to the “network” era of computing that cannot evaluate the effects of technology
investment in the banking industry during the past decade.

For studies based on data from European banks, one can argue that significant
differences exist between the U.S. banking system and the European banking system (e.g.,
market structure and regulations, sample period, and size of the industry).9 Thus, the results
based on European bank data may not apply to the U.S. banking industry. Also, previous
literature largely uses proxies for technology usage, such as the number of ATMs and
transaction website adoption for information technology. There is little research based on
direct firm-level technology spending data from U.S. listed banks. More importantly, the
results regarding financial performance and technology spending are largely mixed in the
literature, suggesting that further research on this issue is warranted.

Using technology spending data from Fortune 1000 companies around the year
2000 (Y2K), Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran (2006) find technology investment
increases firm value. Yet, there is little research in the banking literature as to how
technology investment influences the firm value of banks, while the impact of other factors
on bank value have been widely examined including bank deregulation (Marcus, 1984),
diversification (Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010), and equity capital (Mehran and
Thakor, 2011). If banks can provide better customer service via technology (Melnick et al.,

9

The GDP of Spain in 2015 is roughly 6.6% of the GDP of the U.S. The total assets of Spanish banks in
2016 is about €2.7 trillion based on a BBVA research report and the total assets of U.S. commercial banks at
the same year is $12 trillion based on FRED economic data.
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2000) and bank performance is positively related to their technology spending, the market
value of banks should also be positively correlated with their technology spending.
Meanwhile, not all technology investments are placed on positive NPV projects as bank
managers may have potential managerial entrenchment issues (Fiordelisi and Molyneux,
2010). Thus, the relationship between bank value and technology investment becomes an
empirical question.

The banking literature also notes significant differences in portfolio composition
and technology adoption strategies for small and large banks (Berger and Udell, 2002;
Berger and DeYoung, 2006; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). In addition, it is well known
that there exist economies of scale in technology investment (Katz and Shapiro, 1986;
Harris and Katz, 1991; Hall and Khan, 2003), which implies that technology investment
could have different effects on firms with different size. Thus, it is meaningful to examine
the impact of technology spending on both large and small banks.

To what extent is the use of technology exogenously determined? Previous research
suggests that technology has profoundly changed the way that traditional business is
conducted and technological advances have become an exogenous driving force in the
economy (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 1997; Hansen and Prescott, 2002). 10
Additionally, the innovation and adoption of technology from the world technology

10

Technology is often assumed as exogenous in the neoclassical growth model (Grossman and Helpman,
1994) and in the real business-cycle theory (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Huffman, 1988; Gali, 1999).
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frontier of firms drives the economic growth (Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2006;
Madsen, 2014).

With the rapid technological progress across the banking industry, many believe
that banks must adopt new technology in order to stay competitive, while others argue that
adoption of technology may be driven by certain firm characteristics. Hall and Khan (2003)
contend that the choice of technology adoption is between adopting it now or deferring the
decision until later, but it is not a choice between adopting and not adopting. To stay
competitive and better serve customers, banks should invest or adopt new technology at
some point in time. Hernândez-Murillo, Llobet, and Fuentes (2010) investigate the
determinants of banks’ decisions to adopt a transactional website for their customers. Using
a panel of commercial banks in the U.S. from 2003-2006, they find that while bank-speciﬁc
characteristics are important in banks’ adoption decisions, market competition plays a
prominent role consistent with the notion that the adoption of technology is a necessity for
banks to remain competitive. Overall, previous research seems to support that the use of
technology by banks can be exogenously determined.

2.3.Data and Research Methodology
2.3.1.

Data Description

The firm-level data set for this study is obtained from the Compustat banking
database, and the S&P Global Market Intelligence (formally SNL Financial) banking
database from 2000-2017 for the U.S. listed commercial banks (SIC Code: 60). Specifically,
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the annual technology and communication expense data are collected from the S&P Global
Market Intelligence. Other annual financial information is obtained from Compustat.11

Technology and communication expenses include physical technology equipment,
software, and services. However, it is challenging to disentangle the components of this
expense from the database. The technology expense from the S&P Global Market
Intelligence is primarily constructed based on U.S. GAAP Standard Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 86 and includes expenses paid for communications, such
as telephone and fax usage charges, internet data plans, internet plans, data processing,
technology equipment as well as software purchases and subscriptions to cloud-based
services. On the financial reports and bank regulatory filings of banks, these expenses are
usually reported as technology and communications expenses, data processing expenses,
Internet banking expenses, and ATM expenses, etc. Table A2 in the appendix provides
detailed descriptions of the technology expenses, along with some typical examples
indicating their original sources and compositions.

Regarding performance measures of banks, two commonly used ratios are used:
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), which are defined as earnings before
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization divided by the book value of assets
and by the book value of equity, respectively. To assess which channel of technology
spending affects bank performance, ROA is decomposed into two components: Profit

𝑥
If an accounting item is missing in year t, it is replaced by estimates from this formula: 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑥
𝑥
𝑥
(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 )/2, where 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡 is the information of 𝑥 (total assets, technology expense, etc.) of
bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡.
11
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Margin and Asset Turnover. Profit Margin is measured as earnings before extraordinary
items plus depreciation and amortization divided by the sum of interest income and
noninterest income, while Asset Turnover is measured as the sum of interest income and
noninterest income divided by the book value of assets. The market value of banks is
measured as the market-to-book equity ratio (market-to-book), defined as share prices as
of the fiscal year-end times common shares outstanding divided by the book value of equity,
and Q as in Lamont and Polk (2002), measured as share prices as of the fiscal year-end
times common shares outstanding plus total assets minus the book value of equity, to total
assets. Table A1 in the appendix provides detailed descriptions of the variables used in this
paper.

As large banks may spend more on technology, it needs to adjust for firm size
making it meaningful to compare technology spending among banks. Thus, controlling for
firm size, two technology ratios (technology expense/total assets and technology
expense/total loan and deposit) are included as independent variables in the regressions.12

Since lagged variables are included in the regressions, banks with fewer than two
consecutive years of technology expenses and total assets information are excluded.
Observations with missing values of the key variables are also excluded. All the variables

12

It is possible that the technology expense variable does not include all technology investment. By
normalizing the technology expense variable using firm size and including bank fixed effects in the
regression, the measurement error problem is mitigated. It also alleviates the problem resulting from an
increase in bank size, especially from mergers and acquisitions.
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are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to mitigate the effect of outliers.
The final sample consists of 8,706 bank-year observations for 994 banks from 2000-2017.

Table 2-1 reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in this paper. The
total assets of the banks have a mean of $7.1 billion and a median of $0.9 billion. The
typical bank has an average market capitalization of $1.1 billion and a median of $0.1
billion. The mean and median of the technology expenses is $14.3 million and $1.5 million,
respectively. Regarding the performance measures, the mean Return on Assets is 0.82%
and the median is 0.94%, while the mean Return on Equity is 8.28% and the median is
9.77%. For measures of firm value, the average market-to-book equity ratio is 1.33 and the
median is 1.21, and the average Q is 1.03 and the median Q is 1.02. Regarding the
technology expense measures, the mean (median) ratio of technology expense over total
assets and total loans and deposits are 0.18% (0.17%) and 0.13% (0.12%), respectively.

2.3.2. Empirical Specifications for the Correlation between
Performance and Technology Spending

This subsection discusses the empirical specification to assess the relationship
between bank performance and technology spending. Return on Assets (ROA) and Return
on Equity (ROE) are used as the performance measures. ROA demonstrates how well a
firm can generate a return on its assets and indicates whether a bank’s assets are productive
and well managed. ROE is the measure of company performance in the views of analysts
and investors. The relations between the ROA and ROE of banks and their previous year’s
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technology spending measures, controlling for several firm characteristics based on the full
sample, small bank, and large bank sample, respectively, are examined. A fixed effects
model is used with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level as
follows:
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1

(2-1)

+ 𝛽6 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is either the ROA or ROE of bank 𝑖 at year 𝑡, 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 is either the ratio of
technology expense over total assets or the ratio of technology expense over total loans and
deposits of bank 𝑖 at year t-1. 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the previous year’s natural log of the market
capitalization of equity following Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2015). 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
is the previous year’s book assets to equity ratio, as in Adrian and Shin
(2009). 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 / 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the previous year’s total loans to total assets ratio.
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 / 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the previous year’s total deposits to total assets ratio,
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 / 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the previous year’s total deposits to total liabilities ratio, and
𝜂𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 represent firm and year fixed effects, respectively.
ROA can be expressed as the product of Profit Margin and Asset Turnover. This
decomposition is widely used in the literature (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Jansen,
Ramnath, and Yohn, 2012) and can be found in financial statement analysis textbooks (e.g.,
Healy and Palepu, 2012, Titman, Keown, and Martin, 2013; Brigham and Daves, 2014).
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Intuitively, Profit Margin indicates how much of every dollar of revenue a bank keeps in
earnings. It reflects a bank’s operating efficiency and profitability after considering the
costs of goods and/or services sold and operating expenses. Asset Turnover measures asset
utilization indicating how well a company can deploy its assets in generating revenue.
Some firms may emphasize high Profit Margin to improve their ROA, while others pay
closer attention to Asset Turnover or both. The existing literature provides little evidence
regarding the relationship between bank technology investments and Profit Margin and/or
Asset Turnover.

To examine the specific channel that technology spending influences bank
performance, the following equation to study the relationship between the two components
and technology spending is posited:
𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1

(2-2)

+ 𝛽6 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

The dependent variable, 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , is either 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (defined as
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization divided by the sum
of interest income and noninterest income) or 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (defined as the sum of
interest income and noninterest income divided by the book value of assets) of bank 𝑖 at
year 𝑡. Other variables are as previously defined.
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2.3.3. Firm Value and Technology

This subsection discusses the methodology to examine the relationship between
technology investment and firm value. In value-based management (VBM) theory, the
primary objective of a firm is to increase the wealth of its shareholders (Ittner and Larcker,
2001). Firm managers should first consider the interests of shareholders when making
investment decisions. Thus, sound technology investment decisions should help maximize
firm value. In addition, if technology investment influences the financial performance of
banks, there should exist a positive relationship between firm value and technology
investment.

To empirically examine the relationship, a similar regression as follows is adopted.
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1

(2-3)

+ 𝛽6 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

The dependent variable is the market-to-book equity ratio or the Q of bank 𝑖 at year
𝑡 and the other variables are as previously defined. Here, the market-to-book equity ratio
is defined as share prices (common shares outstanding at the fiscal year-end) divided by
the book value of equity. Q is the ratio of the market value, measured as share prices as of
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the fiscal year-end times common shares outstanding plus total assets minus the book value
of equity, to its total assets as in Lamont and Polk (2002).

2.4.

Empirical Results

2.4.1. The Growth of Technology Spending and Its Relationship with Firm Performance

First, dramatic growth in technology spending by banks from 2000-2017 is found.
The median technology and communication expense per bank (in 2017 dollars) grew from
$1.12 million in 2000 to $2.95 million in 2017 (see Figure 2-1). The trend is almost
monotonically increasing during this period. Then, the banks are grouped into two subsets
based on their gross total assets (GTA). For small banks, whose time-series average of
GTA is up to $1 billion, the median rose from $0.52 million to $1.29 million, while for
large banks, whose time-series average of GTA exceeds $1 billion, the median grew from
$2.57 million to $6.39 million. This finding indicates that there exists a steady increase in
a bank’s technology spending each year over this period. 13 The result is also in line with
the final sales of domestic computers in the United States, as shown in Table 9.2U of the
National Income and Product Accounts and illustrated in Figure B1 in the appendix.14

13

U.S listed commercial banks without mergers and acquisitions activities (Non-M&A banks) are kept in the
sample from 2000-2017. There are 538 Non-M&A banks in the sample. The trends of technology and
communication expenses (based on median) of those Non-M&A banks are illustrated. The results are
quantitatively similar and are reported in Figure B1 in the appendix.
14

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=19&step=3#reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=underlying&1903=2076
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To assess whether banks with better financial performance are more likely to adopt
new technology, a closer look is taken at how technology spending is related to bank
performance during the financial crisis. The argument is that if technology spending is
largely determined by a bank’s financial performance, then technology spending should
have dropped significantly during the financial crisis. The median technology spending per
bank grew from $1.63 million in 2007 to $1.94 million in 2012 (see Figure 2-1), although
the median bank performance measures experienced a significant drop starting from 2007.
Also, the median technology spending measures (Tech Expenses/Total Assets and Tech
Expenses/Loans & Deposits) gradually increased from 2007 until 2014 (see Figure 2-2),
while there is a clear “V” shape for bank performance measures over the sample period.

Next, if bank performance strongly influences technology investment, one would
expect technology spending to decrease when banks face significant financial hardships.
Essentially, it is examined how technology spending reacts on a negative performance
shock, which is measured as a bank’s ROA becomes negative at year t, while it is positive
in year t-1. In the sample, there are 247 bank years that a bank’s ROA becomes negative
from a positive previous year. The technology spending trend three years before and after
the negative performance shock year are examined. 15

The negative performance shock measure is also measured as a bank’s ROA at year t is one standard
deviation less than that of year t-1. In the sample, there are 258 bank years that a bank’s ROA drops two
standard deviations from its previous year. The results are quantitatively similar and are reported in Figure
B2 in the appendix.
15
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Figure 2-3 illustrates the pattern of the mean and the median of the technology
spending measures. The results indicate that the mean and median technology spending
measures (Tech Expenses/Total Assets and Tech Expenses/Total Loan & Deposits,
respectively) after the year with a negative performance shock still increase monotonically
in both cases. However, the mean (median) Tech Expenses/Total Assets ratio in year t+3
is higher than the ratio in year t-3 by 0.04 (0.03), with a t-statistic from the two sample ttest of 5.17 and a z-statistic from the two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test of 4.94. The test
results based on Tech Expenses/Total Loan & Deposits are similar. These results indicate
that technology spending continues to increase even when banks experience a negative
performance shock, suggesting that a negative shock on bank performance does not affect
their technology spending.16

2.4.2. Firm Performance and Technology Spending

This section explores the correlation between bank performance, measured by
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), and their lagged technology
spending measures, measured by Tech Expenses/Total Assets and Tech Expenses/Loans
& Deposits, while controlling for firm size, capital structure, and portfolio composition in
the previous year.

16

Same analysis is also applied by measuring bank negative profitability shocks via ROE. The results are
quantitatively similar with those presented in this panel. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are
available upon request.
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Table 2-2 reports the regression results based on Equation (2-1) (i.e., the basic
regression of bank performance on the lagged technology investment measures), when
ROA is used as the dependent variable. In Columns (1) and (2), when, the estimated
coefficients of the previous year’s technology spending measures are positive (0.60 and
0.85) and statistically significant at the 10% level. For small banks [Columns (3) and (4)],
the estimated coefficients of the previous year’s technology spending measures are
statistically insignificant. In contrast, the coefficients of the previous year’s technology
spending measures based on large banks are all positive (0.93 and 1.32) and highly
statistically significant at the 1% level, as in Columns (5) and (6). It is worth noting that
the coefficients of the large banks are significantly greater than those of the full sample and
the small banks. The result highlights the importance of technology investment on
performance for large banks. For the control variables, the results confirm that bank size is
positively correlated with ROA indicating that large banks tend to have better performance.
Moreover, firm leverage is negatively associated with ROA, which is not surprising.

Similarly, with ROE as the dependent variable Table 2-3, the coefficients are also
positive (10.59 and 15.14) and statistically significant at the 5% level for the full sample
[Columns (1) and (2)]. For small banks sample [Columns (3) and (4)] the estimated
coefficients of the previous year’s technology spending measures are positive, but
statistically insignificant. In the meanwhile, the coefficients of the previous year’s
technology spending measures based on large banks [Columns (5) and (6)] are positive
(15.75 and 22.12) and highly statistically significant at the 1% level. The results also show
that bank size is positively correlated with performance. As expected, banks with a higher
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deposit/assets ratio tend to have higher ROE, while those with a higher deposit/total
liabilities ratio tend to have lower ROE.

The insignificant coefficients of the technology spending measures for small banks
can partly explain the “IT performance paradox” stated in Beccalli (2007) whose sample
consists of commercial banks from five European countries. The positive relationship
between technology spending and performance for large banks is consistent with Mithas et
al. (2012), a recent study whose sample contains more than 400 large global firms.
Collectively, the results provide strong evidence that bank performance is positively related
to their previous year’s technology spending for large banks, but not small banks.

2.4.3. Channel of Technology Spending Influencing Firm Performance

The results presented in this subsection shed light on the mechanism in which a
bank’s performance is associated with its technology spending. As mentioned previously,
a bank’s Return on Assets are decomposed into two parts: Profit Margin, measuring
operating efficiency and profitability, and Asset Turnover, measuring sales volume effect.

When the dependent variable is Profit Margin, the results from Equation (2-2) are
reported in Table 2-4. With the full sample, as in Columns (1) and (2), the estimated
coefficients of the previous year’s technology spending measures are positive, but
statistically insignificant. For small banks, the estimated coefficients of the previous year’s
technology spending measures are negative and statistically insignificant, as in Columns
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(3) and (4). For the large banks, the estimated coefficients of the previous year’s technology
spending measures are positive (14.57 and 19.40) and statistically significant at the 5% or
10% level, as Columns (5) and (6).

While the dependent variable is Asset Turnover, the results from Equation (2-2) are
reported in Table 2-5. All six estimated coefficients of the previous year’s technology
spending measures are positive [1.88 and 2.78 for the full sample as in Columns (1) and
(2), 1.64 and 2.45 for the small banks sample as in Columns (3) and (4), and 1.97 and 2.89
for the large banks sample as in Columns (5) and (6)] and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The results imply that banks with higher previous year’s technology spending, on
average, generate more revenues.

The results imply that technology spending does help small banks to increase their
revenue (higher Asset Turnover) but does not increase their ability to convert revenue into
profit. Thus, the revenue generated from the technology investment of small banks may
not fully cover their increased costs. Large banks can better capture the benefits from
technology investment through efficiency gains and cost reduction resulting from the
economies of scale, which suggests that bank size matters in such a relation. These results
from the full sample also suggest that Asset Turnover, but not Profit Margin, may be
associated with their previous year’s technology spending. These results imply that
technology investment is likely to affect bank performance by increasing sales volume
rather than by improving operational efficiency.
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2.4.4. Market Value and Technology Investment

This subsection examines the extent to which the technology investment of a bank
is a source of value creation for its shareholders. The results from Equation (2-3) with the
market-to-book ratio as the dependent variable are reported in Table 2-6. The coefficient
estimates of the technology spending measures are statistically insignificant in the full
sample and the small bank sample, as in Columns (1) to (4). In contrast, the coefficient
estimates of the technology spending measures for the large banks are positive (0.53 and
0.66) and statistically significant at the 5% level, as in Columns (5) and (6).

The results from Equation (2-3) with Firm Q as the dependent variable are reported
in Table 2-7. Consistently, the four coefficient estimates of the previous year’s technology
spending measures are statistically insignificant in the full sample and the small banks
sample, as in Columns (1) to (4), while they are positive (0.04 and 0.05) and statistically
significant at the 10% level, in the large bank sample, as in Column (5) and (6).

Collectively, these results provide evidence that bank value is positively associated
with their previous year’s technology spending related to total assets and total loans and
deposits, respectively, in large banks. The results are consistent with Anderson et al. (2006)
who focus on Fortune 1000 firms and find that firm value increased, on average, with Y2K
spending on technology. In addition, the estimated coefficients of the technology spending
measures in the large bank sample are greater than those in the full sample and small bank
sample.
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2.5.

Robustness Checks

This section presents a range of robustness checks, which provide additional
supporting evidence for the main results in Section 4. The control variables used in this
section are the same as those in the main regression models unless noted below.

2.5.1. Alternative Technology Spending Levels

As argued in the previous section, some banks seem to benefit significantly from
their technology investments only if the amount of their technology spending is large
enough and can change their business model and significantly lower their operating cost
due to the economies of scale. Other banks may not be able to capture the benefits of
technology investments as technology investments are often lumpy and costly. The
analysis is re-run using $1 million and $3 million as the cutoff point for technology expense,
respectively.

Panels A and B of Table 2-8 report the results of the regressions of the performance
and firm value measures on technology spending measures with the three cutoff points.
The parameters for the lagged technology spending measures in the $5 million sample and
the $3 million sample are larger and have higher statistical significance levels than those
in the $1 million sample. These results support the main results in Section 4.
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2.5.2. Large Banks with Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) Banks Excluded

It is believed that the largest banks operate in very different models and under
different degrees of government regulation, supervision, and support. To ensure the results
concerning large banks are not determined by those TBTF banks, an analysis for the large
bank sample excluding banks whose time-series average gross total assets exceed $50
billion is conducted. Those banks are usually called too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks or
systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs).

Panel D of Table 2-8 reports the regression results on Return on Assets, Return on
Equity, Profit Margin, Asset Turnover, market-to-book, and Q of the banks on their
previous year’s technology spending measures with each column as a separate regression
for the dependent variable indicated in the column header. The estimated coefficients are
quantitatively similar to those presented in the previous tables and significance is found in
similar cases except for Q. The findings of the relationship between the performance and
firm value of large banks and their technology investment measures remains unchanged
when TBTF banks are dropped from the sample.

2.5.3. Large Banks without Mergers and Acquisitions Activities

One may concern that consolidation or mergers and acquisitions activities may
drive the results since there exists tremendous growth in banks’ assets in the past decades.
To ensure the results concerning large banks are not determined by those mergers and
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acquisitions activities, an analysis for the large bank sample excluding banks whose have
mergers and acquisitions activities during the sample period (Non-M&A Banks) is
conducted.

Panel E of Table 2-8 reports the regression results on the performance and market
value of Non-M&A large banks on their previous year’s technology spending measures
with each column as a separate regression for the dependent variable indicated in the
column header. Consistent estimated coefficients for technology investment measures in
Columns (1) to (4) suggest that technology make significant contributions in bank
performance for those banks without large variations on their sizes. When the dependent
variables are bank market valuation, the estimated parameters are positive but insignificant.

2.5.4. Long Lags of Technology Spending Measures

Panel F and Panel G of Table 2-8 report the regression results of Return on Assets
and Return on Equity of banks on their previous one- to five-year technology spending
measures using Equation (2-1) for large banks. Each column is a separate regression for
the dependent variable indicated in the column header. The results indicate that bank
performance of the large banks is associated with up to four-year lags of technology
spending measures. These estimated coefficients are all positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. For instance, the coefficient for Tech Expenses/Total Assets is 1.22 when
a two-year lag of the technology spending ratio is used. The t-statistics are highly
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statistically significant. These results suggest that long lags of technology spending
measures have significant effects on bank performance.

2.5.5. Further Discussion on Endogeneity between Firm Performance and Technology
Spending

Overall, the use of technology by banks is likely to be driven by a number of factors
such as the rapid technological progress, socialization of the banking industry (Terry,
Schwartz, and Schwartz, 2015), competition from non-banking institutions (Buchak,
Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru, 2017), risk of information breaching, and financial regulations
and compliance. Thus, one can argue that bank technology investments are largely
exogenously driven. Just like other firms in the manufacturing and service industries,
banks must meet challenges from the rapid advancement of technology, such as mobile
banking, cloud computing, and data security, to stay competitive in the market regardless
as to whether they are willing or able to adapt. To a large extent, the competitive market
environment “forces” banks to increasingly invest in technology to catch up with the
technology advancements.

Despite the argument and the attempts to address the potential endogeneity between
bank performance and technology investments, the endogeneity concern is not completely
eliminated. Further research should be conducted to provide additional evidence on this
issue. Due to data limitations, it is challenging for us to employ other econometric
techniques in empirical corporate finance to address the endogeneity issue (e.g.,
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instrumental variables, difference-in-differences estimation, and regression discontinuity
design). Thus, this paper provides some preliminary evidence regarding a possible causal
effect of technology investments on bank performance.

2.6.

Conclusion

The rapid adoption of technology by U.S. firms over the past two decades has
drawn great attention from academics, policymakers, and practitioners. Despite the
importance of technology investment, research regarding its impact on public firms has
been limited. To fill this gap, this paper examines the effect of technology investment on
firm performance and market value, using a unique dataset from the U.S. listed commercial
banks from 2000-2017.

To meet the strong demand for agile and secure technology infrastructure and to
stay competitive in the market, U.S. banks have significantly increased their technology
spending during the past decades. This paper is one of the first studies to examine the
extent to which expanded technology spending is related to financial performance and firm
value, using technology spending data from the U.S. listed commercial banks.

First, a strong growth pattern in technology investment in the banking industry is
documented. The technology spending of banks almost monotonically increased, even
during the financial crisis. Banks experiencing negative performance shocks do not
subsequently cut their technology spending. Thus, there is little evidence that bank
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technology spending is affected by negative performance shocks during the financial crisis
and the slow revenue growth in recent years. These findings suggest that adoption of new
technology has become a necessity instead of a strategic choice for banks, as they must
provide quality services to customers and improve their productivity to remain competitive
in the market.

Moreover, the research indicates that there is a strong positive correlation between
bank performance and their lagged technology spending measures. This positive
correlation is primarily driven by large banks. While greater technology spending increases
Asset Turnover for both small and large banks, it only improves the Profit Margin of large
banks implying that technology investments affect bank performance by improving
operational efficiency, rather than by increasing sales. It appears that large banks are more
likely to enjoy the economies of scale from lumpy technology investments. Consistent with
Prasad and Harker (1997), there is little evidence that the financial performance of small
banks is related to expanded technology spending, perhaps because small banks primarily
adopt technology in order to survive and it is very costly for them to invest in technology,
such as cybersecurity.
The findings in the paper can partly explain the “IT performance paradox” in the
literature, as a size effect concerning the effects of technology spending on banks is
identified. The results also indicate that technology investment helps increase bank value
for large banks. The paper fills a gap in the literature as to whether the use of technology
enhances or destroys firm value.
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This paper provides insights for managers with different firm sizes to make efficient
capital allocation decisions. Also, the findings have implications for policymakers
regarding changing regulations related to the use of technology. As large firms are more
likely to gain benefits from lumpy technology investments, they are likely to have a
significant competitive advantage in the market given the rapid growth in technological
advances. This may lead to further consolidation in the banking industry and influence
small business lending. Meanwhile, regulators should consider whether the current legal
system, capital requirements, and cost models would facilitate firms in keeping up with the
technological advances. Given the evidence that the effects of technology investment differ
between small banks and large banks, it becomes a critical issue whether those regulations
should be different for small firms and large firms.

As one of the first empirical studies examining the effects of technology
investments on firm performance and firm value, there are some limitations in the paper.
Additional research on the causal relationship between technology spending and firm
performance is warranted. Also, it will be fruitful to examine relationships between
technology investments and financing decisions, corporate governance, and firm risk on
U.S. financial institutions. Finally, as the literature primarily consists of empirical analysis,
there is a strong need for theoretical work to explain the effects of technology investments
on corporate decisions.
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in this paper. All of the
variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are included in
regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology expenses and total
assets information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99%
tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Media Std.
Variables
Mean
Min
Max
Obs.
n
Dev.
Total Assets ($B)
Market Capitalization ($B)
Technology Expense ($M)
Leverage
Loans/Assets
Deposits/Assets
Deposits/Liability
Return on Assets (%)
Return on Equity (%)
Profit Margin (%)
Asset Turnover (%)
Market-to-Book Equity Ratio
Firm Q
Tech Expense/Total Assets (%)
Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits
(%)

7.089
1.143
14.305
11.159
0.667
0.768
0.856
0.816
8.282
18.874
4.178
1.330
1.030
0.180

0.923
0.105
1.504
10.556
0.682
0.788
0.879
0.942
9.773
23.424
4.080
1.212
1.021
0.166

29.461
4.963
70.077
4.053
0.124
0.092
0.102
0.827
11.894
21.291
1.033
0.635
0.056
0.097

0.095
0.004
0.117
4.282
0.257
0.468
0.510
-3.425
-67.231
-103.491
1.955
0.231
0.932
0.025

247.259
42.479
598.000
32.467
0.892
0.908
0.995
2.456
30.417
47.813
8.131
3.603
1.224
0.486

8,706
8,343
8,706
8,706
8,706
8,706
8,706
7,974
7,974
7,974
8,703
8,308
8,343
8,706

0.127

0.116

0.069

0.020

0.369

8,706
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Table 2.2. Return on Assets and Technology Investment
This table reports the results of the regressions of bank Return on Assets on their
technology investment measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech Expense/Loans &
Deposits) in the previous year in the sample from 2000-2017. The standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels are presented as*, **, or ***, respectively. All
of the variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are
included in regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology
expenses and total assets information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at
the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All
All
Small Small Large Large
Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
0.927**
Tech Expense/Total Assets, t-1
0.604*
0.128
*
[1.90]
[0.24]
[3.10]
1.317**
Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits, t-1
0.853*
0.194
*
[1.84]
[0.24]
[3.21]
0.321** 0.321** 0.326** 0.326** 0.329** 0.328**
Log Market Capitalization, t-1
*
*
*
*
*
*
[8.58] [8.55] [4.25] [4.23] [7.64] [7.60]
Leverage, t-1
-0.013 -0.013 -0.018* -0.018*
0.015** 0.015**
[-2.06] [-2.05] [-1.10] [-1.10] [-1.79] [-1.78]
Loans/Assets, t-1
-0.048 0.027 0.380 0.397 -0.404* -0.291
[-0.24] [0.13] [1.15] [1.23] [-1.78] [-1.28]
Deposits/Assets, t-1
1.608* 1.689* 1.513 1.531 1.280 1.403
[1.81] [1.90] [1.26] [1.27] [0.98] [1.07]
Deposits/Liability, t-1
-1.122 -1.131 -0.796 -0.799 -1.094 -1.110
[-1.43] [-1.44] [-0.73] [-0.73] [-0.95] [-0.97]
Constant
-0.330 -0.431 -0.602 -0.628 -0.112 -0.265
[-1.06] [-1.35] [-1.23] [-1.26] [-0.28] [-0.65]
Number of Observations
6,652 6,652 3,060 3,060 3,592 3,592
Number of Banks
912
912
463
463
449
449
Adjusted R-squared
0.293 0.293 0.249 0.249 0.334 0.334
Bank Fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year Fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Table 2.3. Return on Equity and Technology Investment
This table reports the results of the regressions of bank Return on Equity on their
technology investment measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech Expense/Loans &
Deposits) in the previous year in the sample from 2000-2017. The standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels are presented as*, **, or ***, respectively. All
of the variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are
included in regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology
expenses and total assets information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at
the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All
All
Small Small Large Large
Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
Tech Expense/Total Assets, t-1

10.595*
*
[2.03]

15.752*
**
[3.25]

4.078

[0.47]
15.135*
22.112*
Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits, t-1
6.829
*
**
[1.98]
[0.52]
[3.32]
4.046** 4.040** 4.690** 4.715** 4.054** 4.034**
Log Market Capitalization, t-1
*
*
*
*
*
*
[5.34] [5.32] [3.35] [3.35] [4.46] [4.44]
Leverage, t-1
-0.156 -0.156 -0.200 -0.200 -0.125 -0.123
[-0.94] [-0.94] [-0.70] [-0.70] [-0.66] [-0.65]
Loans/Assets, t-1
-2.954 -1.627 1.997 2.604 -6.546* -4.646
[-0.94] [-0.52] [0.38] [0.50] [-1.81] [-1.29]
56.219* 57.649* 46.662* 47.319* 61.743* 63.787*
Deposits/Assets, t-1
**
**
*
*
**
**
[3.64] [3.72] [2.17] [2.19] [2.66] [2.75]
Deposits/Liability, t-1
47.610* 47.783* -31.093 -31.226 60.008* 60.247*
**
**
**
**
[-3.41] [-3.42] [-1.63] [-1.64] [-2.86] [-2.87]
Constant
-4.014 -5.829
1.160 -1.362
12.709* 13.696*
[-0.73] [-1.01] [-1.81] [-1.81] [0.15] [-0.17]
Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Adjusted R-squared
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

6,652
912
0.208
YES
YES
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6,652
912
0.208
YES
YES

3,060
463
0.168
YES
YES

3,060
463
0.168
YES
YES

3,592
449
0.250
YES
YES

3,592
449
0.250
YES
YES

Table 2.4. Profit Margin and Technology Investment
This table reports the results of the regressions of bank Profit Margin on their technology
investment measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits)
in the previous year in the sample from 2000-2017. The standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the
1%, 5%, or 10% levels are presented as*, **, or ***, respectively. All of the variables are
defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are included in regressions,
firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology expenses and total assets
information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of
the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All
All
Small Small Large Large
Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
Tech Expense/Total Assets, t-1

6.903
[0.86]

Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits, t-1
Log Market Capitalization, t-1

Leverage, t-1

Loans/Assets, t-1
Deposits/Assets, t-1

Deposits/Liability, t-1

Constant

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Adjusted R-squared
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

7.706**
*
[7.51]
0.426**
[-2.03]

14.571*
*
[2.02]

-2.981
[-0.21]
8.449
[0.73]
7.679**
*
[7.47]
0.427**
[-2.03]

-5.180
19.399*
[-0.25]
[1.95]
7.612** 7.589** 7.772** 7.740**
*
*
*
*
[3.48] [3.46] [6.90] [6.85]
-0.452

-0.452

-0.427

[-1.37] [-1.37] [-1.55]
-1.265 -0.529 11.330 10.869
11.811*
[-0.23] [-0.10] [1.22] [1.19] [-1.82]
45.438* 46.195* 45.702 45.201 43.424
[1.94] [1.96] [1.50] [1.48] [1.21]
40.870* 40.817* -30.407 -30.293 -47.759
*
*
[-1.97] [-1.97] [-1.10] [-1.09] [-1.53]
-1.310 -2.156 -10.312 -9.543 5.670
[-0.16] [-0.25] [-0.81] [-0.71] [0.54]
6,652
912
0.277
YES
YES
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6,652
912
0.277
YES
YES

3,060
463
0.242
YES
YES

3,060
463
0.242
YES
YES

3,592
449
0.311
YES
YES

-0.426
[-1.55]
-10.151
[-1.55]
45.148
[1.26]
-47.822
[-1.53]
3.592
[0.33]
3,592
449
0.311
YES
YES

Table 2.5. Asset Turnover and Technology Investment
This table reports the results of the regressions of bank Asset Turnover on their technology
investment measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits)
in the previous year in the sample from 2000-2017. The standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the
1%, 5%, or 10% levels are presented as*, **, or ***, respectively. All of the variables are
defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are included in regressions,
firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology expenses and total assets
information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of
the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All
All
Small Small
Large
Large
Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
Tech Expense/Total Assets, t-1

1.880***
[6.14]

Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits, t-1

2.775***
2.448***
2.892***
[6.29]
[4.15]
[4.48]
0.107*** 0.108*** 0.132** 0.136*** 0.117** 0.117**
[2.63] [2.66] [2.52] [2.63] [2.06] [2.06]
0.006
0.006 0.019* 0.019* -0.002 -0.002
[0.82] [0.82] [1.81] [1.80] [-0.22] [-0.21]
0.517* 0.759** 0.638** 0.857*** 0.436
0.681
[1.74] [2.50] [2.03] [2.82] [0.91] [1.39]
-0.247 0.028 -1.016 -0.782 -0.242 0.054
[-0.21] [0.02] [-0.65] [-0.50] [-0.13] [0.03]
1.502
1.445
1.765
1.734
1.671
1.594
[1.48] [1.43] [1.22] [1.21] [1.13] [1.08]
2.246*** 1.907*** 2.174*** 1.850*** 2.321*** 1.983**
[4.67] [3.91] [3.93] [3.46] [3.05] [2.54]

Log Market Capitalization, t-1
Leverage, t-1
Loans/Assets, t-1
Deposits/Assets, t-1
Deposits/Liability, t-1
Constant

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Adjusted R-squared
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

7,291
963
0.136
YES
YES

1.639***
[4.31]

7,291
963
0.139
YES
YES
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3,271
481
0.123
YES
YES

1.970***
[4.17]

3,271
481
0.125
YES
YES

4,020
482
0.156
YES
YES

4,020
482
0.158
YES
YES

Table 2.6. Market-to-Book Equity Ratio and Technology Investment
This table reports the results of the regressions of bank Market-to-Book Equity Ratio on
their technology investment measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech
Expense/Loans & Deposits) in the previous year in the sample from 2000-2017. The
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors
are in brackets. Significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels are presented as*, **, or ***,
respectively. All of the variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged
variables are included in regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of
technology expenses and total assets information are excluded. The variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme
observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All
All
Small Small Large Large
Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
Tech Expense/Total Assets, t-1
Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits, t-1
Log Market Capitalization, t-1

Leverage, t-1
Loans/Assets, t-1
Deposits/Assets, t-1

Deposits/Liability, t-1

Constant

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Adjusted R-squared
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

0.249
[1.64]

-0.117
[-0.63]

0.526**
[2.39]

0.299
-0.162
0.652**
[1.42]
[-0.61]
[2.20]
0.249** 0.248** 0.212** 0.212** 0.286** 0.284**
*
*
*
*
*
*
[9.98] [9.96] [4.41] [4.43] [9.43] [9.38]
0.018** 0.018**
0.015** 0.015**
0.018** 0.018**
*
*
*
*
[3.56] [3.55] [2.27] [2.27] [2.61] [2.60]
0.092 0.118 0.445 0.431 -0.210 -0.155
[0.52] [0.67] [1.63] [1.58] [-1.12] [-0.82]
2.943** 2.969**
4.212** 4.266**
1.435 1.420
*
*
*
*
[4.73] [4.76] [1.62] [1.60] [4.50] [4.54]
2.231** 2.229** -0.966 -0.965 3.352** 3.350**
*
*
*
*
[-4.18] [-4.17] [-1.41] [-1.41] [-4.02] [-4.01]
-0.179 -0.207 -0.214 -0.194 -0.231 -0.291
[-0.89] [-1.00] [-0.77] [-0.67] [-0.81] [-1.00]
7,256
962
0.555
YES
YES
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7,256
962
0.555
YES
YES

3,253
481
0.543
YES
YES

3,253
481
0.543
YES
YES

4,003
481
0.585
YES
YES

4,003
481
0.585
YES
YES

Table 2.7. Firm Q and Technology Investment
This table reports the results of the regressions of bank Firm Q on their technology
investment measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits)
in the previous year in the sample from 2000-2017. The standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the
1%, 5%, or 10% levels are presented as*, **, or ***, respectively. All of the variables are
defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are included in regressions,
firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology expenses and total assets
information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of
the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All
All
Small Small Large Large
Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
Tech Expense/Total Assets, t-1
Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits, t-1
Log Market Capitalization, t-1

Leverage, t-1
Loans/Assets, t-1
Deposits/Assets, t-1

Deposits/Liability, t-1

Constant

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Adjusted R-squared
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

0.016
[1.27]

-0.010
[-0.69]

0.038*
[1.92]

0.020
-0.016
0.050*
[1.13]
[-0.76]
[1.85]
0.019** 0.019** 0.017** 0.017** 0.020** 0.020**
*
*
*
*
*
*
[7.83] [7.81] [4.36] [4.37] [6.74] [6.71]
0.001** 0.001**
0.001** 0.001**
0.000 0.000
*
*
[2.46] [2.46] [2.79] [2.79] [0.78] [0.77]
0.005 0.007 0.033 0.032 -0.022 -0.017
[0.32] [0.44] [1.35] [1.30] [-1.28] [-1.02]
0.235** 0.237**
0.352** 0.357**
0.094 0.093
*
*
*
*
[4.21] [4.24] [1.24] [1.22] [4.42] [4.48]
0.163** 0.163** -0.045 -0.045 0.266** 0.267**
*
*
*
*
[-3.25] [-3.25] [-0.71] [-0.71] [-3.63] [-3.63]
0.909** 0.907** 0.893** 0.895** 0.922** 0.917**
*
*
*
*
*
*
[46.18] [44.57] [35.76] [34.64] [32.73] [31.59]
7,285
963
0.560
YES
YES
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7,285
963
0.560
YES
YES

3,265
481
0.573
YES
YES

3,265
481
0.573
YES
YES

4,020
482
0.574
YES
YES

4,020
482
0.573
YES
YES

Table 2.8. Robustness Checks
This table presents the results of the robustness checks.
Panels A, B and C keep firm-year observations whose technology expenses exceed $1
million, $3 million and $5 million, respectively, and reports the results of regressions of
ROA, ROE, Profit Margin, Asset Turnover, market-to-book, and Q on their technology
spending measures in the previous year.
Panel D drops too-big-to-fail banks from large banks and reports the results of regressions
of ROA, ROE, Profit Margin, Asset Turnover, market-to-book, and Q on their technology
spending measures in the previous year.
Panel E and F includes large banks and reports the results of regressions of ROA and ROE
on their previous one- to five-year technology expenses related to total assets and to total
loans and deposits, respectively.
Each cell is a separate regression for the dependent variable indicated in the column header
and the independent variables indicated in the row label. The reported observations and
firms are from regressions when the independent variable is the previous-year technology
expense related to total assets. Control variables include the previous-year market cap,
leverage, loans/assets, deposits/assets, and deposits/liability. The standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets.
Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels are presented as*, **, or ***, respectively. All
of the variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are
included in regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology
expenses and total assets information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at
the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A. Banks Whose Technology Expense > $1 Million
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Return Return
MarketProfit
Asset
Variables
on
on
toMargin Turnover
Assets Equity
Book
Tech Expense/Total
Assets, t-1
Tech Expense/Loans &
Deposits, t-1

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Control Variables
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

(6)
Q

0.751* 12.719* 10.545 1.855*** 0.461** 0.034*
[1.84]

[1.79]

[1.01]

1.009*

16.812

13.329 2.644*** 0.553** 0.043*

[1.74]

[1.63]

[0.90]

[4.72]

[2.02]

[1.77]

4,121
626
YES
YES
YES

4,121
626
YES
YES
YES

4,121
626
YES
YES
YES

4,563
666
YES
YES
YES

4,543
664
YES
YES
YES

4,560
666
YES
YES
YES
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[4.53]

[2.32]

[1.94]

Panel B. Banks Whose Technology Expense > $3 Million
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Return
Return
Profit
Asset MarketVariables
on
on Equity Margin Turnover to-Book
Assets
Tech Expense/Total
Assets, t-1

1.270*** 21.195*** 16.237 2.504*** 0.606**
[2.62]

Tech Expense/Loans &
Deposits, t-1

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Control Variables
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

[2.96]

[1.32]

[3.88]

0.050*
[1.92]

1.734*** 28.852*** 21.514 3.530*** 0.666*

0.061*

[2.73]

[3.08]

[1.32]

[4.12]

[1.86]

[1.73]

1,926
314
YES
YES
YES

1,926
314
YES
YES
YES

1,926
314
YES
YES
YES

2,203
338
YES
YES
YES

2,194
337
YES
YES
YES

2,203
338
YES
YES
YES

(6)
Q

1.384*** 17.150*** 19.159 2.358*** 0.662** 0.058**
[2.76]

[2.63]

[1.62]

[4.29]

Tech Expense/Loans &
1.859*** 23.165*** 24.698 3.241***
Deposits, t-1
[2.93]
[2.74]
[1.65]
[4.59]
Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Control Variables
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

Q

[2.26]

Panel C. Banks Whose Technology Expense > $5 Million
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Return
Return
Profit
Asset
MarketVariables
on
on Equity Margin Turnover to-Book
Assets
Tech Expense/Total
Assets, t-1

(6)

1,309
217
YES
YES
YES

1,309
217
YES
YES
YES
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1,309
217
YES
YES
YES

1,492
241
YES
YES
YES

[2.42]

[2.20]

0.706*

0.070**

[1.92]

[1.98]

1,487
241
YES
YES
YES

1,492
241
YES
YES
YES

Panel D. Large Banks with Too-big-to-fail Banks Excluded
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Return
Return
Profit
Asset MarketVariables
on
on Equity Margin Turnover to-Book
Assets
Tech Expense/Total
Assets, t-1

(6)
Q

1.003*** 17.535*** 18.672** 1.822*** 0.455**

0.030

[3.19]
[3.36]
[2.45]
[3.74]
[2.02]
Tech Expense/Loans &
1.403*** 24.733*** 24.602** 2.769*** 0.629**
Deposits, t-1
[3.19]
[3.40]
[2.30]
[4.06]
[2.00]

[1.47]

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Control Variables
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

3,787
457
YES
YES
YES

3,395
426
YES
YES
YES

3,395
426
YES
YES
YES

3,395
426
YES
YES
YES

3,787
457
YES
YES
YES

3,770
456
YES
YES
YES

Panel E. Large Banks without Mergers and Acquisitions Activities
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Return
Return
Profit
Asset
MarketVariables
on
on Equity Margin Turnover to-Book
Assets
Tech Expense/Total
Assets, t-1

0.043
[1.51]

(6)
Q

3.175*** 57.759*** 61.684*** 3.162***

0.785

0.049

[4.18]
[4.16]
[3.18]
[3.24]
Tech Expense/Loans & 4.195*** 78.290*** 77.933*** 4.478***
Deposits, t-1
[3.94]
[3.97]
[2.83]
[3.43]

[1.60]
0.881

[1.20]
0.055

[1.27]

[0.96]

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Control Variables
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

1,041
154
YES
YES
YES

1,054
155
YES
YES
YES

923
142
YES
YES
YES

923
142
YES
YES
YES
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923
142
YES
YES
YES

1,054
155
YES
YES
YES

Panel F. Return on Assets and Multi-lagged Technology Investment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
m=1
m=2
m=3
m=4
Tech Expense/Total
Assets, t-m

(5)
m=5

0.927***

1.222***

1.253***

1.366***

0.547

[3.10]

[3.90]

[3.51]

[3.63]

[1.41]

1.317***

1.733***

1.714***

1.839***

0.700

[3.21]

[4.08]

[3.66]

[3.67]

[1.30]

3,592
449
YES
YES
YES

3,193
432
YES
YES
YES

2,810
414
YES
YES
YES

2,424
380
YES
YES
YES

2,069
341
YES
YES
YES

Panel G. Return on Equity and Multi-lagged Technology Investment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
m=1
m=2
m=3
m=4

(5)
m=5

Tech Expense/Loans &
Deposits, t-m

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Control Variables
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

Tech Expense/Total
Assets, t-m

15.752*** 18.364*** 19.713*** 19.066***
[3.25]

Tech Expense/Loans &
Deposits, t-m

Number of Observations
Number of Banks
Control Variables
Bank Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

[4.10]

[3.87]

[3.81]

22.112*** 26.056*** 26.925*** 25.880***

7.081
[1.20]
8.302

[3.32]

[4.28]

[4.06]

[3.87]

[1.01]

3,592
449
YES
YES
YES

3,193
432
YES
YES
YES

2,810
414
YES
YES
YES

2,424
380
YES
YES
YES

2,069
341
YES
YES
YES
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Figure 2.1. Bank Technology Spending Trends
This figure illustrates the trends of technology and communication expenses (based on
median) of U.S listed commercial banks in the sample from 2000-2017. Technology and
communication expense is converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. All of the
variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are included in
regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology expenses and total
assets information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99%
tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
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Figure 2.2. Performance and Technology Investment Over Time
This figure illustrates the medians of bank performance measures (Return on Assets and
Return on Equity) and technology investment measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets and
Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits) of U.S listed commercial banks in the sample from 20002017. All of the values are normalized to equal one in the year 2000. All of the variables
are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are included in regressions,
firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology expenses and total assets
information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of
the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.

102

Figure 2.3. Technology Investment Around Negative Performance Shocks
This figure illustrates the means and the medians of the bank technology investment
measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits) before and
after three years of the bank negative performance shocks. The performance shock is
defined as banks’ Return on Assets are one standard deviation less than that in the previous
year. All of the variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables
are included in regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology
expenses and total assets information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at
the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
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Appendix
Table A1. Definition of Variables
Variable
Abb.
Technology
and Technology
Communication
Expense or Tech
Expense
Expense

Technology Expense Tech
to Total Assets
Expense/Total
Assets
Technology Expense Tech
to
Loans
and Expense/Loans
Deposits
& Deposits
Return on Assets

ROA

Return on Equity

ROE

Profit Margin

Profit Margin

Asset Turnover

Asset Turnover

Market-to-Book
Equity Ratio

Market-to-Book

Definition
Expenses paid for communications, data
processing. and technology including
computers, software, information systems,
and telecommunications, as defined by S&P
Global
Market
Intelligence
(SNL
Financial). (SNL keyfield: 132659,
tech_comm_exp).
Technology and communication expense
(SNL keyfield: 132659, tech_comm_exp)
scaled by the book value of assets
(Compustat: at).
Technology and communication expense
(SNL keyfield: 132659, tech_comm_exp)
scaled by the sum of total loans (Compustat:
lntal) and total deposits (Compustat: dptc).
Earnings before extraordinary items
(Compustat: ib) plus depreciation and
amortization (Compustat: dp) divided by
the book value of assets (Compustat: at).
Earnings before extraordinary items
(Compustat: ib) plus depreciation and
amortization (Compustat: dp) divided by
the book value of equity (Compustat:
ceq+txdb). Txdb is set to zero if missing.
Earnings before extraordinary items
(Compustat: ib) plus depreciation and
amortization (Compustat: dp) divided by
the sum of interest income (Compustat:
niint) and noninterest income (Compustat:
tnii).
The sum of interest income (Compustat:
niint) and noninterest income (Compustat:
tnii) divided by the book value of assets
(Compustat: at).
The ratio of the market value of the bank
measured as share prices as of the fiscal
year-end (Compustat: prcc_f) times
common shares outstanding (Compustat:
csho) to its book value of equity
(Compustat: ceq+txdb). Txdb is set to zero
if missing.
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Firm Value Q

Q

Market
Capitalization

MktCap (Size)

Leverage

Leverage

Total
Assets

Loans/Total Loans/Assets

Total Deposits/Total Deposits/Assets
Assets
Total Deposits/Total Deposits/Liabilit
Liability
y
Gross Total Assets

GTA

Small Banks

Small Banks

Large Banks

Large Banks

Too-big-to-fail
banks

TBTF Banks

The ratio of the market value of the bank
measured as share prices as of the fiscal
year-end (Compustat: prcc_f) times
common shares outstanding (Compustat:
csho) plus total assets (Compustat: at)
minus the book value of equity (Compustat:
ceq+txdb) to its total assets (Compustat: at).
Txdb is set to zero if missing.
Share prices as of the fiscal year-end
(Compustat: prcc_f) times common shares
outstanding (Compustat: csho).
The ratio of total assets (Compustat: at) to
the book value of equity (Compustat:
ceq+txdb). Txdb is set to zero if missing.
The ratio of the banks’ total loans
(Compustat: lntal) to total assets
(Compustat: at).
The ratio of the banks’ total deposits
(Compustat: dptc) to total assets
(Compustat: at).
The ratio of the banks’ total deposits
(Compustat: dptc) to total liabilities
(Compustat: lt).
The sum of total assets (Compustat: at) and
provision for loan losses (Compustat: pclc).
pclc is set to zero if missing.
Banks whose time-series average GTA are
up to $1 billion in 2017 dollars.
Banks whose time-series average GTA
exceed $1 billion in 2017 dollars.
Banks whose time-series average GTA
exceed $50 billion in 2017 dollars.
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Table A2. Discussion on Technology and Communication Expense
The technology and communication expense include expenses paid for communications,
such as telephone and fax usage charges, internet data plans, and mobile phone and internet
plans, data processing and technology including computers, wire services, modems,
routers, and switches, as well as software purchases and subscriptions to cloud-based
services. The variable is primarily constructed based on U.S. GAAP Standard FAS No. 86.
Some typical examples are as follows:

Bank

Citigroup
Bank of
America

Technolo
gy
Ticker
Decomposition
Expense
($000)
$6,581,0 Technology/communic
C
00
ation
BAC

$3,938,0
00

Guaranty
Federal
Bancshares
, Inc.

GFED $1,171

Home
HOM
BancShares B
, Inc.

$17,857

$6,581,0
00

Telecommunications

$823,000

Data processing

$3,115,0
00

Tech &
First
Communications
Citizens
FCNC
$114,896 Expense
BancShares A
, Inc.
Telecommunications

Community
First
CMFP $399
Bancorp,
Inc.

Documents
(Sources)

$114,896
$14,406

Data processing

$162,616

Telephone

$59,150

Internet banking

$87,643

ATM expenses

$89,771

Data processing

$790,928

Telephone

$141,674

ATM expense

$238,744

Data processing
expense
Electronic banking
expense
Telephone
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$10,774
$5,166
$1,917

12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
Bank
Regulatory
Filings
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K
12/31/2015
10-K

Pandora
Bancshares
, Inc.
Webster
Financial
Corporatio
n
First
Farmers
Financial
Corporatio
n

PDRB $736

WBS

$34,639

FFMR $2,303

Tech &
Communications
Expense

$736

Data Processing

$505

Tech &
Communications
Expense

$34,639

Bank
Regulatory
Filings

$2,303

Bank
Regulatory
Filings

Tech &
Communications
Expense
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Bank
Regulatory
Filings
12/31/2015
10-K

Figure B1. Bank Technology Spending Trends of Non-M&A Banks
This figure illustrates the trends of technology and communication expenses (based on
median) of U.S listed commercial banks without mergers and acquisitions activities (NonM&A banks) in the sample from 2000-2017. Technology and communication expense is
converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. All of the variables are defined in Table
A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables are included in regressions, firms with fewer
than two consecutive years of technology expenses and total assets information are
excluded. The variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions
to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
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Figure B2. Final Sales of Domestic Computers
This figure illustrates the trends of Final Sales of Domestic Computers in the United States
(in Billions of 2012 dollars) from the National Income and Product Accounts (Table 9.2U).
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Figure B3. Technology Investment Around Negative Performance Shocks
This figure illustrates the means and the medians of the bank technology investment
measures (Tech Expense/Total Assets, and Tech Expense/Loans & Deposits) before and
after three years of the bank negative performance shocks. The performance shock is
defined as banks’ Return on Equity are one standard deviation less than that in the previous
year. All of the variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. Since lagged variables
are included in regressions, firms with fewer than two consecutive years of technology
expenses and total assets information are excluded. The variables have been winsorized at
the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
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3. Chapter III: Bank Technology: Productivity and Employment

3.1.Introduction

Advances in technology have transformed many aspects of the production process
in many industries (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Autor, 2015; Ford, 2015). The
banking industry, which is considered one of the most technology-intensive industries in
the U.S. (see Triplett and Bosworth, 2006), has also been significantly affected by
technology advances (e.g., Berger 2003; Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013; Brynjolfsson
and McAfee, 2014; Philippon, 2016). During the past decade, technology spending by U.S.
banks experienceddramatic growth (see Figure 1). Technology has become a critical
component in the production of banks and has revolutionized how financial institutions
operate - from their customer services, banking process, “Know Your Customer” (KYC)
activities, to business Application Programming Interface (API), and many others. 1 , 2
Given the important impact of technology advances, it is interesting to examine to which
extent technology investment contributes to bank productivity over the past decade.

See an industrial report from EY, “Global banking outlook 2015: Transforming banking for the next
generation technology reshaping banking”, and DeYoung (2010).
1

2

For instance, Barclays Bank provides an innovative video banking service, Wells Fargo allows its customers
to make cash withdrawals from automatic teller machines (ATMs) using smartphones rather than debit cards.
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Meanwhile, with the rapid development of new technology, many are worried about
that technology adoption, and automation reduces or destroys jobs. 3 This concern has
drawn great attention among researchers and policymakers in recent years. There is a
growing literature investigating whether and howthe use of new technology affect
employment (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2013;
Fort, Pierce, and Schott, 2018). From a theoretical standpoint, technology investment can
impede employment via its labor-saving effects (e.g., Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014;
DeCanio, 2016). However, others argue that the effects related to technological innovation
can overcompensate the displacement effect (Harrison et al., 2014). Thus, technology can
enhance employment via its employment-stimulating effects. For example, Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018) suggest technology adoption can increase firm productivity and generate
new tasks. The creation of new tasks and more complex version of existing tasks by
adopting new technology will increase employment and labor share. To understand the
overall effect of technology on employment, the countervailing force should be
incorporated, and additional empirical evidence is needed.

In the banking industry, new bank technology creates new opportunities for
business expansion, and generates new jobs or tasks. Some believe that a significant
number of banking jobs will be lost due to technology adoption in the near future. For
instance, a report from Citibank warns that about 30% of banking jobs are likely to be lost

See an article from MIT Technology Review on June 12, 2013, “How technology is destroying jobs”, and
an article from BBC News on 6 August 2015, “Will machines eventually take on every job?”, among many
others.
3
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from 2015 to 2025. 4 Also, based on a static production function framework assuming
constant elasticity of substitution, Martin-Oliver and Salas-Fumas (2008) suggest that an
additional 1 million Euros IT investment in Spanish banks may be substituted for 25
employees. However, others argue that new technology can create more jobs in the banking
industry.5 Bogliacino and Pianta (2010) and Harrison et al. (2014) suggest that a major
driver for employment growth of firms are technology and innovation. Bessen (2015) and
David (2015) show that one of the greatest technology inventions in the banking industry
- automatic teller machines (ATMs) - does not eliminate the teller job. Instead, it increases
teller-related jobs.6 While technology adoption is well documented to replace labors over
the past few decades in agriculture and manufacturing industries (e.g., Rifkin, 1996;
Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017), little empirical evidence has been provided regarding the
effect of technology on bank employment.

This paper examines the benefit of technology capital in bank production and
investigates howthe use of technology affects employment in the U.S. banking industry.
Technology is considered as an essential core competency and a key driving force for the
future growth of banks.7 Because of the significance of technology innovations, which

4

See an article from CNN News on April 4, 2016, “30% of bank jobs are under threat”.

See an article from The Guardian on August 18, 2015, “Technology has created more jobs than it has
destroyed, says 140 years of data”, and from U.S. News on December 7, 2015, “Machines reshape more jobs
than they destroy”.
5

6

See an article from The Economist on June 15, 2011, titled “Are ATMs stealing jobs?”.

7

See page 52 in the 2015 Annual Report of JPMorgan Chase & Co.
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have rapidly changed the business environment for the U.S., it is interesting to examine the
effect of bank technology on production and employment.

The questions of interest in the paper include: Does the expanded technology
adoption indeed improve bank productivity? Would the contribution of technology
investment be greater than its cost? Do the labor-saving effects or employment-stimulating
effects play a greater role? In other words, while algorithms and machines replace a part of
bank jobs, are the adoption of new technology creating new jobs quick than they destroy
them? The answers to these questions are of great importance to practitioners, academics,
and policymakers, as evidenced by academic research, extensive media coverage and
industrial reports in recent years.

With a unique sample of U.S. listed commercial banks from S&P Global Market
Intelligence from 2000 to 2017, the contribution of technology capital on bank production
and the effect of technology spending on bank employment is examined. 8 First, the
parameters of a value-added bank production function correcting for endogenous input is
estimated choices to understand the benefits banks receive from technology capital. The
results show that the estimated parameters for technology capital are statistically significant
in all four specifications, ranging from 0.065 to 0.112. On average, technology inputs
contribute about 12.85% to the increase in the value-added output of banks. Interestingly,
the contribution of technology input becomes stronger after the financial crisis, consistent

Unless otherwise specified, in the rest of the paper, “commercial banks”, “U.S. banks” or “banks” refer to
U.S. listed commercial banks, whose two-digit SIC code is 60.
8
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with the notion that technology has played a more important role in bank production in
recent years. Moreover, the median net marginal product for technology on banks based
on the estimated parameter range from $0.41-$0.81. These results suggest that technology
investment is highly productive to U.S. banks.

Next, dramatic growth in technology spending by banks is documented. The
median technology expenses of banks increased 285% (from $1.16 million to $3.31 million)
over the period, while the median number of employees and staff expenses increased by
70% and 100%, respectively. Moreover, when the employment of a bank is measured as
the number of employees it employs and the staff expense it pays, bank employment is
positively and significantly correlated with their lagged technology spending in the crosssection. These results suggest that when banks spend more on technology, on average, their
number of employees also increase. Furthermore, since the primary function of banks is to
accept deposits from the public and to provide loans and advances of various forms, total
loans and deposits, value-added, and number of branches are used as proxies to measure
tasks of banks. Bank tasks are positively and significantly associated with their previousyear technology spending, suggesting that banks investing more in technology tend to
create more tasks. The latter result is consistent with the task-based framework of
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), which argue that exogenous technology adoption can
create new tasks in the process of production for the next period.

This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it uses direct
information on technology spending to investigate the impacts of technology on banks at
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the firm level, which overcomes the data limitation issue in the previous literature.9 The
study is based on more than seven thousand annual observations of technology and
communication expense of U.S. banks from S&P Global Market Intelligence, which takes
a “deep dive” into the banking sector and collects memo items, regulatory filings,
supplemental financial schedules and financial reports from banks. The technology
spending data in the analysis is mainly consisted of expenses paid for communications such
as telephone and fax usage charges, internet data plans, and mobile phone and internet
plans, data processing, and technology such as computers, wire services, modems,
routers and switches, as well as software purchases and subscriptions to cloudbased services. This unique data set allows us to provide direct empirical evidence on the
benefit of technology capital in bank production and the effect of technology spending on
bank employment in details and fill in the gap of literature.

This paper estimates a value-added production function of banks to examine the
contribution of technology capital to productivity, correcting for endogenous input choices
and the measurement errors in technology capital. Comparing with the technology capital
or IT capital in prior literature, this research is likely to have a more rigorous definition of
technology capital as it is constructed from the annual technology and communication
expense of banks assuming a perpetual inventory model with a depreciation ratio of 35%
as well as a four-year linear depreciation schedule.

9

Previous literature often uses survey data on technology investment, instead of the direct firm-level
technology spending data.
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Finally, this paper is one of the first studies examining the extent to which the
employment and tasks of U.S. bank are correlated with their technology investment. This
empirical evidence focusing on the banking sector may also provide insights on the impacts
of technology investment to other industries, as U.S. banks are intensive users of
technology. Even though non-traditional financial intermediaries are growing in
importance, banks are still preeminent in the financial system.10 Banks help individuals
and firms fulfill transactions, issue deposits and make loans.

3.2.Related Literature

Regarding technology and employment relationship, some studies argue that
technology and innovation are major drivers of employment growth of firms (e.g., Mokyr,
1992; Van Reenen, 1997; Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010; Harrison et al., 2014). Theoretically,
technology investment has labor-saving effects (i.e., displacement effects), which impede
employment, as well as employment-stimulating effects (i.e., compensation effects), which
enhance employment. For example, there are a lot of cases in manufacturing and
agriculture industries that machines replace the labor-intensive tasks (e.g., Bresnahan, 1999;
Manyika et.at., 2013; Frey and Osborne, 2017; Bessen, 2017). On the contrary, the
development of computers, as well as software, generates a huge demand for technician
and services positions. In a task-based framework, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) argue

10

See Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2001). What is the economic function of a bank?
https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2001/july/bank-economic-function/
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that technological automation tends to reduce employment, while the creation of new tasks
by technology adoption increase employment since technology adoption will increase
productivity, generate new tasks, deepen automation, and encourage capital automation.

There is also a clear example of the effect of technology adoptions on employment
in the banking industry. Examining the effects of the introduction of automated teller
machines (ATMs) on the employment of bank tellers, Bessen (2015) and David (2015)
document that ATMs does not eliminate the teller job but increase it. He suggests that there
more demand for teller since ATMs reduced the operating costs of banks and encouraged
bank branching activities. However, early banking literature shows that the decline in the
number of branches is delayed due to technology adoption (Saloner and Shepard, 1995).
With a static production function framework assuming constant elasticity of substitution,
Martin-Oliver and Salas-Fumas (2008) conclude that an additional 1 million Euros
investment in IT may be substituted for 25 employees in Spanish commercial banks.

Regarding the effects of technology investment on productivity, most empirical
studies found in economics, finance, and management literature largely employed survey
data from large manufacturing firms or hospitals (e.g., Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1996; Lee,
McCullough, and Town, 2013).11 The results are mixed and inconclusive. For example,
Baily (1986), Morrison (1997), Loveman (1994), and Berndt and Morrison (1995) find a
negative or inconclusive relationship between use of technology and firm productivity,

11

For instance, besides proprietary data, International Data Group (IDG) annual survey and Information
Week annual survey are commonly used.
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while Lichtenberg (1995), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995, 1996, 2003),

Bresnahan,

Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) show a positive
correlation.12 Moreover, Hall and Khan (2003) show that the choice of technology adoption
is between adopting it now or deferring the decision until later, but not a choice between
adopting and not adopting, since that firms should invest or adopt new technologies at some
points of time to stay competitive and provide better customer services.

Despite the intensity and importance of technology investment in the banking
industry, research about its impact on U.S. banks is limited. One main reason is the lack of
data on technology investment or spending, as this information is not typically disclosed
to the public through bank financial reports and regulatory filings. Following a seminal
work by Sealey and Lindley (1977), a few studies examine the impacts of technology
investment using either survey data from U.S. banks or data from European banks. Based
on data from 1984 to 2001, Berger (2003) find that technology significantly improves the
quality of banking services and technological progress facilitates banking consolidation.
With data from U.S. community banks from 1999-2001, DeYoung, Lang, and Nolle (2007)
find that internet adoption improves performance for community banks, mainly through
increased revenues from deposit service charges. 13 Using a sample of 737 European banks
from 1995 to 2000, Beccalli (2007) finds no relationship between total IT investment and

12

See Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996) and Sichel and Oliner (2002) for reviews.

13

Based on various proxies for technology, other studies also examine the role of technology in banking,
including small business lending (e.g., Petersen and Ranjian, 2002), Internet usage (e.g., Hernando and Nieto,
2007; Hernández-Murillo, Llobet, and Fuentes, 2010; Dandapani, Lawrence, and Rodriguez, 2016). And,
some earlier studies also include Hunter and Timme (1986) and Hamid and Verma (1994), which are based
on banking data more than two decades ago.
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bank performance or efficiency. Examining the theory and measurement of financial
intermediation, Philippon (2015) shows that the adoption of financial technology does not
reduce intermediation costs.

In the aspect of technology on bank productivity, based on a survey data set on U.S.
retail banking institutions from 1993-1995, Prasad and Harket (1997) show that increase
in IT investment does not benefit banks in both productivity and performance. They argue
that the use of IT is more of a strategic necessity for banks to stay in the competition.
Martin-Oliver and Salas-Fumas (2008) examine the impact of information technology (IT)
in the output of Spanish banks in the 1983-2003 period and find that one-third of output
growth of banks can be explained by the growth in the stock of IT capital. Later, MartinOliver, Ruano, and Salas-Fumas (2013) provide similar results via different methodologies,
using data from Spanish commercial banks during the 1992-2007 period.

To sum up, most of the studies related to technology in the banking literature are
based on some proxies for technology usage (e.g., the number of ATMs, the transaction
website adoption), limited survey data from U.S. bank, or data from European banks. Most
of the papers use short-term data before the “network” era of computing, and thus unable
to capture the full effects of the dramatic increase in technology adoption by banks. The
results based on European bank data may not apply to the U.S. banks since there are
significant differences between U.S. banking system and European banking system (e.g.,
capital market dependence, market structure, bank regulations, economic and banking
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industry size 14 ). Lastly, most of the prior research focuses on the effects on bank
productivity and the relationship between technology investment and bank performance.
Little research has been done on how technology investment influences employments in
commercial banks.

3.3.Research Methodologies
3.3.1. Technology and Production

Early literature does not properly differentiate among technology capital, nontechnology capital, and labor in their bank production models. For example, Martín-Oliver
and Salas-Fumás (2008) and Martín-Oliver, Ruano, and Salas-Fumás (2013) first discuss
and estimate the contribution of investment in information technology (IT) to the output of
banks. In their specification, the bank-level output of the production function is total loan
and deposit, and the bank-level inputs are IT capital and labor, which is defined as the
number of employees (MRS Model, hereafter). The results from the MRS Model shows
that one-third of output growth of banks can be explained by the growth in the stock of IT
capital on their pre-crisis Spanish bank data. The issue with the MRS Model is that it does
not take account of Non-IT physical capital, which includes but not limited to all machinery,
equipment, and buildings, etc.

14

GDP of Spain in 2015 is roughly 6.6% of the GDP of U.S. The total asset of Spanish banks in 2016 is
about 2.7 trillion Euros based on a BBVA research report and the total asset of U.S. commercial banks at the
same year is 12 trillion Dollars based on FRED economic data.
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Another issue when examining the impact of technology investment on banks is
how to model the contribution of the increase of technology capital on revenue growth.
Since there are well-known endogeneity issues on the estimation of production function
(e.g., Marschak and Andrews, 1944; Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer, 2006, 2015), as inputs
are unobserved by the econometrician but may be observed by firm managers, standard
approaches of parameter estimation will be biased due to simultaneity and correlation
between inputs and productivity shocks.

Built upon the MRS Model, an augmented model is proposed. The production
function in each bank is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas, whose output is value-added (𝑌𝑖,𝑡 )
and inputs are technology capital (𝑇𝐾𝑖,𝑡 ), conventional capital or non-technology capital
(𝐶𝐾𝑖,𝑡 ), and labor (𝐿𝑖,𝑡 )15. The analysis starts with the following log-transformation valueadded production function:
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑘 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡

(3-1)

where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 are the natural logarithm of value-added, technology capital,
conventional capital and labor of bank 𝑖 at year 𝑡, respectively. The primary interest is the
𝛽𝑡𝑘 s, which measure the technology capital contribution. The term 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 represents the
information that bank managers possess, which may be used for input selection. The major
concern on the estimation of the above firm-level production function econometric to

15

Several studies on IT-based production model have used a similar model but dividing the labor into IT
labor and conventional labor (e.g., Loveman, 1994; Lichtenberg, 1995; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996; Prasad
and Harker, 1997; Lee, McCullough, and Town, 2013). Due to data availability, this analysis it not able to
divide the labor information into IT labor and non-IT labor as theirs.
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correct for the endogenous bias in the estimation of the elasticity of the output with respect
to technology capital, conventional capital and labor caused by the fact that the quantity of
those inputs used in production might themselves be determined the value of the
productivity shock (Griliches and Mareisse, 1998).

First, the production parameters using Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology (OP
for short) is estimated. The OP model employs a two-step estimation on the parameters
using a proxy variable to control the productivity shocks. It the OP methodology, the term
𝜐𝑖,𝑡 can be decomposed as:
𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(3-2)

where 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is a normally distributed idiosyncratic error term. 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 is assumed to be the
unobserved productivity or technical efficiency term and evolves according to a first-order
Markov process, 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 (𝜂𝑖,𝑡 |𝜂𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑔(𝜂𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 is a random
shock component, which is assumed to be uncorrected with the productivity term, 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
and 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1.

There are several key assumptions in the OP methodology. First, it assumes that
𝜂𝑖,𝑡 is observed by the firm manager and that 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 is used by the firm manager to decide the
amount of inputs. Second, it assumes that firm-level investments (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ) is a function of
𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 , that 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is strictly monotone in 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 . 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 is scalar unobservable in 𝑖𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑖(. ). Third, the levels of 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 have been chosen prior to period 𝑡. The level
of 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is then decided after the realization of the shock 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 . In other words, the
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productivity shock proxy must be monotonically increasing with respect to the true
productivity shock. These assumptions ensure the invertibility of 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 in 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 , and lead to
the following partially-identified model:

𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑘 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + ℎ(𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 , +𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
(3-3)
= 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓(𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
where 𝜓 is approximated with a second order polynomial series in technology capital and
conventional capital. Equation (3-3) can be estimated by non-parametric approach. In the
first stage, the production function parameters are estimated by taking advantage of the
Markovian nature of the productivity process and the assumptions above as moment
conditions. In the second stage, the residual term is derived as follows:
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽̂𝑙 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑘 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔(𝜂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑖,𝑡 , ) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(3-4)

where g(.) is typically unspecified and approximated by an n-th order polynomial and 𝜗𝑖,𝑡
is an indicator function for the attrition in the market.

Besides the OP methodology, the production parameters using dynamic panel data
(DPD) model of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and
Bond (1998, 2000), firm fixed-effects (FE) approach and traditional ordinary least squares
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(OLS) approach are also estimated.16 In these models, the last term 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 in Equation (3-1)
can also be further decomposed into four components:
𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(3-5)

where 𝑎𝑖 is a time-invariant firm fixed-effect and 𝛾𝑡 is a time-varying productivity shock.
These factors are likely to be related to the observed inputs. 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 is an unobserved
productivity term, which might be correlated with the observed inputs, and evolves as an
autoregressive process, 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝜂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is a pure stochastic component.
The innovation on unobserved productivity, 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 , is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
observed inputs. The last term, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , reflects a productivity shock, which might be correlated
with the observed inputs and might evolve as a moving average process. The impact in
time for 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 might also last for a long period.
Even if the term 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 consists of a firm fixed-effect and a component of the evolving
productivity, it is likely to be correlated with the observed inputs. By solving for 𝜂𝑖,𝑡−1 and
substituting it into the empirical model in Equation (3-1), a dynamic form is generated as
follows:

16

Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) aimed to overcome the empirical issue that there are usually quite a lot of
zeros in the investment data and proposed to use intermediate inputs (materials) to estimate the production
shock. However, it is too difficult to define what are the intermediate inputs (materials) of banks. See Martí
nOliver, Ruano and Salas-Fumás (2013) for some attempts using this methodology.
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𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡𝑘 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝛽𝑡𝑘 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝛽𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌𝑎𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 − 𝜌𝛾𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡

(3-6)

+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

An equation can be obtained by renaming the respective coefficients and grouping
the error components, as Equation (3-7):
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿2 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3 𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿4 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿5 𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿6 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
(3-7)
+ 𝛿7 𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖 ∗ + 𝛾𝑡 ∗ + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 ∗
where the common factor restrictions are 𝛿3 = −𝛿1 ∗ 𝛿2 , 𝛿5 = −𝛿1 ∗ 𝛿4 and 𝛿7 = −𝛿1 ∗
𝛿6 , with 𝑎𝑖 ∗ = 𝑎𝑖 (1 − 𝜌) , 𝛾𝑡 ∗ = 𝛾𝑡 (1 − 𝜌) and 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 ∗ = 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . Assuming all the
common factor restrictions hold, the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) approach will
yield consistent parameters only when 𝐸(𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ) = 0, 𝐸(𝜔𝑖,𝑡 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ) = 0 and 𝐸(𝜖𝑖,𝑡 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ) = 0,
where 𝑥 are state variables in the production estimation. Consistent parameters can be
obtained in firm fixed-effect model only if 𝐸(𝜔𝑖,𝑡 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ) = 0 and 𝐸(𝜖𝑖,𝑡 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ) = 0.

The DPD approach provides consistent parameters under less restrictive
assumptions than the OLS approach and the fixed-effects (FE) approach. A system GMM
approach that simultaneously estimates the production function using both levels and
difference specifications is adopted. The system GMM estimators are designed for
dynamic "small-T, large-N" panels that may contain fixed-effects and idiosyncratic errors
that are heteroskedastic and correlated within, but not across firms.
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Managers are likely to choose their input levels because productivity is known to
them (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). Since measurement errors and endogeneity may
exist in the production input measures, the OLS estimators will be biased towards zero.
The DPD approach allows for a time-invariant firm fixed-effect, which it is important since
there are different business strategies and production inputs among banks in different
locations and various customer focus. Nonetheless, there is no agreement in academics
about which parameter estimation approach is more appropriate. In this paper, all four
models – OP, DPD, FE, and OLS are adopted, to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimated
parameters under different kinds of identification assumptions.

3.3.2. Technology and Employment

To some extent, bank technology investment should be exogenous [see the Static
Model of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)], even if there exists some endogeneity concern
that bank employment may also drive its technology investment. The technology adoption
of banks, to a large extent, is driven by the general economic conditions, the competitive
environment and the rapid development of technology. 17 Banks should confront the
difficulty and challenge of the rapid development and creation of new technologies: online
banking, data security, DLT system, clouds, etc. Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the
European Central Bank, states that “beyond increased competition from non-banks, the

See an article from The Telegraph on April 2, 2017, “Mark Carney warns of fintech threat to traditional
banks”.
17
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banking sector faces competition from Financial Technology (FinTech) firms…” 18 The
indeterminacy nature of the banking system and the astonishing adoption of technology,
not the supply of ordinary employees, have made radical transformations in the way how
banks do business and continue to change even further.

Bank employment is highly persistent (continuous workflow and difficult to hire or
fire) over time and that there exist automation of old tasks and creation of new tasks [see
Figure 2 in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)]. There exist labor-saving effects as well as
employment-stimulating effects in technology investment. Hence, one would also like to
see whether banks with a higher level of technology adoption would have more employees
in the next period.

It is extremely important to control heterogeneity in size in the analysis, considering
one need to compare technology spending among firms with equal firm size and examine
the effect of technology spending on firm-level employment. The technology expense of
banks regresses on their size in the cross-section. Specifically, the following specification
using ordinary least squares (OLS) is estimated. The residual technology spending obtained
from this regression is the independent variable of interest.
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(3-8)

See a lecture on July 7, 2016, titled “Challenges for the European banking industry,” by Vítor Constâncio
at the conference of “European banking industry: What’s next,” organized by the University of Navarra.
18
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Since it is also needed to compare the differentials of employment and tasks of
firms at the equal size, residual employment and tasks are also obtained by replacing the
dependent variable of equation (3-8) to the measures of employment and tasks of banks.

With residual firm-level technology spending and employment estimated, one can
examine the relationship between employment and technology spending in the crosssection by the following equation using OLS model with standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level and are heteroscedasticity-robust:
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1

(3-9)

+ 𝛽5 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡
where 𝜂𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 represent firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient of
interest, 𝛽1 , measures the cross-sectional relationship between the previous-year
technology spending and employment at the firm-level. The effect is pooled across crosssections in the panel, net of interacted firm characteristics within each year.
To examine how a firm’s technology investment influences its tasks, a similar
model is run as what in examining the relationship between employment and technology
spending as in Equation (3-9), by replacing residual employment into residual tasks in the
right-hand side of the equation, as follows:
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𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1

(3-10)

+ 𝛽5 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡

3.4.Data Description
3.4.1. Data Source

The empirical analysis uses annual data on firm characteristics of U.S. listed
commercial banks (two-digit SIC code: 60) from Compustat banking database and S&P
Global Market Intelligence’s (formally SNL Financial) banking database from 2000- 2017.
The technology and communication expense, the total number of offices, and the number
of automatic teller machines (ATMs) are collected from the S&P Global Market
Intelligence, while all other annual financial characteristics are collected from
Compustat.19

The technology and communication expense (technology expense) reported in the
S&P Global Market Intelligence database is primarily constructed based on U.S.
GAAP standard FAS No. 86. The item includes expenses paid for communications such as

𝑥
Missing financial characteristics in year t are replaced by estimates from this formula: 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑥
𝑥
𝑥
(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 )/2, where 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the information of 𝑥 of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡.
19
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telephone and fax usage charges, internet data plans, and mobile phone and internet plans,
data processing and technology such as computers, wire services, modems, routers and
switches, as well as software purchases and subscriptions to cloud-based services. The
value of technology and communication expense is constructed via original data from the
bank’s financial reports and bank regulatory filings. For instance, the 2015 technology
expense of Citigroup (Ticker: C) in the sample is $6,581 million, which comes from the
technology/communication item ($6,581 million) in its annual report (10-K). The 2015
technology expense of Bank of America (Ticker: BAC) is $3,938 million, which comes
from the telecommunications item ($823 million) and data processing item ($3,115 million)
in its annual report. The 2015 technology expense of Community First Bancorp, Inc (Ticker:
CMFP) is $399,000, which comes from data processing item ($162,616), telephone item
($59,150), internet banking item ($87,643) and ATM expenses item ($89,771) on its
annual report. The 2015 technology expense of Pandora Bancshares, Inc. (Ticker: PDRB)
is $736,000, which comes directly from tech & communications expense item ($736,000)
on its bank regulatory filings, even if a data processing item ($505,000), which is smaller
than the reported number in its bank regulatory filings, is reported on its annual report.

3.4.2. Variable Construction

Value added is commonly used as a measure of production output. It represents the
wealth created through a firm’s production process. Nonetheless, there is no agreement in
academics and practitioners about how to define and measure the output of the service
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industries, especially for banks (see Griliches, 1992; Griliches, 1994; Triplett and
Bosworth, 2004; Prasad and Harker, 2007; Berger and Humphrey, 2008; Basu, Inklaar, and
Wang, 2011).
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), “banks are compensated
for some services by a portion of the interest that they charge on loans or by a reduction in
the interest rates that they pay to depositors—rather than by charging explicit fees.” (Hood,
2013). The value-added output measure for banks is operationalized as its net interest
income, which measures the difference between the revenue generated from a bank's assets
and the costs of its materials and services (liabilities). The labor input is measured by the
compensation and benefits of employees (staff expense) as it can capture the difference in
the skill level of employees (as in, for example, Prasad and Harker, 1997; Brynjolfsson and
Hitt, 2003; Levine and Warusawitharana, 2014). Conventional capital is defined as total
assets excluding intangible assets and technology capital. The technology investment in
the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology is measured as investment expenditure.

The complication for the construction of technology capital is that S&P Global
Market Intelligence and Compustat do not report the actual value of the banks’ technology
capital stock. Hence, the value of technology capital is constructed using the technology
and communication expense recorded in S&P Global Market Intelligence each year. First,
the paper follows Martín-Oliver, Ruano, and Salas-Fumás (2013) and estimates the
physical technology capital stock from the annual technology expense of banks assuming
a perpetual inventory model with a depreciation ratio of 35%. Alternatively, a four-year
linear depreciation schedule to construct the annual physical technology capital stock for
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each bank are also used, as in Lee, McCullough, and Town (2013). In the Financial
Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks, the maximum estimated useful life for
standard technology personal computers (PCs) is three years, and state-of-the-art
technology PCs is four years, while it is six years for operating equipment with 10%
salvage value.20

It should be recognized that technology expense likely includes both physical
technology equipment and services. There is no practical way for us to disentangle the
components of the expense. To address the concern whether it is a proper technology
capital measure, its relation to the adoption of ATMs is examined. Regression of the natural
log of technology capital estimated from perpetual inventory model and linear depreciation
schedule, respectively, to the natural log of the number of ATMs with standard errors that
are clustered at the bank-level and are heteroscedasticity-robust is adopted. The estimated
parameter of the number of ATMs is positive (0.892 and 0.887) and highly statistically
significant (t-statistic: 35.33 and 35.18). In this univariate regression, the number of ATMs
accounts for a very large portion of the overall variation in technology capital (R-squared:
0.725 and 0.728). The correlation between the two measures of technology capital and the
number of ATMs are 0.852 and 0.854, and statistically significant at the 1% level. This
evidence gives us confidence in the validity of the technology capital measure.

20

For more details, please see Section 30.78 Maximum Useful Lives and Salvage Values Table of the
document. https://www.federalreserve.gov/federal-reserve-banks/fam/chapter-3-property-andequipment.htm
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The technology capital measure is, to some extent, different from the technology
capital or IT capital in previous bank production literature. In the extent of U.S. banks,
Prasad and Harker (1997) use survey data from large retail banks on their IT spending
during 1993-1995 to construct the IT-related expense. In the extent of Spanish banks,
Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008) and Martín-Oliver, Ruano, and Salas-Fumás (2013)
construct their total IT capital of banks as the sum of the book value of IT capital on the
asset side of the balance sheet and the estimated IT capital stock. The huge differential of
inputs in the production functions in this paper and the previous papers might lead to the
difference of the results comparing to theirs. The ratio of IT capital and non-IT capital in
Prasad and Harker is about 0.106, while the ratio of IT capital and physical capital in the
year 1983 is 0.105 and that in the year 2003 reaches 0.621 in Martín-Oliver, Ruano, and
Salas-Fumás (2013), according to the summary statistic tables of their papers. The ratio of
technology capital and conventional capital in this paper is, on average, only 0.39% when
technology capital is estimated using perpetual inventory model and 0.38% when
technology capital is estimated using linear depreciation schedule. The ratio of the mean
(median) of the technology expense related to total current operating expense is 4.12%
(3.63%), which is close to the number in Mai, Speyer, and Hoffmann (2012) and the
McKinsey report. Comparing with previous studies, this analysis is likely to have a much
more rigorous definition of technology capital and a broader sense of conventional capital
as it includes tangible capital that is not technology capital.

As the paper constructs the technology capital measure using expense information
and assumption of depreciation, there are possibilities that it systematically over- or under-
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represent the true value of technology capital of each bank. The over- or under- estimations
is a common issue on production analysis, which generally relies on survey or accounting
information that naturally embodies assumptions and depreciation and expenditure
classification. The more concern issue is that how one can estimate consistent parameters,
given there exist measurement errors in the input and endogenous issue between input and
productivity shocks as in the discussion in the previous sections.

The employment of a bank is measured as the number of employees it employs and
the staff expense it pays. Although the number of employees and staff expense gives us an
idea of how employees a bank has, it suffers from one major drawback: it does not adjust
for the bank’s size, thus making it hard to compare how many staff one bank employs
related to another. Similarly, although technology expense gives us an idea of how much
technology investment a bank is doing, it is very difficult to compare how much one bank
is investing relative to another. Hence, residual employment and technology expense,
which can be used to compare employment and technology expense among firms with
equal firm size, is used as key variables in the regressions.

The bank task measures are extremely difficult to quantify, not to say to distinguish
these tasks into old tasks and new tasks recently generated. The traditional banking
business is to accept deposits and make loans.21 Since the primary functions of banks is (a)
to receive various types of deposits from individuals, businesses, financial institutions, and
governments, and (b) to lend money in various forms to businesses, other financial

21

See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) for a review.
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institutions, individuals, and governments,22 the total loans and deposits of a bank should
be a proper proxy of its tasks. As the main business of banks is to collect deposits and make
loans, the total loans and deposits of a bank should represent the amounts of tasks it has.
Alternatively, value added and the number of branches are also employed as two proxies
of bank tasks. The value-added reflects the wealth created by a bank through the production
process. The number of branches of a bank reflects its complexity. Hence, both can be used
as a measure of the amounts of tasks.
Other variables used in this study include are as follows. Bank’s size (Firm Size) is
defined as the natural log of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year. Market to
book ratio (Market to Book) is defined as the ratio of total book assets to total book equity.
Leverage ratio (Leverage) is defined as the ratio of total book assets to total book equity.
Return on Assets is defined as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary plus depreciation
and amortization to total book assets. Non-interest income ratio (Non-Interest Income) is
defined as the ratio of banks’ non-interest income to the sum of net interest income and
non-interest income. Risk-adjusted tier1 capital ratio (Tier 1 Capital Ratio) is obtained from
Compustat.

22

Diamond and Dybvig (1986) argue that main functions of bank as asset services to the borrowers, liability
services to the depositors, and transformation services.
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3.4.3. Summary Statistics

The definitions for all variables used are listed in Table A1 in the appendix.
Reducing noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years of technology
expense and total asset information during the sample period are excluded. Firms with
missing values of the relevant variables are also excluded. Finally, all the variables are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme
observations. The final sample consists of 8,030 firm-year observations for 781 banks
during the 2000-2017 period.

Figure 3-1 displays bank technology expense trends over the sample period. In
2017 dollars, the median of bank technology spending jumps to $3.31 million in 2017 from
$1.16 million in 2000. This figure shows that there exists a steady increase in the
technology spending of banks for most of the years over this time. 23

Table 3-1 reports the summary statistics of the regression variables used in this
paper. The mean (median) market capitalization in the panel is $1,191 million ($110.16
million), while the mean (median) total assets is $7,613 million ($966 million) ]. The
technology expense of $15.69 million and a median of $1.58 million. In term of production
variables, the mean (median) of value-added, technology capital estimated with a perpetual
inventory model, its corresponding conventional capital, labor, and investment is $204.96

23

When one keeps firms that record technology and communication expense in each year during 2000-2017
and illustrate their trends (medians) of technology and communication expense, a monotonic increase in the
technology spending in the sample period is also found. There is a total of 97 firms in this sample. See Figure
B1 of the appendix for details.
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($31.19) million, $35.06 ($3.39) million, $7,329.40 ($954.60) million, $113.31 ($14.55)
million, and $8.62 ($1.56) million, respectively. The typical bank has an average (median)
total loans and deposits of $9,225.38 ($1,398.39) million and average (median) number of
branches of 57.766 (15.00). On average (median), it employs 1,648 (264) employees and
pays $113.31 ($14.55) million as staff expense.

Figure 3-2 illustrates the evolution of the median of technology spending, the
number of employees and staff expense of banks during the sample period. All monetary
values are adjusted for inflation using GDP deflator and are normalized to equal one in the
year 2000. The figure shows that technology expense grew about 250%, much faster than
the number of tasks and employment, from 2000 to 2017. In the meanwhile, the median
number of total loans and deposits increased by about 100%, and the median number of
employees increased by about 70%. The dramatical increase of expense on technology
draws the attention to evaluate its contribution to the production of banks, and its
relationship with employment.24

24

When one keep firms that record technology and communication expense in each year during 2000-2017
and illustrate the evolution of the median of technology spending, the number of employees and staff expense
of those banks, similar evolution patterns in the sample period are also found. There is a total of 97 firms in
this sample. See Figure B2 of the appendix for details.
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3.5.Empirical Results
3.5.1. Technology in Production

As stated in the methodologies section, the analysis starts by estimating the
contribution of technology capital on banks using a firm-level value-added production
function and examine whether banks benefit from their technology investments. The
production function estimates with the model that technology capital is calculated from a
perpetual inventory model are presented in Table 3-2.

The first column represents the parameter estimated from the Olley and Pakes (OP,
1996) methodology. The estimated parameter for technology capital in the OP model is
0.085 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The variable that serves as a proxy for
productivity shocks is investment expenditure, which is used to control for the simultaneity
between the productivity shocks and the labor input decision. The p-value associated with
the null hypotheses of constant return to scale (𝛽𝑡𝑘 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽𝑙 = 1)is 0.285. Standard
errors for the OP model are generated via bootstrap based on 200 replications. The results
indicate that technology capital is very productive.

Columns (2), (3) and (4) report the DPD, FE and OLS estimates. The parameter
estimate for technology capital in the DPD model is 0.112 and statistically significant at
the 1% level. It is greater than that from the OP model. Common factor restrictions are
rejected, while the null hypotheses of constant return to scale are not. The parameter
estimates for technology capital are 0.054 from FE model and 0.061 from OLS model. All
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are statistically significant at the 1% level. Common factor restrictions and constant return
to scale are rejected for both models.

These results are also consistent with the literature on the production function
parameter estimation and the notion that the production input choices could be endogenous.
The results also confirm the worry on the measurement errors on the technology capital
input. The measure is likely to underestimate the true value of technology capital. Besides,
the investment proxy in the OP (1996) methodology is much easier to observe and more
precious, as these numbers are usually disclosure in their financial reports.

The paper further examines the implications of the production function parameter
estimates on the historical contributions of the technology capital input of banks to their
value-added. To measure the historical contribution of technology capital, the difference
in each bank's value-added under 2017 and 2003 technology capital input levels are
calculated. Value-added grew an average of 225% over this period - an approximately 5.78%
compound growth rate. Technology capital grew an average of 554% over this period - an
approximately 9.70% compound growth rate. On average, technology inputs accounted for
an approximately 12.85% increase in value-added output of banks. The result suggests that
there exists a huge economically significant return from technology investments of banks
during this period.

Next, whether the contribution of technology investment is greater than its cost is
assessed. The median net marginal product for technology on banks based on the estimated
parameter range from $0.41 for the FE model (p-value < 0.001) and $0.81 for the DPD
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model (p-value < 0.001). 25 Even if technology capital is assumed to have an average
service life as little as three years,26 the median net marginal product still ranges from $0.22
for the FE model and $0.61 for the DPD model and be greater than zero at statistical
significance at the 1% level. Their results suggest that the substantial increases in
technology investment would be beneficial.

These net marginal products are similar to the estimations in other industries. For
instance, the net marginal product is $0.67 for technology in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996),
whose sample is of U.S. large firms (Fortune 500). They range from $0.73 to $1.29 in Lee,
McCullough, and Town (2013), whose focus is California hospitals.

Concerning there may be systematically over- or under- represent the true value of
technology capital of each firm, alternatively, the production function parameters using
technology capital stock estimated from a four-year linear depreciation schedule as a
production input are estimated. Table 3-3 reports the result. The estimated parameters for
technology capital (0.079 from OP, 0.083 from DPD, 0.050 from FE and 0.053 from OLS)
are quantitively similar with that in Table 3-2, where technology capital is estimated using
a perpetual inventory model. Common factor restrictions are quite similar with those in
Table 3-2. The null hypotheses of constant return to scale cannot be rejected in the OP

25

Following Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996), the gross marginal product for technology capital is the output
elasticity, which is the estimated parameter to technology capital, multiplied by the ratio of output to
technology capital input. Hence, the net marginal product is calculated as gross marginal products subtract
14%.
26

Thus, the net marginal product is calculated as gross marginal products subtract 33.33%.
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model and the DPD model but rejected in the other models. The levels of statistical
significance are consistent as well. The consistent results provide further evaluation of the
sensitivity of the estimated parameters under different kind of construction methods on
technology capital stock.

Based on the estimations in Table 3-3, technology input, on average, accounted for
an approximately 9.27% increase in value-added output of banks. The median net marginal
product for technology range from $0.32 for the FE model and $0.58 for the DPD model
and are greater than zero at statistical significance at the 1% level. Assuming technology
capital have an average three years’ service life, the median net marginal product still range
from $0.10 to $0.38 and are greater than zero at statistical significance at the 1% level.

3.5.2. Technology and Employment

This subsection explores whether their previous-year technology spending can
explain bank employment. First, the residual technology spending of banks is computed
using equation (3-8). Columns (1) to (4) of Panel A, Table 3-4 report the cross-sectional
regression results of the natural log of technology expense on firm size, which is the log of
market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year, for four years: 2000, 2005, 2010 and
2015. The estimated coefficients of firm size are highly consistent in each of the crosssection regression: 0.828 in 2000, 0.855 in 2005, 0.658 in 2010, and 0.782 in 2015. All the
estimated coefficients are highly statistical significance at the 1% level (t-statistics range
from 22.35 to 32.26). The R-squared range from 0.655 to 0.818. Columns (5) reports the
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results based on a pooled regression for all the cross-sections from 2000 to 2017. Again,
the estimated coefficient is 0.767, with t-statistics of 35.14 and R-squared of 0.760. Thus,
through this regression, residual technology spending is computed, and the effects of firm
size on technology spending are excluded. Using the same method, residual employment
and residual tasks are calculated adjusting the effects of firm size. These results are reported
in Table A2 of the appendix.

Panel B of Table 3-4 shows the results on the persistence tests of residual
technology spending and residual employment of banks. The residuals in year t are strongly
correlated with their corresponding residuals in year t-1. Specifically, in Column (1), the
estimated coefficient for residual technology spending is 0.905, with t-statistics being
133.59 and R-squared being 0.823. The coefficients of the residual number of employees
and residual staff expense are 0.901 and 0.884, respectively, both being highly statistically
significant, as in Column (2) and (3). These results indicate the residual technology
spending and residual employment of banks are highly persistent over time.

Panel C of Table 3-4 presents the results on the correlations of residual technology
spending and residual employment. The residual technology spending in year t is strongly
correlated with the residual technology spending in year t-1, with the correlation being
0.908. Similarly, the correlation of residual number of employees (staff expense) in year t
with residual number of employees (staff expense) in year t-1 is 0.900 (0.880). These
findings suggest that there exists a permanent firm effect on technology spending and firm
employment. Moreover, residual employment is correlated with residual technology
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spending in the previous year. The correlation is 0.579 for residual number of employees
and 0.599 for residual staff expense.

After documenting the persistence of technology spending and employment at the
firm-level, the extent to which bank employment is related to the previous-year technology
spending is examined. Table 3-5 reports the results from Equation (3-9). Overall, the results
provide evidence that the firms that invest more in technology have higher employment,
controlling for firm size, growth strategy, financing, performance, fee income ratio, and
financial strength.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3-5 report the univariate regression results. When the
dependent variable is residual number of employees, the estimated coefficient of the
previous-year residual technology spending is positive (0.348) and statistically significant
at the 1% level. Concerning residual staff expense, the estimated coefficient is also positive
(0.390) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The baseline result suggests that banks
with more technology spending employ more staff.

Columns (3) and (4) present the multivariate regression results. Positive relations
between firm-level employment and technology spending are evident. The estimated
coefficients of the previous-year technology spending variable are 0.196 when the
dependent variable is residual number of employees and 0.202 when the dependent variable
is residual staff expense. Both display statistically significant at 1% level. Aside from the
coefficients of the main interests, bank employment is negatively correlated with the
previous-year market-to-book ratio and return on assets and positively correlated with the
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previous-year leverage and non-interest income. The result is also consistent with Van
Reenen (1997), which finds a positive and significant effect of innovations on employment
based on the British firm-level panel data. 27

The positive relationship between employment and technology spending holds
consistently throughout the panel, which plots the relationship between residual number of
employees (Figure 3-3) and residual staff expense (Figure 3-3) and residual technology
spending for nine cross-sections, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 20011, 2013, 2015 and
2017.

Next, the extent to which firm-level tasks are related to the previous-year
technology spending is examined, using a similar approach as in the previous analysis.
Table 3-6 reports the results from Equation (3-10). When the dependent variable is residual
loans and deposits, the estimated coefficients of the previous-year technology spending
variable are 0.308 in the univariate regression, as in Column (1), and 0.137 in the
multivariate regression, as in Column (4), with statistical significance at the 1% level.
When the dependent variable is residual value added, the estimated coefficients are 0.301
in the univariate regression and 0.161 in the multivariate regression, and statistically
significant at the 1% level, as in Column (2) and (5). When the dependent variable is

27

The analysis are rerun by measuring size using book asset values rather than the market value of equity,
based on the idea that book asset values reflect both debt plus equity and thus may constitute a better proxy
for the scale of the firm. Results are very similar. See Table A3 of the appendix for details. Moreover, the
analysis are rerun by measuring firm size as total loans and deposits, based on the idea that the basic business
model of banks is to make loans and collect deposits and most of their assets should be in loans and deposits
and thus may constitute a better proxy for the scale of the firm. Similar results are reported, as in Table A4
of the appendix.
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residual number of branches, the estimated coefficients are 0.324 in the univariate
regression and 0.191 in the multivariate regression, and statistically significant at the 1%
level, as in Column (3) and (6). Bank tasks are positively correlated with the previous-year
leverage and negatively correlated with the previous-year market-to-book ratio and return
on assets, non-interest income, and tier 1 capital ratio.

Overall, the regression result shows that bank tasks are positively and significantly
associated with their previous-year technology spending, supporting the notion that
technology adoption creates new tasks (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). The result also
implies that technology help banks to expense their business.

Collectively, the cross-sectional results provide strong evidence that bank
employment and tasks are positively related to their previous-year technology spending,
implying that on average, banks adopting more technology tend to increase their number
of employees and create more tasks.

3.5.3. Robustness Checks

Results for robustness checks are presented in this subsection. It also re-estimates
the main analysis by 1) excluding too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, which are also called
systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 2) keeping observations only in
the post financial crisis period (2010-2017). It is believed that the extremely large banks
operate in very different models and are under different degrees of regulation, supervisions,
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and supports. To ensure those banks do not overly influence the results, the main analysis
excluding banks whose gross total assets exceed $50 billion in 2017 dollars are reestimated. In recent years, the banking industry gradually recovered from the financial
crisis. Banks have adapted well to the new business environment and regulations.28 They
have bolstered their balance sheets and adjusted product portfolios, business strategies, and
even operation models. Thus, the bank production process or business model might be
quite different during the pre- and post- financial crisis period. To ensure the results hold
in the new era, the main analysis is re-estimated in the post-financial crisis period (20102017).

Panel A, Table 3-7 shows the production function parameter estimates. While toobig-to-fail banks excluded, as in Columns (1) to (4), The estimated parameters for
technology capital (0.065 in OP, 0.114 in DPD, 0.064 in FE, and 0.070 in OLS) are largely
consistent with those estimated to the full sample as in Table 3-2, suggesting technology
capital also make meaningful and significant contributions to bank production. Columns
(4) to (8) presents the results for the post financial crisis period. The estimated parameters
for technology input are quantitatively and qualitatively greater than that in Table 2. While
they are 0.085 in OP, 0.112 in DPD, 0.065 in FE, and 0.067 in OLS during the full sample
period , the estimated parameters are now 0.131 in OP, 0.239 in DPD, 0.133 in FE, and
0.107 in OLS in the post financial crisis period, indicating that technology investment
played a greater role and was more beneficial, and that technology capital was highly

28

See a report by Bank for International Settlements, Committee on the Global Financial System on January
2018, “Structural changes in banking after the crisis,” CGFS Papers, No. 60.
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productive in recent years. The consistent results provide further evaluation of the
sensitivity of the estimated parameters, further confirming that substantial increases in
technology investment would be beneficial.

In Panel B, the estimated coefficients confirm a positive relationship between the
technology spending of banks and their employment. When too-big-to-fail banks excluded,
the estimated parameters for lagged technology spending are positive and statistically
significant. They are 0.183 when the dependent variable is number of employees, and 0.190
when the dependent variable is staff expense, as in Column (1) and (2). Both are
statistically significant at the 1% level. In the post financial crisis period, the estimated
parameters for previous-year technology spending are also positive (0.174 and 0.206,
respectively) and statistically significant at the 1% level, as in Column (3) and (4).
Collectively, the main result remains unchanged when TBTF banks are dropped from the
sample and when the post financial crisis period is considered.

3.6.Conclusions

Technology is considered as the lifeblood of banks given the rapid advances of
technology in the banking industry. Meanwhile, many believe that automation and
technology adoption will destroy millions of banking jobs in the future. While the impacts
of technology advances in the banking sector are significant, research in this area is limited.
The paper fills this gap in the literature by examining the benefit of technology capital in
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bank production and the effect of technology spending on bank employment. This is one
of the few empirical studies on the impacts of technology investment on banks.

Based on a sample of U.S. listed commercial banks data from 2000 to 2017, the
research first documents strong growth trends in the technology adoption by banks. The
median bank technology spending increased 250%, while the median loans and deposits
and the number of employees of banks increased by 100% and 70%, respectively, during
the sample period. Then the parameters of a bank value-add production function correcting
for endogenous input choices and the measurement errors to assess the returns that banks
earn from technology capital is estimated. Technology capital is shown as a major
contributing factor to the value-addition generated by banks. On average, technology
inputs accounted for an approximately 12.85% increase in value-added output of U.S.
banks. Interestingly, the contribution of technology input becomes stronger after the
financial crisis, consistent with the notion that technology has played a more important role
in bank production in recent years. These results suggest that technology capital is highly
productive and that substantial increases in technology investment would be beneficial.

As the main functions of banks are to collect deposits and make loans, total loans
& deposits and number of branches are used as proxies for bank tasks. Bank employment
is measured as the number of employees it employs as well as the staff expense it pays.
There is strong evidence that show bank employment and tasks are positively correlated
with lagged technology investment. This is consistent with the task-based framework of
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), which suggest technology can impede employment via its
labor-saving effects and enhance employment via its employment-stimulating effects.
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Collectively, the findings illustrate the importance of technology investment to
bank productivity and employment. This research also opens the door for additional
research on the technology development and adoption of banks and the service industry in
general. When technology investment is a necessity, instead of a strategic choice, for firms
to succeed in future competition, further research that examines in detail the importance of
the components of technology investment concurrent with financing decision, mergers and
acquisitions, and corporate governance, management, operational structure and risk may
yield considerable insights.

References

Acemoglu, D. (2002). Technical change, inequality, and the labor market. Journal of
Economic Literature, 40(1), 7-72.
Acemoglu, D., & Autor, D., (2011). Skills, tasks and technologies: Implications for
employment and earnings. In Handbook of Labor Economics (Vol. 4, pp. 1043-1171).
Elsevier.
Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P., (2017). Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets.
NBER Working Paper No. w23285.
Acemoglu, D. & Restrepo, P. (2018). The race between machine and man: Implications of
technology for growth, factor shares and employment. American Economic Review.
Forthcoming.
Ackerberg, D., Caves, K., & Frazer, G. (2006). Structural identification of production
functions. Working Paper
Ackerberg, D. A., Caves, K., & Frazer, G. (2015). Identification properties of recent
production function estimators. Econometrica, 83(6), 2411-2451.
Bhattacharya, S., & Thakor, A. V. (1993). Contemporary banking theory. Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 3(1), 2-50.

150

Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic
Studies, 58(2), 277-297.
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of
erroR-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.
Autor, D. (2015) “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of
Workplace Automation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3): 3-30.
Baily, M. N. (1986). What has happened to productivity growth?. Science, 234(4775), 443451.
Basu, S., Inklaar, R., & Wang, J. C. (2011). The value of risk: measuring the service output
of US commercial banks. Economic Inquiry, 49(1), 226-245.
Berger, A. N. (2003). The economic effects of technological progress: Evidence from the
banking industry. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35(2), 141-176.
Berger, A. N., & Black, L. K. (2011). Bank size, lending technologies, and small business
finance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(3), 724-735.
Berger, A. N., & Humphrey, D. B. (1992). Measurement and efficiency issues in
commercial banking. In Output measurement in the service sectors (pp. 245-300).
University of Chicago Press.
Berndt, E. R., & Morrison, C. J. (1995). High-tech capital formation and economic
performance in U.S. manufacturing industries an exploratory analysis. Journal of
Econometrics, 65(1), 9-43.
Bessen, J. (2015). Learning by doing: the real connection between innovation, wages, and
wealth. Yale University Press.
Bessen, J. (2017). Automation and jobs: When technology boosts employment. Boston
University. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-09.
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2012). Americans do IT better: US multinationals
and the productivity miracle. The American Economic Review, 102(1), 167-201.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (2000). GMM estimation with persistent panel data: An
application to production functions. Econometric Reviews, 19(3), 321-340.

151

Bogliacino, F., & Pianta, M. (2010). Innovation and employment: a reinvestigation using
revised Pavitt classes. Research Policy, 39(6), 799-809.
Bresnahan, T. F. (1999). Computerisation and wage dispersion: an analytical
reinterpretation. The Economic Journal, 109(456), 390-415.
Bresnahan, T. F., Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. M. (2002). Information technology,
workplace organization, and the demand for skilled labor: Firm-level evidence. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 339-376.
Brynjolfsson,
E.
(1993).
The
productivity
paradox
technology. Communications of the ACM, 36(12), 66-77.

of

information

Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. (1995). Information technology as a factor of production: The
role of differences among firms. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 3(3-4),
183-200.
Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. (1996). Paradox lost? Firm-level evidence on the returns to
information systems spending. Management Science, 42(4), 541-558.
Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. M. (2003). Computing productivity: Firm-level
evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(4), 793-808.
Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2014). The second machine age: Work, progress, and
prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies. WW Norton & Company
Brynjolfsson, E., & Yang, S. (1996). Information technology and productivity: a review of
the literature. Advances in Computers, 43, 179-214.
Charles, K. K., Hurst, E. and Notowidigdo, M. (2013). Manufacturing decline, housing
booms, and non-employment. Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-57.
Dandapani, K., Lawrence, E. R., & Rodriguez, J. (2016). Determinants of transactional
Internet banking. Journal of Financial Services Research, 1-25.
David, H. (2015). Why are there still so many jobs? The history and future of workplace
automation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3), 3-30.
DeCanio, S. J. (2016). Robots and humans–complements or substitutes?. Journal of
Macroeconomics, 49, 280-291.
DeYoung, R. (2010). Banking in the United States. In Oxford Handbook of Banking.
DeYoung, R., Lang, W. W., & Nolle, D. L. (2007). How the Internet affects output and
performance at community banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(4), 1033-1060.

152

Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1986). Banking theory, deposit insurance, and bank
regulation. The Journal of Business, 59(1), 55-68.
Ford, M. (2015). Rise of the robots: Technology and the threat of a jobless future. Basic
Books.
Fort, T. C., Pierce, J. R., & Schott, P. K. (2018). New perspectives on the decline of US
manufacturing employment. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(2), 47-72.
Frame, W. S., & White, L. J. (2014). Technological change, financial innovation, and
diffusion in banking. Prepared for The Oxford Handbook of Banking, 2nd Edition. Allen
N. Berger, Philip Molyneux, and John O.S. Wilson, eds
Frey, C. B., & Osborne, M. A. (2017). The future of employment: how susceptible are jobs
to computerisation?. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114, 254-280.
Gali, J. (1999). Technology, employment, and the business Cycle: Do technology shocks
explain aggregate fluctuations?. American Economic Review, 89(1), 249-271.
Goos, M., Manning, A., & Salomons, A. (2014). Explaining job polarization: Routinebiased technological change and offshoring. American Economic Review, 104(8), 250926.
Greenwood, R., & Scharfstein, D. (2013). The growth of finance. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 27(2), 3-28.
Griliches, Z. (1992). Output measurement in the service sectors. University of Chicago
Press Griliches, Z. (1994). Productivity, R&D, and the data constraint. American
Economic Review, 84(1), 1-23.
Griliches, Z. & Mareisse J. (1998). Production functions: The search for identification. In
Econometrics and Economic Theory in the Twentieth Century: The Ragnar Prisch
Centennial Symposium, 169–203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, B. H. H., & Khan, B. (2003). New Economy Handbook, Chapter Adoption of New
Technology. Elsevier Science
Hamid, S. S., & Verma, S. K. (1994). Regional variations in technological change and in
potential gains from consolidation among US commercial banks. Journal of Regional
Science, 34(3), 411-423.
Hansen, G. D., & Prescott, E. C. (2002). Malthus to solow. The American Economic
Review, 92(4), 1205-1217.

153

Harrison, R., Jaumandreu, J., Mairesse, J., & Peters, B. (2014). Does innovation stimulate
employment? A firm-level analysis using comparable micro-data from four European
countries. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 35, 29-43.
Hernández-Murillo, R., Llobet, G., & Fuentes, R. (2010). Strategic online banking
adoption. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(7), 1650-1663.
Hernando, I., & Nieto, M. J. (2007). Is the Internet delivery channel changing banks’
performance? The case of Spanish banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(4), 10831099.
Hitt, L. M., & Brynjolfsson, E. (1996). Productivity, business performance, and consumer
surplus: three different measures of information technology value. MIS Quarterly, 121142.
Hood, K. K. (2013). Measuring the services of commercial banks in the national income
and products accounts. Survey of Current Business, 93, 8-19.
Hunter, W. C., & Timme, S. G. (1986). Technical change, organizational form, and the
structure of bank production. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18(2), 152-166.
Katz, L. F., & Murphy, K. M. (1992). Changes in relative wages, 1963–1987: supply and
demand factors. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), 35-78.
Lee, J., McCullough, J. S., & Town, R. J. (2013). The impact of health information
technology on hospital productivity. The RAND Journal of Economics, 44(3), 545-568.
Levine, O., & Warusawitharana, M. (2014). Finance and productivity growth: Firm-level
evidence. FEDS Working Paper No. 2014-17.
Levinsohn, J., & Petrin, A. (2003). Estimating production functions using inputs to control
for unobservables. The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 317-341.
Lichtenberg, F. R. (1995). The output contributions of computer equipment and personnel:
A firm-level analysis. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 3(3-4), 201-218.
Loveman, G. W. (1994). An assessment of the productivity impact of information
technologies. Information technology and the corporation of the 1990s: Research studies,
84-110.
Mai, H., Speyer, B., AG, D. B., & Hoffmann, R. (2012). IT in banks: What does it
cost?. Deutsche Bank Research.

154

Manyika, J., Chui, M., Bughin, J., Dobbs, R., Bisson, P., & Marrs, A. (2013). Disruptive
technologies: Advances that will transform life, business, and the global economy (Vol.
180). San Francisco, CA: McKinsey Global Institute.
Marschak, J., & Andrews, W. H. (1944). Random simultaneous equations and the theory
of production. Econometrica, 143-205.
Martín-Oliver, A., Ruano, S., & Salas-Fumás, V. (2013). Why high productivity growth of
banks preceded the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(4), 688-712.
Martín-Oliver, A., & Salas-Fumás, V. (2008). The output and profit contribution of
information technology and advertising investments in banks. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 17(2), 229-255.
Mokyr, J. (1992). The lever of riches: Technological creativity and economic progress.
Oxford University Press.
Morrison, C. J. (1997). Assessing the performance of information technology equipment
in U.S. manufacturing industries. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(3), 471-481.
Olley, G., & Pakers, A. (1996). The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications
equipment industry. Econometrica, 64(6), 1263-1297.
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (2002). Does distance still matter? The information
revolution in small business lending. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2533-2570.
Philippon, T. (2015). Has the US finance industry become less efficient? On the theory and
measurement of financial intermediation. The American Economic Review, 105(4), 14081438.
Philippon, T. (2016). The fintech opportunity. NBER Working Paper (No. w22476).
Prasad, B., & Harker, P. T. (1997). Examining the contribution of information technology
toward productivity and performance in U.S. retail banking. The Wharton Financial
Institutions Center Working Papers, 97(9).
Rifkin, J. (1996). End of work (pp. 141-157). Pacifica Radio Archives.
Saloner, G., & Shepard, A. (1995). Adoption of technologies with network Effects: An
empirical examination of the adoption of teller machines. RAND Journal of
Economics, 26(3), 479-501.
Sealey, C. W., & Lindley, J. T. (1977). Inputs, outputs, and a theory of production and cost
at depository financial institutions. The Journal of Finance, 32(4), 1251-1266.

155

Sichel, D. E., & Oliner, S. D. (2002). Information technology and productivity: Where are
we now and where are we going?. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
FEDS, 29.
Triplett, J. E., & Bosworth, B. P. (2004). Productivity in the US Services Sector: New
Sources of Economic Growth. Brookings Institution Press.
Triplett, J. E., Bosworth, B. P. (2006). “Baumol’s Disease” has been cured: IT and
multifactor productivity in US services industries. The New Economy and Beyond: Past,
Present, and Future. 34-71.
Van Reenen, J. (1997). Employment and technological innovation: Evidence from UK
manufacturing firms. Journal of Labor Economics 15(2), 255-284.
Zeira, J. (1998). Workers, machines, and economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113(4), 1091-1117.

156

Table 3.1. Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of regression variables in the sample. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix.
To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.

Market Capitalization ($M)
Total Asset ($M)
Technology Expense ($M)
Value Added ($M)
Technology Capital - Perpetual ($M)
Conventional Capital - Perpetual ($M)
Technology Capital - Linear ($M)
Conventional Capital - Linear ($M)
Labor ($M)
Investment ($M)
Loans and Deposits($M)
Number of Branches
Number of Employees
Staff Expense ($M)
Market to Book
Leverage
Return on Asset (%)
Non-Interest Income (%)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%)

Mean
1,191.36
7,612.55
15.69
204.96
35.06
7,329.40
33.67
7,329.50
113.31
8.62
9,225.38
57.66
1,648.09
113.31
1.33
11.15
0.82
21.98
12.34

Median
110.16
965.85
1.58
31.19
3.39
954.60
3.31
954.76
14.55
1.59
1,398.39
15.00
264.00
14.55
1.21
10.56
0.95
20.31
11.80
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Std. Dev.
5,096.43
31,864.82
77.16
798.29
176.17
30,366.10
167.82
30,362.91
478.86
28.28
34,817.88
174.34
6,439.30
478.86
0.65
3.99
0.84
12.31
3.57

Min
4.01
97.17
0.12
2.95
0.18
96.58
0.18
96.57
1.25
-1.73
133.47
1.00
26.00
1.25
0.18
4.31
-3.41
-2.24
5.75

Max
43,060.26
268,298.00
653.00
6,839.70
1,516.53
255,449.13
1,429.78
255,380.50
3,937.00
213.00
280,620.00
1,404.00
52,277.00
3,937.00
3.64
32.19
2.47
68.88
26.04

Obs.
7,759
8,030
8,030
8,027
8,030
8,030
8,030
8,030
8,012
6,380
8,030
7,825
7,201
8,012
7,758
8,029
7,324
8,026
7,703

Table 3.2. Production Function Parameter Estimates I
This table reports the results from regressions of the natural log of valued-added as the
dependent variable on the natural log of technology capital, which is estimated using a
perpetual inventory model, conventional capital, and labor. The standard errors are
reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on standard errors are in brackets. Significance
at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. Production
function variables are converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. The estimation
models, which are Olley and Pakes (OP), dynamic panel data (DPD), fixed-effects (FE)
and ordinary least squares (OLS), are indicated in the column header. All variables are
defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer
than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to
avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
OP
DPD
FE
OLS
Technology Capital, 𝑡𝑡

Conventional Capital, 𝑘𝑡

Labor, 𝑙𝑡

𝜌

Common factor
p-value: 𝛽𝑡𝑘 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽𝑙 = 1
Observations
Firms

0.085***
(0.030)
[2.78]
0.621***
(0.038)
[16.25]
0.253***
(0.026)
[9.74]
0.285

0.112***
(0.032)
[3.44]
0.452***
(0.025)
[17.71]
0.428***
(0.033)
[12.90]
0.873***
(0.024)
[37.04]
0.000
0.812

0.065***
(0.009)
[7.25]
0.371***
(0.011)
[34.39]
0.424***
(0.011)
[37.32]
0.630***
(0.009)
[69.06]
0.000
0.000

0.067***
(0.007)
[9.63]
0.449***
(0.010)
[42.90]
0.435***
(0.011)
[41.13]
0.926***
(0.005)
[200.59]
0.000
0.000

6,149
770

7,151
781

7,151
781

7,151
781
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Table 3.3. Production Function Parameter Estimates II
This table reports the results from regressions of the natural log of valued-added as the
dependent variable on the natural log of technology capital, which is estimated using a
linear depreciation schedule, conventional capital, and labor. The standard errors are
reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on standard errors are in brackets. Significance
at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. Production
function variables are converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. The estimation
models, which are Olley and Pakes (OP), dynamic panel data (DPD), fixed-effects (FE)
and ordinary least squares (OLS), are indicated in the column header. All variables are
defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer
than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to
avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
OP
DPD
FE
OLS
Technology Capital, 𝑡𝑡

Conventional Capital, 𝑘𝑡

Labor, 𝑙𝑡

𝜌

Common factor
p-value: 𝛽𝑡𝑘 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽𝑙 = 1
Observations
Firms

0.079***
(0.026)
[3.00]
0.638***
(0.036)
[17.53]
0.253***
(0.027)
[9.47]
0.449

0.083***
(0.025)
[3.32]
0.451***
(0.026)
[17.62]
0.434***
(0.034)
[12.95]
0.869***
(0.024)
[36.96]
0.000
0.320

0.050***
(0.008)
[6.29]
0.373***
(0.011)
[34.48]
0.427***
(0.011)
[37.75]
0.629***
(0.009)
[68.83]
0.000
0.000

0.053***
(0.006)
[8.58]
0.450***
(0.010)
[43.03]
0.440***
(0.011)
[41.70]
0.925***
(0.005)
[200.03]
0.000
0.000

6,149
770

7,151
781

7,151
781

7,151
781
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Table 3.4. Persistence in Technology Spending and Employment
Panel A report results from cross-sectional regressions of the natural log of technology and communication expense of banks as the
dependent variable on the natural log of their market capitalization (Firm Size) for fthe sample years, as well as a pooled panel
regression with year fixed effects. The standard errors are computing using HC3 robust standard errors for the first four columns and
are clustered at the firm-level at the last column. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on standard errors
are in brackets. Panel B reports cross-sectional regression results for persistence in technology spending and employment of banks.
The dependent variables are residual technology spending and employment measures in year t, and the independent variables are
residual technology spending and employment measures in year t-1. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported
in parentheses. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. Panel C reports correlations of residual technology spending
and employment measures. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables
are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years of technology
expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to
avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A. Technology Spending and Firm Size
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Variables
2000
2005
2010
2015
Pooled
Firm Size

Constant

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Year FE

0.828***
(0.027)
[31.10]
-3.576***
(0.126)
[-28.28]

0.855***
(0.027)
[31.52]
-4.035***
(0.140)
[-28.91]

0.658***
(0.029)
[22.35]
-2.213***
(0.138)
[-16.03]

0.782***
(0.024)
[32.26]
-3.053***
(0.130)
[-23.41]

0.767***
(0.022)
[35.14]
-3.294***
(0.097)
[-34.13]

301
301
0.818
NO

426
426
0.800
NO

474
474
0.655
NO

500
500
0.777
NO

7,758
780
0.760
YES
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Panel B. Persistence in Technology Spending and Employment
(1)
Residual Technology
Variables
Spending
Residual Technology Spending, t-1

(2)
Residual Number of
Employees

0.901***
(0.007)
[126.17]

Residual Staff Expense, t-1

Observations
Firms
R-squared

Residual Staff Expense

0.905***
(0.007)
[135.59]

Residual Number of Employees, t-1

Constant

(3)

0.026***
(0.004)
[6.87]

0.020***
(0.003)
[6.28]

0.884***
(0.008)
[114.41]
0.023***
(0.003)
[7.19]

6,903
780
0.823

6,213
740
0.809

6,885
780
0.789
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Variables

Residual Technology Spending, t

Panel C. Residual Correlations
Residual
Residual
Residual
Residual
Technolog
Technolog
Number of Number of
y
y
Employees, Employees,
Spending,
Spending, t
t
t-1
t-1
1

Residual
Staff
Expense, t

Residual Technology Spending, t-1

0.908***

1

Residual Number of Employees, t

0.648***

0.579***

1

Residual Number of Employees, t-1

0.584***

0.644***

0.900***

1

Residual Staff Expense, t

0.672***

0.599***

0.898***

0.808***

1

Residual Staff Expense, t-1

0.599***

0.671***

0.798***

0.897***

0.888***
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Residual
Staff
Expense, t1

1

Table 3.5. Employment and Technology Spending
This table reports the results from panel regressions where the dependent variables are
residual of bank employment and the independent variables are their previous-year residual
technology spending as well as other firm characteristics. The coefficients on variables of
years are suppressed from reporting. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and
reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. All
variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms
with fewer than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information
are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions
to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Number of
Staff
Number of
Staff
Variables
Employees
Expense
Employees
Expense
Technology Spending, t-1

0.348***
(0.017)
[19.93]

0.380***
(0.018)
[21.28]

-0.029
(0.021)
[-1.42]

0.196***
(0.023)
[8.49]
-0.196***
(0.022)
[-9.00]
0.015***
(0.004)
[4.19]
-6.813***
(1.180)
[-5.77]
0.499***
(0.108)
[4.63]
-0.536*
(0.310)
[-1.73]
0.095
(0.072)
[1.31]

0.202***
(0.021)
[9.65]
-0.227***
(0.021)
[-10.73]
0.019***
(0.003)
[5.70]
-7.910***
(1.212)
[-6.53]
0.636***
(0.107)
[5.94]
-0.267
(0.287)
[-0.93]
0.042
(0.069)
[0.61]

-0.036*
(0.022)
[-1.65]
6,302
742
0.233
YES
YES
YES

6,892
780
0.253
YES
YES
YES

5,570
708
0.318
YES
YES
YES

6,078
743
0.364
YES
YES
YES

Market to Book, t-1

Leverage, t-1

Return on Assets, t-1

Non-Interest Income, t-1

Tier 1 Capital Ratio, t-1

Constant

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Size t Effects
Firm FE
Year FE
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Table 3.6. Tasks and Technology Spending
This table reports the results from panel regressions where the dependent variables are the
residual of bank tasks and the independent variables are their previous-year residual
technology spending as well as other firm characteristics. The coefficients on variables of
years are suppressed from reporting. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and
reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. All
variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms
with fewer than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information
are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions
to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Loans &
Value
No. of
Loans &
Value
No. of
Variables
Deposits
Added Branches Deposits
Added Branches
Technology Spending, t-1

Market to Book, t-1

Leverage, t-1

Return on Assets, t-1

Non-Interest Income, t-1

Tier 1 Capital Ratio, t-1

Constant

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Size t Effects
Firm FE
Year FE

0.308*** 0.301*** 0.324*** 0.137***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.017)
(0.019)
[19.77]
[18.90]
[18.74]
[7.19]
-0.230***
(0.019)
[-12.40]
0.020***
(0.003)
[5.83]
-5.412***
(1.105)
[-4.90]
-0.208**
(0.087)
[-2.39]
-1.313***
(0.277)
[-4.75]
-0.034*
-0.023
-0.023
0.284***
(0.018)
(0.017)
(0.022)
(0.069)
[-1.87]
[-1.35]
[-1.04]
[4.11]
6,903
780
0.203
YES
YES
YES

6,903
780
0.196
YES
YES
YES
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6,753
774
0.228
YES
YES
YES

6,086
743
0.323
YES
YES
YES

0.161***
(0.020)
[7.92]
-0.199***
(0.019)
[-10.30]
0.019***
(0.004)
[5.12]
-3.430***
(1.153)
[-2.97]
-0.307***
(0.090)
[-3.40]
-1.054***
(0.303)
[-3.48]
0.243***
(0.072)
[3.37]

0.191***
(0.022)
[8.56]
-0.171***
(0.021)
[-8.04]
0.014***
(0.003)
[4.96]
-6.028***
(1.084)
[-5.56]
-0.046
(0.100)
[-0.46]
-0.337
(0.285)
[-1.18]
0.134**
(0.061)
[2.19]

6,086
743
0.287
YES
YES
YES

5,974
737
0.303
YES
YES
YES

Table 3.7. Robustness Checks
This table presents the results of the robustness checks. Panel A reports the production function parameter estimates with technology
capital estimated using a perpetual inventory model and production variables converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator on
the too-big-to-fail banks excluded subsample and on the post financial crisis period (2010-2017) subsample. The estimation models,
which are Olley and Pakes (OP), dynamic panel data (DPD), fixed-effects (FE) and ordinary least squares (OLS), are indicated in the
column header. Panel B reports the results from panel regressions of employment and tasks on technology spending on the too-bigto-fail banks excluded subsample and on the post financial crisis period (2010-2017) subsample. The dependent variables are
indicated in the column header. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on
robust standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All
variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years of
technology expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the
distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.

Variables
Technology Capital, 𝑡𝑡
Conventional Capital, 𝑘𝑡
Labor, 𝑙𝑡
𝜌

Panel A. Production Function Parameter Estimates
Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Excluded
Post Financial Crisis Period (2010-2017)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
OP
DPD
FE
OLS
OP
DPD
FE
OLS
0.065**
(0.032)
[2.05]
0.600***
(0.048)
[12.61]
0.264***
(0.024)
[11.08]
-

0.114***
(0.033)
[3.47]
0.443***
(0.025)
[17.56]
0.435***
(0.034)
[12.96]
0.872***
(0.023)
[37.60]

0.064***
(0.009)
[7.07]
0.369***
(0.011)
[33.71]
0.425***
(0.012)
[36.84]
0.630***
(0.009)
[67.56]
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0.070*** 0.131*** 0.239*** 0.133*** 0.107***
(0.007)
(0.044)
(0.060)
(0.014)
(0.010)
[9.94]
[2.99]
[4.00]
[9.73]
[11.00]
0.443*** 0.631*** 0.357*** 0.307*** 0.422***
(0.011)
(0.052)
(0.042)
(0.015)
(0.014)
[41.96]
[12.11]
[8.45]
[20.80]
[29.99]
0.440*** 0.194*** 0.461*** 0.394*** 0.463***
(0.011)
(0.032)
(0.060)
(0.017)
(0.015)
[41.18]
[6.12]
[7.69]
[23.10]
[29.92]
0.915***
0.863*** 0.458*** 0.926***
(0.005)
(0.053)
(0.014)
(0.006)
[187.13]
[16.41]
[32.13] [151.80]

Common factor
p-value: 𝛽𝑡𝑘 + 𝛽𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽𝑙 = 1

0.098

0.000
0.809

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000

0.353

0.000
0.394

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.593

Observations
Firms

6,013
749

6,922
758

6,922
758

6,922
758

3,711
595

3,326
582

3,326
582

3,326
582

Variables
Technology Spending, t-1

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Controls
Size t Effects
Firm FE
Year FE

Panel B. Employment and Technology Spending
Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Excluded
Post Financial Crisis Period (2010-2017)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Number of
Number of
Staff Expense
Staff Expense
Employees
Employees
0.183***
(0.023)
[7.86]

0.190***
(0.021)
[8.97]

0.174***
(0.030)
[5.82]

0.206***
(0.029)
[7.18]

5,393
687
0.325
YES
YES
YES
YES

5,899
722
0.368
YES
YES
YES
YES

2,585
490
0.200
YES
YES
YES
YES

2,947
543
0.237
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Figure 3.1. Technology Spending Trends
This figure illustrates the trends (medians) of technology and communication expense of
banks in the sample during 2000-2017. Technology and communication expense is
converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. All variables are defined in Table A1 in
the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years
of technology expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme
observation
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Figure 3.2. Employment and Technology Spending Over Time
This figure illustrates the evolution of the median of technology and communication
expense, the number of employees and staff expense of banks in the sample during 20002017. All values are normalized to equal one in the year 2000. Monetary variables are
converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. All variables are defined in Table A1 in
the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years
of technology expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme
observations.
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Figure 3.3. Number of Employees and Technology Spending in the Cross-Sections
This figure plots residual number of employees on the vertical axis against residual
technology spending on the horizontal axis for nine sample years. The t-statistics are
calculated using HC3-robust standard errors with an adjustment to account for the degrees
of freedom absorbed by computing residuals. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the
appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years of
technology expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme
observations.
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Figure 3.4. Staff Expense and Technology Spending in the Cross-Sections
This figure plots residual staff expense on the vertical axis against residual technology
spending on the horizontal axis for nine sample years. The t-statistics are calculated using
HC3-robust standard errors with an adjustment to account for the degrees of freedom
absorbed by computing residuals. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix.
To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years of technology
expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the
1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
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Appendix
Table A1. Definition of Variables
Variable
Abb.
Technology
Technology
and
Expense or
Communicati Technology
on Expense
Spending

ValuedAdded
Technology
Capital

Valued-added

Conventional
Capital
Labor

Conventional
capital
Labor

Investment
Expenditure

Investment

Number of
Automatic
Teller
Machines
Residual

ATMs

Number of
Employees
Staff Expense
Total Loans
and Deposits
Number of
Branches

Number of
Employees
Staff Expense
Loans and
Deposits
Number of
Branches

Technology
capital

Res

Definition
Expenses paid for communications, data processing
and technology such as computers, software,
information systems and telecommunications, as
defined by S&P Global Market Intelligence (SNL
Financial). (SNL Keyfield: 132659,
tech_comm_exp)
Net interest income (Compustat: niint)
Technology capital is constructed using a perpetual
inventory model with a depreciation rate of 35% or a
four-year linear depreciation schedule.
Total assets (Compustat: at) minus intangible assets
(Compustat: intan) and technology capital
Staff expense (Compustat: xlr). It represents salaries,
wages, pension costs, profit sharing and incentive
compensation, payroll taxes, and other employee
benefits.
Capital expenditure (Compustat: capx) minus sale of
property (Compustat: sppe). Sppe is set to zero if
missing.
The number of automatic teller machines operated.
[SNL Keyfield: 131225, num_atms]

Residuals obtained from the regression model:
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 .Where
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 are the natural log of technology and
communication expense, employment measures,
tasks measures, respectively, and 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the
natural log of market capitalization at the end of the
fiscal year.
The number of people employed by the company
(Compustat: emp)
Staff expense of the company (Compustat: xlr)
The sum of total loans (Compustat: lntal) and total
deposits (Compustat: dptc).
For banks and thrifts, the number of offices a
company operates within the United States, updated
for completed M&A activity. A branch/office is any
location, or facility, of a financial institution,
including its main office, where deposit accounts are
opened, deposits are accepted, checks paid, and
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Firm Size

Firm Size

Market to
Book

Market to
Book

Leverage

Leverage

Return on
Assets

ROA

Non-Interest
Income

Non-Interest
Income

Tier 1 Capital
Ratio
Too-big-tofail banks

Tier 1 Capital
Ratio
TBTF Banks

loans granted. A branch does not include Automated
Teller Machines (ATM), Consumer Credit Offices,
Contractual Offices, Customer Bank Communication
Terminals (CBCT), Electronic Fund Transfer Units
(EFTU), and Loan Production Offices. As a result,
this figure may differ from what a company reports
in its earnings releases or SEC filings. For Specialty
Lenders, it is the number of retail branch offices.
[SNL KeyField: 131227, total_numfices]
The natural log of market capitalization at the end of
the fiscal year (Compustat: prcc_f*csho).
The ratio of the market capitalization of equity
(Compustat: prcc_f*csho) to book value of equity
(Compustat: ceq+txdb). txdb is set to zero if missing.
The ratio of total assets (Compustat: at) to book
value of equity (Compustat: ceq+txdb). Txdb is set
to zero if missing.
Earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat: ib)
plus depreciation and amortization (Compustat: dp)
to total assets (Compustat: at).
The ratio of banks’ Non-Interest Income
(Compustat: tnii) to the sum of Net Interest Income
(Compustat: niint) and Non-Interest Income
(Compustat: tnii)
Risk-adjusted capital ratio – Tier1 (Compustat:
capr1)
Banks whose gross total assets exceed $50 billion in
2017 dollars. Gross total assets are the sum of total
assets (Compustat: at) and provision for loan losses
(Compustat: pclc). pclc is set to zero if missing.

172

Table A2. Residual Employment and Tasks
This table report results from cross-sectional regressions of bank employment and tasks, respectively, as the dependent variable on
the natural log of their market capitalization (Firm Size) for fthe sample years, as well as a pooled panel regression with year fixed
effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics are in brackets. The standard errors are computing using HC3
robust standard errors for the fthe sample years and are clustered at the firm-level at the pooled panel regressions. Significance at the
1%, 5% or 10% levels is shown with 3, 2, or 1 asterisks, respectively. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To
reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information are
excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A. Employment and Firm Size
Number of Employees
Staff Expense
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Variables
2000
2005
2010
2015
Pooled
2000
2005
2010
2015
Pooled
Firm Size

Constant

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Year FE

0.788*** 0.858*** 0.636*** 0.764*** 0.758*** 0.818***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024)
(0.022) (0.015) (0.018)
[44.21] [53.40] [26.73] [35.14] [50.95] [45.09]
2.080*** 1.229*** 2.867*** 1.743*** 2.220*** -1.186***
(0.092) (0.088) (0.119)
(0.121) (0.071) (0.093)
[22.57] [13.97] [24.09] [14.40] [31.04] [-12.71]
277
277
0.889
NO

404
404
0.885
NO

438
438
0.730
NO

425
425
0.847
NO

7,052
747
0.827
YES
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300
300
0.900
NO

0.899***
(0.016)
[56.34]
-1.882***
(0.086)
[-21.86]
425
425
0.913
NO

0.684*** 0.818*** 0.799***
(0.023) (0.017)
(0.014)
[30.10] [48.33] [55.90]
-0.132 -1.121*** -1.097***
(0.112) (0.092)
(0.069)
[-1.18] [-12.18] [-15.87]
474
474
0.768
NO

499
499
0.893
NO

7,744
780
0.858
YES

Variables

Firm Size

Constant

Panel B. Tasks and Firm Size
Loans and Deposits
Value Added
Number of Branches
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Pool
Pool
Pool
2000 2005 2010 2015
2000 2005 2010 2015
2000 2005 2010 2015
ed
ed
ed
0.800* 0.881* 0.665* 0.847* 0.793* 0.812* 0.895* 0.687* 0.834* 0.805* 0.655* 0.727* 0.554* 0.680* 0.657*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
(0.015)(0.011)(0.020)(0.013)(0.010)(0.016)(0.012)(0.019)(0.012)(0.010)(0.047)(0.024)(0.023)(0.024)(0.017)
[52.10][80.21][33.10][65.76][75.74][50.08][75.53][36.62][67.57][78.02][14.08][29.82][23.60][28.69][39.31]
3.481* 2.821* 4.540* 3.326* 3.511*
0.660*
0.499*
0.288* 1.037*
0.481* 0.257* -0.247 0.941*
0.564* 0.255*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
(0.074)(0.059)(0.102)(0.073)(0.051)(0.075)(0.063)(0.097)(0.070)(0.050)(0.189)(0.122)(0.114)(0.124)(0.079)
[[47.23][47.44][44.43][45.43][68.44][-3.81]
[6.84] [-6.89] [-5.18] [-1.31] [-7.69] [4.39] [-4.55] [-3.22]
16.46]

Observations

301

426

474

Firms

301
0.92
9
NO

426
0.95
0
NO

474
0.78
2
NO

R-squared
Year FE

7,75
301
8
500 780 301
0.94 0.89 0.93
1
3
7
NO YES NO
500

426

474

426
0.95
5
NO

474
0.80
7
NO
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7,75
283
7
500 780 283
0.93 0.90 0.68
9
2
6
NO YES NO
500

417

468

417
0.72
4
NO

468
0.60
5
NO

7,57
9
489 775
0.69 0.68
5
6
NO YES
489

Table A3. Employment and Technology Spending - Size as Assets
Panel A report results from cross-sectional regressions of the natural log of technology and
communication expense of banks as the dependent variable on the natural log of their total
assets (Firm Size) for fthe sample years, as well as a pooled panel regression with year
fixed effects. The standard errors are computing using HC3 robust standard errors for the
first four columns and are clustered at the firm-level at the last column. The standard errors
are reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on standard errors are in brackets. Panel B
reports the results from panel regressions where the dependent variables are residual of
bank employment and the independent variables are their previous-year residual
technology spending as well as other firm characteristics. The coefficients on variables of
years are suppressed from reporting. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and
reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. All
variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms
with fewer than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information
are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions
to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A. Technology Spending and Firm Size
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Variables
2000
2005
2010
2015
Pooled
Firm Size

Constant

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Year FE

0.828***
(0.027)
[31.10]
-3.576***
(0.126)
[-28.28]

0.855***
(0.027)
[31.52]
-4.035***
(0.140)
[-28.91]

0.658***
(0.029)
[22.35]
-2.213***
(0.138)
[-16.03]

0.782***
(0.024)
[32.26]
-3.053***
(0.130)
[-23.41]

0.767***
(0.022)
[35.14]
-3.294***
(0.097)
[-34.13]

301
301
0.818
NO

426
426
0.800
NO

474
474
0.655
NO

500
500
0.777
NO

7,758
780
0.760
YES
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Variables

Panel B. Firm Size Employment and Technology Spending
(1)
(2)
(3)
Number of
Staff
Number of
Employees
Expense
Employees

Technology Spending, t-1

0.124***
(0.017)
[7.32]

0.123***
(0.014)
[8.85]

0.002
(0.013)
[0.13]

0.109***
(0.018)
[5.95]
-0.008
(0.009)
[-0.83]
-0.002
(0.002)
[-0.83]
-1.647***
(0.436)
[-3.78]
0.592***
(0.086)
[6.85]
0.060
(0.212)
[0.28]
-0.072
(0.051)
[-1.40]

0.110***
(0.015)
[7.36]
-0.006
(0.009)
[-0.61]
-0.001
(0.002)
[-0.66]
-1.859***
(0.471)
[-3.95]
0.623***
(0.085)
[7.31]
0.272
(0.194)
[1.40]
-0.097**
(0.043)
[-2.26]

-0.004
(0.014)
[-0.27]
6,526
745
0.069
YES
YES
YES

7,162
781
0.064
YES
YES
YES

5,573
708
0.135
YES
YES
YES

6,084
743
0.141
YES
YES
YES

Market to Book, t-1

Leverage, t-1

Return on Assets, t-1

Non-Interest Income, t-1

Tier 1 Capital Ratio, t-1

Constant

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Size t Effects
Firm FE
Year FE
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(4)
Staff
Expense

Table A4. Employment and Technology Spending - Size as Total Loans and Deposits
Panel A report results from cross-sectional regressions of the natural log of technology and
communication expense of banks as the dependent variable on the natural log of their total
loans and deposits (Firm Size) for fthe sample years, as well as a pooled panel regression
with year fixed effects. The standard errors are computing using HC3 robust standard errors
for the first four columns and are clustered at the firm-level at the last column. The standard
errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on standard errors are in brackets. Panel
B reports the results from panel regressions where the dependent variables are residual of
bank employment and the independent variables are their previous-year residual
technology spending as well as other firm characteristics. The coefficients on variables of
years are suppressed from reporting. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and
reported in parentheses. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in brackets. All
variables are defined in Table A1 in the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms
with fewer than five consecutive years of technology expense and total assets information
are excluded. Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions
to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Panel A. Technology Spending and Firm Size
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Variables
2000
2005
2010
2015
Pooled
Firm Size

Constant

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Year FE

1.029***
(0.023)
[45.57]
-7.131***
(0.157)
[-45.32]

0.966***
(0.026)
[36.98]
-6.739***
(0.186)
[-36.22]

0.988***
(0.023)
[43.23]
-6.701***
(0.170)
[-39.39]

0.930***
(0.023)
[41.19]
-6.173***
(0.175)
[-35.31]

0.963***
(0.019)
[49.52]
-6.657***
(0.130)
[-51.27]

318
318
0.881
NO

447
447
0.835
NO

491
491
0.834
NO

500
500
0.837
NO

8,030
781
0.845
YES

177

Variables

Panel B. Firm Size Employment and Technology Spending
(1)
(2)
(3)
Number of
Number of
Staff Expense
Employees
Employees

Technology Spending, t-1

0.134***
(0.016)
[8.36]

0.136***
(0.014)
[9.82]

-0.012
(0.014)
[-0.83]

-0.009
(0.014)
[-0.66]

0.112***
(0.014)
[8.04]
-0.014
(0.009)
[-1.58]
0.001
(0.001)
[0.59]
-2.216***
(0.505)
[-4.39]
0.749***
(0.089)
[8.38]
0.850***
(0.175)
[4.84]
-0.203***
(0.035)
[-5.73]

6,526
745
0.076
YES
YES
YES

7,162
781
0.069
YES
YES
YES

5,573
708
0.167
YES
YES
YES

6,084
743
0.180
YES
YES
YES

Leverage, t-1

Return on Assets, t-1

Non-Interest Income, t-1

Tier 1 Capital Ratio, t-1

Observations
Firms
R-squared
Size t Effects
Firm FE
Year FE
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Staff Expense

0.110***
(0.016)
[6.69]
-0.010
(0.009)
[-1.04]
0.000
(0.001)
[0.18]
-2.073***
(0.478)
[-4.34]
0.699***
(0.088)
[7.90]
0.614***
(0.178)
[3.45]
-0.177***
(0.038)
[-4.72]

Market to Book, t-1

Constant

(4)

Figure B1. Technology Spending Trends
This figure illustrates the trends (medians) of technology and communication expense of
banks in the sample that record technology and communication expense in each year during
2000-2017. There is a total of 97 firms. Technology and communication expense is
converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. All variables are defined in Table A1 in
the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years
of technology expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme
observation
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Figure B2. Employment and Technology Spending Over Time
This figure illustrates the evolution of the median of technology and communication
expense, the number of employees and staff expense of banks in the sample that record
technology and communication expense in each year during 2000-2017. There is a total of
97 firms. All values are normalized to equal one in the year 2000. Monetary variables are
converted to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator. All variables are defined in Table A1 in
the appendix. To reduce noises in the analysis, firms with fewer than five consecutive years
of technology expense and total assets information are excluded. Variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails of the distributions to avoid the influence of extreme
observations.
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